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1I N MARIA EDGEWORTH’S novel Helen (1837), the eponymous heroine attends a dinner party given by the family that she is staying with (Gen-eral Davenant, Lady Davenant, and their daughter Cecilia):
One day at dinner, Helen was seated between the general and a fine 
young guardsman, who . . . had made some demonstrations of a desire 
to attract her. He was piqued when . .  . he observed that her attention 
was distracted by a gentleman opposite . . . Helen looked first at Cecilia, 
who, as she saw, heard what was said [about the death of a former lover] 
with perfect composure; and then [looked] at Lady Davenant, who had 
meantime glanced imperceptibly at her daughter [i.e., Cecilia], and then 
upon Helen, whose eyes she met—and Helen coloured merely from 
association  .  .  .  Helen had left the guardsman in the midst of his sen-
tence, discomforted, and his eyes were now upon her; and in confusion 
she turned from him, and there were the general’s eyes . . . The general 
now exerted himself to occupy the guardsman in a conversation about 
promotion, and drew all observation from Helen. Yet not the slightest 
indication of having seen, heard, or understood, appeared in his coun-
tenance  .  .  .  Of one point Helen was however intuitively certain, that 
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true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.
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he had noticed that confusion which he had so ably, so coolly covered. 
One ingenuous look from her thanked him, and his look in return was 
most gratifying; she could not tell how it was, but it appeared more as if 
he understood and liked her than any look she had ever seen from him 
before. They were both more at their ease. (33)
 Notice how much of the cognitive functioning described in this passage 
is being shared between these characters without the use of words. Although 
people are, in fact, speaking, it is only social chitchat. As the emboldened 
phrases show, the real communication is going on by means of looks, body 
language, and gestures. Five characters—Helen, the guardsman, Cecilia, 
Lady Davenant, and the general—are all engaging in the most complex and 
subtle mind reading, and all without saying a single word. These are social 
minds in action because they are public, embodied, and so available to each 
other without the need for speech. Helen’s mind is visible: the guardsman 
can see that she is distracted and the general can see that she is discomforted. 
In turn, Helen can see the workings of Cecilia’s and Lady Davenant’s minds: 
Cecilia’s determination not to show her emotions and Lady Davenant’s con-
cern for her daughter. In particular, Helen acquires a lot of knowledge of the 
general’s mind: she knows that he knows that she needs help; and she also 
knows that he understands and likes her.
 It is a cliché of literary studies that, whereas novels can give us direct 
access to the minds of characters, by contrast, in reality, we can never really 
know what other people are thinking. This is the sort of thing that sounds 
true while it is being said within that context, but, in other contexts, can 
sound like complete nonsense. To believe it requires a considerable degree 
of cognitive dissonance in order to contradict the weight of evidence of our 
everyday experience. All of us, every day, know for a lot of the time what 
other people are thinking. This is especially true of our loved ones, close 
friends, family, and work colleagues. It is also true of our encounters with 
total strangers. How could it be possible for two people to hold a coherent 
conversation without at least some knowledge of the other person’s thought 
processes? I am not saying that we always know all of what other people are 
thinking. That would be as silly as the cliché that we can never really know. 
Sometimes, as in the quote with which I began, we know what other people 
are thinking without them having to say anything; at other times we do not 
know what they are thinking even though they are trying to tell us. Some-
times we have secret thoughts that no one else will ever know about; at other 
times, other people, especially those close to us, will know better than we do 
what we are thinking.
 The passage just quoted is an example of the externalist perspective. For 
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a contrasting illustration of the internalist perspective (the theoretical back-
ground to both of these terms is explained at the beginning of chapter 2), 
consider the scene in Walter Scott’s Waverley (1814) in which Waverley is 
interviewed by a local laird, together with a clergyman, about his supposed 
Jacobite activities.
When Waverley retired, the laird and clergyman sat down in silence to 
their evening meal . . . Each mused over the particulars of the examina-
tion, and each viewed it through the medium of his own feelings . . . The 
wide difference of their habit and education often occasioned a great 
discrepancy in their respective deductions from admitted premises. 
(250–51)
As a presentation of mental functioning, what is striking about this passage 
is its emphasis on the differences between the two minds. It presents char-
acters who have completely opposed ways of thinking and so widely diver-
gent views on another mind: Waverley’s. The ensuing discussion makes it 
clear that the laird is of a dour and suspicious cast of mind and so sees the 
young man as a violent and dangerous rebel; the clergyman is more trusting 
and optimistic by nature and so regards him (more accurately, as it turns 
out) as a decent young innocent abroad. In effect, they are constructing 
utterly different minds for the same character. Significantly, the two men 
have great difficulty in understanding each other’s thought processes. There 
is no meeting of minds. This is a picture of consciousness as private, solitary, 
and inaccessible to others. The emphasis is on the gaps between people, the 
difficulties that we all sometimes experience in understanding the thought 
processes of others, the barriers that make it difficult for people to think 
together or in cooperation with each other.
 To take us back to the externalist perspective, have a look now at these 
three examples. In Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit (1857), the villain, Blandois, 
arrives one evening at a French inn. As he walks in, the narrator remarks, 
“There had been that momentary interruption of the talk about the stove, 
and that temporary inattention to and distraction from one another, which 
is usually inseparable in such a company from the arrival of a stranger” 
(167–68). Later in the same novel, Mr Meagles admits to Arthur Clennam 
that “we do, in families, magnify our troubles and make mountains of our 
molehills in a way that is calculated to be rather trying to people who look 
on—to mere outsiders” (370). Mr Meagles also explains that “There is one of 
those odd impressions in my house, which do mysteriously get into houses 
sometimes, which nobody seems to have picked up in a distinct form from 
anybody, and yet which everybody seems to have got hold of loosely from 
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somebody and let go again, that she [Miss Wade] lives, or was living [near 
Park Lane]” (373).
 Like the passage from Helen, these three statements are examples of the 
workings of social minds in the novel. Specifically, they describe intermental 
thought, which is joint, group, shared, or collective thought, as opposed to 
intramental, or private, individual thought. (Again, more background on 
this concept is given in the next chapter.) The minds of the group of people 
in the inn share a sense of intrusion. And, as the narrator points out, this 
shared sense of discomfort at the arrival of a stranger is common in such 
situations. Mr Meagles makes a general point about how families typically 
behave (making mountains out of molehills) that is also true of his family. 
Mr Meagles, again, describes the intermental functioning of his family (a 
shared knowledge of Miss Wade’s whereabouts but no knowledge of how 
this information was acquired) and points out that this sort of thought is 
typical of families. In all three cases, minds are working in the same way, 
and the thought being described here is, to some extent, collective. There 
is one important difference between, on the one hand, the Helen quote and 
the quote about the French inn, and, on the other hand, the two statements 
about the Meagles family. The first two are descriptions of social minds by 
heterodiegetic (or third-person) narrators. The other two are claims by a 
particular character, Mr Meagles, about the group mind of which he is a 
part.
 This last-mentioned relationship—the one between intra- and inter-
mental activity, between social minds and individual minds, between the 
internalist and the externalist perspectives—is a complex and fascinating 
one. It is central to narrative fiction, and it is the subject of this book. My 
purpose is to put statements such as those discussed above, and the many 
other examples presented in later chapters, at the heart of narrative theory. 
Fictional social minds are not of marginal interest; they are central to our 
understanding of fictional storyworlds. This is because real social minds are 
central to our understanding of, and ability to operate in, the actual world. 
My thesis is that social minds are possible because much of our thought is 
visible, which is why Oscar Wilde said that it is only shallow people who do 
not judge by appearances, and that the true mystery of the world is the vis-
ible, not the invisible.
 A fierce debate took place within the nineteenth-century novel in par-
ticular on the nature of social minds. It had two sides. One was epistemo-
logical: To what extent is it possible to have knowledge of the workings of 
other minds? The other side of the debate was ethical: To what purposes 
should our knowledge of other minds be put? The epistemological dispute 
was surprisingly explicit; narrators and characters frequently refer to it. The 
Cognitive Approaches  | 5
ethical side was also ever present; there are many occasions on which sharp 
and painful moral dilemmas arise from the control that characters try to 
exercise over other minds. In literary studies it is usually unwise to specify 
the precise point at which a historical phenomenon begins. Your readers 
will then feel challenged to find earlier examples and you are left looking 
rather underread. Nevertheless, in the interests of scholarship, I am going 
to take that risk and propose that this debate began in 1816 on Box Hill, 
the famous beauty spot in Surrey that is the site of the picnic outing in Jane 
Austen’s Emma (1816). You may remember that the expedition party never 
quite gels. “There seemed a principle of separation” (361) and “a want of 
union” (361). In order to rouse the party and provoke some witty repartee, 
to reduce the separation and increase the union, Frank Churchill exclaims, 
“I am ordered by Miss Woodhouse . . . to say, that she desires to know what 
you are all thinking of ” (363). Mr Knightley sees that she is playing with fire 
and cautions her by asking, “Is Miss Woodhouse sure that she would like to 
hear what we are all thinking of?” (363). Emma ignores the warning, plows 
on with her conceit, inadvertently humiliates Miss Bates, and later incurs 
Mr Knightley’s stinging rebuke. She is made to feel painfully aware of the 
emotional consequences of the pursuit of knowledge about other minds.
 First, though, before going into more detail about social minds in the 
next chapter, I would like to say a little about the context within which this 
book has been written. This is the cognitive turn in the humanities, or, more 
specifically, what has come to be known as cognitive approaches to litera-
ture. I will then recap on some of the concepts that were introduced in my 
first book, Fictional Minds (2004), because they recur throughout this one, 
before explaining the ways in which the two books differ from, but are also 
complementary to, each other. Next, I will briefly introduce the concept of 
attribution theory. After discussing the issue of characterization theory and, 
in particular, the key notion of dispositions, this chapter ends with a brief 
outline of the structure of the rest of the book.
COGNITIVE APPROACHES
The background to this study is the widespread cognitive turn in litera-
ture studies in the 1990s that followed the linguistic turn of the 1960s and 
1970s. (I cannot guess what the next turn will be, but, as part of the cognitive 
turn myself, I am in no hurry for it.) As I see it, there are three important 
new developments in research in my field: cognitive narratology, cognitive 
approaches to literature, and cognitive poetics. At one point, there seemed 
to be a danger that a researcher in one of these areas might not be aware 
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of similar work being done by people in the others. However, thanks to the 
invaluable efforts of scholars such as Monika Fludernik, David Herman, and 
Lisa Zunshine, this danger has been averted. Many lines of communication 
are now open. The barriers are now breaking down to the extent that the 
boundaries between the three areas are becoming rather blurred. Neverthe-
less, their outlines can still be discerned.
 The first, cognitive narratology, has applied the findings of the various 
cognitive sciences, for example the insights of philosophers of mind, psy-
chologists, and cognitive scientists such as Antonio Damasio, Daniel Den-
nett, and Steven Pinker, to a number of different aspects of the narrative 
comprehension process. Notable examples of the success of this approach 
include Towards a “Natural” Narratology (1996) by Monika Fludernik, David 
Herman’s Story Logic (2002), and Marie-Laure Ryan’s Possible Worlds, Artifi-
cial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory (1991). In fact, David Herman (2003b) 
argues that, as narrative is a key cognitive tool and a central and indispensable 
way of making sense of the world, the discipline of narratology itself should 
be considered as one of the cognitive sciences. As Herman’s claim implies, 
cognitive narratology takes narrative in general as its object of study—it is 
as interested in film as in print, as interested in nonfiction as in fiction—but 
most of its work up to this point has focused on novels and short stories. The 
second new development, cognitive approaches to literature, differs from 
the first in that it has emerged from literary criticism generally, rather than 
from narrative theory, and has drama and poetry as its subject matter too. 
One of its particular areas of interest is the analysis of metaphor. Important 
works in this field include Dreaming by the Book (1999) by Elaine Scarry, 
Mark Turner’s Reading Minds (1991), and Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fic-
tion (2006). The third field, cognitive poetics, is a type of applied linguistics 
that, like the previous area, is concerned with poetry and drama as well as 
the novel and also with the role of metaphor. It differs from the other two in 
its use of specifically linguistic tools for the analysis of texts. Leading works 
in this field include Catherine Emmott’s Narrative Comprehension (1997), 
Elena Semino’s Metaphor in Discourse (2008), and Peter Stockwell’s Cognitive 
Poetics (2002).
 All three of these approaches have made a number of important con-
tributions to our understanding of the reading process. In particular, their 
illuminating research findings have great heuristic and pedagogical value. 
Although I am not a teacher myself, I have noticed that this work is gradu-
ally filtering down into teaching courses at both the postgraduate and under-
graduate levels. Cognitive approaches can initially sound intimidating to 
students, but it is perfectly possible to make the subject highly accessible to, 
and surprisingly enjoyable for, those who are new to it. Of particular benefit 
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is the potential versatility of this new subject area. To talk of a cognitive 
approach to literature can be rather misleading if it gives the impression that 
it is simply one alternative among a range of others: historical and cultural, 
Marxist, feminist, rhetorical and ethical criticism, and so on. I do not see it 
like that. In my view, the cognitive approach is the basis of all the others. It 
does not stand alongside them; it sits underneath them. It is the means by 
which critics gather the evidence that allows them to make their various 
judgments. It follows then that the cognitive approach is not necessarily an 
end in itself and so its analyses will naturally tend to drift into these other 
fields. Significantly, a recent collection of essays edited by Lisa Zunshine is 
titled Introduction to Cognitive Cultural Studies (2010), and it applies cogni-
tive insights to a range of historical, social, and cultural concerns.
 As my interest is in the fictional minds of characters in novels, it seems 
to me to make sense to explore the various cognitive sciences concerned 
with the study of real minds such as the philosophy of mind; social, cog-
nitive, and discursive psychology; neuroscience; and psycholinguistics. My 
cognitive approach is a pragmatic, undogmatic, and unideological one. If 
these real-mind disciplines can assist our study of fictional minds, then that 
is fine; if they cannot, then there is no reason to use them. However, it has 
been my experience that we understand fictional minds much better when 
we apply to them some of the work done on real minds by psychologists, 
philosophers, and cognitive scientists. In fact, I would go further and argue 
that, from my perspective, all serious students of literature are cognitivists, 
whether they like it or not. We all study the workings of fictional minds 
and think of novels in terms of the mental functioning of characters. So the 
divide is not between cognitivists and noncognitivists; it is between those 
who explicitly see themselves as cognitivists and make use of real-mind dis-
courses to study literary texts, and those who do not. I can understand the 
concerns of what may be termed implicit cognitivists who are skeptical about 
the value of explicitly cognitive approaches to literature. They may suspect, 
for example, that these approaches erect a huge and unwieldy conceptual 
apparatus with disappointing results, that they are unconvincing, that they 
simply tell us what we already know, and that they tell us only a small part of 
the story because they divorce mental functioning from its social and phys-
ical context.
 I hope that this book may help a little to allay these concerns by showing 
that, with the minimum of theoretical scaffolding, original, illuminating, 
and convincing results can be obtained. The cognitive conceptual apparatus 
in this book is intended both to call attention to overlooked phenomena in 
novels and to offer some new ways of talking about them. I am interested in 
particular in the last of the concerns listed in the previous paragraph (that 
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the social context is left out of account) because it is also felt by many psy-
chologists, philosophers, and scientists in relation to the study of real minds. 
I want to stress emphatically that an interest in the mind does not necessarily 
entail a lack of interest in the social mind. My own experience has been the 
precise opposite. Fictional mental functioning should not be divorced from 
the social and physical context of the storyworld within which it occurs. In 
the view of the philosopher Brian Cantwell Smith (1999, 769), the classical 
(or internalist) view of the mind sees it as individual, abstract, detached, 
and general, while the new (or externalist) view sees it as social, embodied, 
engaged, and specific. It is this new cognitive perspective that underpins 
this book. I have found it disappointing that, although many literary theo-
rists have made good use of what may be termed the “hard” cognitive sci-
ences such as neuroscience, much less use has been made of the “soft” sci-
ences such as social psychology, discursive psychology, sociolinguistics, and 
anthropology. Some scholars have studied the workings of fictional minds 
within their social and physical context by making illuminating use of these 
soft sciences, for example David Herman (2007b) and the literary critic John 
V. Knapp (1996), but there is still much more to do.
FICTIONAL MINDS
There has always been a good deal of interest within traditional narratology 
in the presentation of consciousness in the novel. See especially Transparent 
Minds by Dorrit Cohn (1978), and also the excellent studies by Mieke Bal 
(1997), Seymour Chatman (1978), Monika Fludernik (1993), David Lodge 
(2002), and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (1983). Fictional Minds was, in part, a 
critique of this tradition. In it, I argued that these writers provide only a par-
tial and misleading picture of fictional minds because they tended to limit 
the scope of their analyses to the part of the mind known as inner speech. I 
therefore proposed a much fuller, more holistic, and more informative view 
of the subject. The book was based on the following five basic arguments 
(some of which have already been mentioned).
1. Classical methodologies such as the speech category approach (the dis-
course analysis of thought presentation that employs such concepts as 
free indirect discourse, stream of consciousness, interior monologue, 
and so on), story analysis (the study of characters as actants, functions, 
et cetera), the concept of focalization or point of view, and the study of 
characterization do not add up to a complete and coherent study of all 
aspects of the minds of characters in novels.
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2. Traditional narratology neglected the whole minds of fictional charac-
ters in action by giving undue emphasis to private, passive, solitary, and 
highly verbalized inner thought at the expense of all the other types of 
mental functioning.
3. In studying fictional minds, we should make use of what I called the 
parallel discourses on real minds, such as neuroscience (Antonio Dam-
asio [2000]), psycholinguistics (Steven Pinker [1994, 1997], psychology 
(Edwin Hutchins [1995] and James Wertsch [1991]), and the philos-
ophy of mind (Daniel Dennett [1991, 1996] and John Searle [1992]), 
to study the whole of the mind in action in the novel. They are par-
allel discourses because they contain a different kind of picture of con-
sciousness from the one that is characteristic of classical narratology 
and so can provide explanations that are fuller than those that are cur-
rently available as to how readers are able to reassemble fictional minds 
from narrative texts.
4. The constructions of the minds of fictional characters by narrators and 
readers are central to our understanding of how novels work, because 
readers enter storyworlds primarily by attempting to follow the work-
ings of the fictional minds contained in them. Fictional narrative is, in 
essence, the presentation of mental functioning. The term plot is gener-
ally defined as a chain of causally connected events in a story. (For a 
very helpful analysis of the various usages for this difficult term, see 
Abbott [2008, 240]. For illuminating work on narrative causality gener-
ally, see Kafalenos [2006] and Richardson [1997].) But what are these 
causal connections in practice? Generally, events in the storyworld are 
of little importance unless they become the experiences of characters. 
Events can occur independently of characters, but they will, on the 
whole, have a significance for the narrative only because of their effect 
on those characters’ minds. Descriptions of novels by actual readers 
tend to focus less on events themselves than on characters’ reactions 
to those events, what they were thinking and feeling, their beliefs and 
desires, and so on. These descriptions will usually include actions but, 
typically, will also refer to the mental network behind them—the inten-
tions, purposes, motives, and reasons for the actions. A plot summary is 
often of the following form: character A performed action B because of 
their belief C and their desire D. This is a causal network because action 
B was caused by the mental events C and D. We follow the plot by fol-
lowing the workings of fictional minds. These beliefs, desires, and other 
thought processes to a great extent compose the plot. To put the point 
another way, a description of a plot is an exercise in attribution. There 
is more on this in the later section of this chapter on attribution theory.
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To say this is not to conflate thought and action, or to privilege thought 
over action. It is simply to say that the concept of action necessarily 
requires the presence of thought. Neither is it to flatten out the unde-
niable differences between novels, or to make impossible any worth-
while distinctions between them. To say that the reader can follow the 
actions of the characters in Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749) only by 
following the thought processes behind those actions is certainly not to 
say that it is the same sort of novel as James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922). Of 
course the two are different. Fielding gives us much less of the workings 
of characters’ minds than does Joyce, and so events are more central to 
the plot of the former’s novel and thoughts more central to the plot of 
the latter’s. The two novels are at very different points on the thought-
action spectrum, but my point is simply that it is a spectrum. There is 
no unbridgeable dichotomy between events/actions and thoughts/feel-
ings. I say more about what I call the “thought-action continuum” in the 
discussion of action in Little Dorrit in chapter 4.
5. When the traditional narratological approaches referred to in point 1 
above are brought together within a new theoretical perspective, the 
study of fictional minds can then be established as a clearly defined and 
discrete subject area in its own right within the discipline of narratology. 
Fictional Minds was intended to give an indication of what this new sub-
ject area might look like.
 I will now provide brief explanations of three of the concepts that were 
introduced in that book because they recur throughout this one. These are 
the continuing-consciousness frame, what I referred to then as “embedded 
narratives,” and situated identity.
 Readers are able to follow the workings of characters’ minds by applying 
what I call the continuing-consciousness frame: the ability to take a reference 
to a character in the text and attach to it a presumed consciousness that 
exists continuously within the storyworld between the various, more or less 
intermittent references to that character. To make sense of a text, the reader 
has to collect together all of the isolated references to a specific proper name 
and construct a consciousness that continues in the spaces between all of 
the mentions of the character with that name. The reader strategy is to join 
up the dots. In particular, the reading process is creative in constructing 
coherent and continuous fictional consciousnesses from what is often a bare 
minimum of information. We frequently finish novels with a strong sense 
of the individual personality of a particular character. If, however, we were 
to take the trouble to count up the specific references to that character, we 
might be surprised at how little there is in the text from which we derive 
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our vivid impressions. When I reread George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1872) a 
while ago, I was surprised to find that the famous scene in which Lydgate 
finds himself unexpectedly engaged to Rosamond occupies less than one 
page (208) in the Norton edition. It is the continuing-consciousness frame 
that enables readers to generate so much information from so little source 
material.
 The reader uses existing or prestored knowledge of other minds in the 
actual world in order to process the emergent knowledge that is supplied by 
fictional-mind presentations. The everyday work we put into constructing 
other real minds prepares us, as readers, for the work of constructing fic-
tional minds from the text. Because fictional beings are necessarily incom-
plete, cognitive frames such as the continuing-consciousness frame are 
required to supply the defaults that fill the gaps in the storyworld and pro-
vide the presuppositions that enable the reader to construct continually con-
scious minds from the text. One key default setting is the assumption that a 
consciousness will continue throughout the text until interrupted, as in life, 
by death or absence. Another is that characters will think and act in certain 
fundamental respects like real people. I will say more about cognitive frames 
when I discuss characterization theory below. A number of narrative theo-
rists have referred to aspects of the continuing-consciousness frame from 
within their own theoretical frameworks. Monika Fludernik (1996) puts the 
notion of experientiality at the center of her perspective on narrative. Mieke 
Bal explains the difference between the two editions of her book Narratology 
(1985) and (1997) in terms of a new and growing emphasis on subjectivity: 
“This attention paid to subjectivity is, indeed, the basic tenet of the theory 
presented in this book” (1997, 11).
 Another key tool for the study of fictional minds is Marie-Laure Ryan’s 
notion of embedded narratives (1991), which I extended in Fictional Minds 
to mean the whole of a character’s mind in action: the total perceptual and 
cognitive viewpoint, ideological worldview, memories of the past, and the 
set of beliefs, desires, intentions, motives, and plans for the future of each 
character in the story as presented in the discourse. My use of the term was 
intended to convey that, when we examine these embedded narratives, we see 
storyworlds from the limited and aspectual viewpoints of their inhabitants. 
The results of an analysis of a single fictional mind can then be enmeshed 
with those of the other minds in the storyworld, with their own embedded 
narratives, their own motives, intentions, and plans. The combination of all 
of these forms the plot of the novel. A complete picture of an aspectual, sub-
jectively experienced storyworld results. (This requires skill on the part of 
the novelist. As the narrator of Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier [1915] 
remarks of the narratorial role, “It is so difficult to keep all these people 
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going” [200]). The storyworld is aspectual in the sense that its characters can 
only ever experience it from a particular perceptual and cognitive aspect at 
any one time. As John Searle explains, “Whenever we perceive anything or 
think about anything, we always do it under some aspects and not others” 
(1992, 156–57). Aspectuality is another concept that will crop up regularly 
in the pages to come.
 My use of the term embedded narrative was, in a sense, simply a label 
for an approach that has always been used by literary critics in practice, but 
which has not yet been sufficiently theorized. Some, but only some, of the 
material that is covered by the term has been categorized separately within 
narratology under the various headings I mentioned earlier: consciousness 
representation, story analysis, focalization, and characterization. The use-
fulness of the label is that it encourages a detailed, precise, functional, and 
inclusive approach toward the whole of a fictional mind in its social and 
physical context. It clarifies the process by which the reader constructs a 
series of encounters with a particular fictional mind into a narrative that is 
coherent and continuous. At the time, I thought that it was the best term 
available to convey the fact that fictional minds are, literally, narratives. As I 
aim to show in chapter 3, Lydgate’s mind, like the minds of all the other char-
acters in Middlemarch, is a narrative that is embedded within the whole text. 
However, the disadvantage in using the term is that it already has a meaning: 
it is usually used to describe the narratives that are embedded in so-called 
frame narratives. The tales that Scheherazade tells in The Arabian Nights are 
embedded narratives that occur within the frame narrative of her attempts 
to escape execution. Nelly Dean’s story in Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights 
(1848) is embedded within Lockwood’s frame narrative. I thought that the 
context would always make clear which meaning was being employed, but 
narratological colleagues have persuaded me that this is not the case and that 
there is too much room for confusion. I have therefore abandoned the term 
and will, in this book, use the label cognitive narratives instead.
 The relationship between the continuing-consciousness frame and the 
notion of cognitive narratives is this: the former is the means by which we are 
able to construct fictional minds; the latter is the result of that construction. 
Cognitive narratives are the product of the application of the continuing-
consciousness frame to the discourse. I will use the term double cognitive 
narratives to refer to the versions of characters’ minds that exist in the minds 
of other characters, the presence of one person’s mind within the mind of 
another, or, in my terms, the construction of a double cognitive narrative for 
one character within another character’s cognitive narrative.
 It is important that I distinguish my use of the new term cognitive nar-
rative to describe a character’s mind from the much wider debates about the 
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nature of consciousness and, in particular, whether people in real life regard 
their lives as narratives. Daniel Dennett stresses the essential “gappiness” and 
discontinuity of the various “multiple drafts” of consciousness. According 
to him, it is an illusion that we experience a full, unified, and uninterrupted 
stream of consciousness: “Consciousness is gappy and sparse, and doesn’t 
contain half of what people think is there!” (1991, 366). Dennett criticizes 
the view of Gerald Edelman that “One of the most striking features of con-
sciousness is its continuity” (1989, 119; quoted in 1991, 356). Dennett’s typi-
cally robust response is that “This is utterly wrong. One of the most striking 
features of consciousness is its discontinuity” (1991, 356). He reinforces the 
point and relates it to the question of identity by commenting that “while 
consciousness appears to be continuous, in fact it is gappy. A self could be 
just as gappy  .  .  . Are you the very person whose kindergarten adventures 
you sketchily recall (sometimes vividly, sometimes dimly)? . . . Is (was) that 
child you?” (1991, 423). Dennett comments that his multiple-drafts model of 
consciousness is “initially deeply counterintuitive” (1991, 17). According to 
the science writer Susan Blackmore, “Every time I seem to exist, this is just 
a temporary fiction and not the same ‘me’ who seemed to exist a moment 
before, or last week, or last year. This is tough, but I think it gets easier with 
practice” (2005, 81). It may well be that part of the required practice that 
Blackmore refers to is the reading of postmodern novels.
 The philosopher Galen Strawson (1997, 2004) has a similarly “gappy” 
view of consciousness and, in addition, resists attempts to bind the notion of 
the self together by means of the concept of narrative. Strawson criticizes in 
refreshingly blunt terms what he calls the psychological Narrativity thesis and 
the ethical Narrativity thesis. The former is the “widespread agreement that 
human beings typically see or experience their lives as a narrative or story 
of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories” (2004, 428). It is associated 
with such thinkers as the psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986). The latter is 
the connected view that “experiencing or conceiving one’s life as a narrative 
is a good thing; a richly Narrative outlook is essential to a well-lived life, to 
true or full personhood” (2004, 428). A well-known advocate of this position 
is the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981). In Strawson’s opinion, both 
these arguments are wrong. They hinder human self-understanding, close 
down important avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical pos-
sibilities, needlessly and wrongly distress those who do not fit their model, 
and are potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic contexts (2004, 429). In 
Strawson’s view, we would do better to accept the gappy nature of conscious-
ness and the transitory, ephemeral, and nonnarrative nature of the self.
 In his perceptive commentary in the Editor’s Column of the journal 
Narrative (October 2005), James Phelan welcomes Strawson’s intervention 
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in this debate, despite having some reservations (which I share) about his 
position. Phelan then discusses what he calls narrative imperialism—“the 
impulse by students of narrative to claim more and more territory, more 
and more power for our object of study, and our ways of studying it” (2005, 
206). He argues that “now that so many disciplines have made the narrative 
turn, now that narrative and narrative theory are so firmly established as 
important objects of study, the accompanying overreaching, unsustainable, 
and extravagant claims may be more harmful to our field than the misplaced 
humility accompanying overly modest ones” (2005, 210). Strawson’s position 
is a provocative and bracing onslaught on what has become a rather stifling 
orthodoxy. If his relentless probing forces people to say precisely what they 
mean by statements such as “our lives are narratives,” then that can only be 
a good thing. I am skeptical about some aspects of Strawson’s arguments 
(are there really people who do not see their lives as narratives, at all, in any 
way, ever?), but I think that the more important point is that he is right that 
much of the “life is a narrative” rhetoric of present-day cultural studies is 
unthinkingly flabby. In saying so, I am acutely conscious of potential charges 
of inconsistency, given the fact that I refer to fictional minds as cognitive 
narratives. My defense is that I am talking about fictional, not real minds, 
and these sorts of minds are narratives in a literal sense. Calling fictional 
minds narratives does not have any relevance to the entirely separate point 
about whether or not real minds can be regarded as narratives.
 When I refer to fictional minds, I mean those of characters. The 
enmeshing of the workings of these minds is often framed within a larger 
perspective: that of the narrator, and also, especially in novels with unreli-
able narration, that of the implied author. Obviously, the readers’ awareness 
of the workings of characters’ minds is determined, or at the least heavily 
influenced, by their presentations by narrators and implied authors. It might 
be a plausible next step, therefore, to refer to the narrators of novels such as 
Helen and Little Dorrit as having social minds because of their sensitivity to 
the presence of minds of this sort within the storyworlds they have created. 
This is, however, for me, a step too far. The most urgent need is to establish 
the existence of social minds within storyworlds. I do not wish to get drawn 
into the fascinating and intricate disputes that surround the status of narra-
tors and implied authors by referring to their minds. It seems to me to be 
better, therefore, to make characters’ minds the main focus of this book. I 
will, of course, refer to narrators and implied authors where appropriate; it is 
just that I will not talk about them as having minds.
 Analyses of concepts such as identity, self, and subjectivity sometimes 
focus in restrictive and unhelpful ways on individuals divorced from their 
social context. My term situated identity, by contrast, is intended to convey 
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a balance between the perceptions of individuals regarding themselves and 
the perceptions of others regarding those individuals. If an aspect of our 
identity is under consideration, how is it to be determined? Which is more 
reliable: our own first-person attribution of various qualities to ourselves, 
or the third-person attributions of others? Where is our identity situated? 
If you want to find out about an aspect of someone’s mind and make an 
attribution to them of a particular disposition, say selfishness, whom do you 
ask? Certainly not just them, because you know that you cannot be sure that 
you will get a complete answer. Selfish people may not admit to being selfish. 
For reasons of this sort, we are all reluctant to take somebody’s word for 
the workings of their own mind, and this seems to me to be a tacit admis-
sion that there is a strong sense in which our mind is distributed among 
those other people who have an image of us in their minds. How else can 
we say that someone is selfish when there is no representation of selfishness 
in their mind? This image is contained in the minds of others but we are 
attributing it to this particular mind. Surely, then, our identity is situated 
among the minds of others. Furthermore, we behave in different ways with 
different people. Someone seeing you in an unfamiliar context might easily 
say, “You’ve become a different person!” As Walt Whitman said, we “contain 
multitudes.” And the situating of identity between individuals and others 
requires endless negotiation. As the wife says to her husband in the New 
Yorker cartoon as they go into a dinner party, “Remember—just don’t be 
yourself!”
 Lisa Zunshine approaches this issue from a different direction in her 
discussion of the concept of metarepresentation (the representation of a rep-
resentation) in Why We Read Fiction. She points out that many of the state-
ments to be found in fictional texts must be taken “under advisement,” as 
U.S. lawyers say. A character proclaiming that she is a generous person and 
that another character is selfish does not, of itself, guarantee the truth of 
either statement. Zunshine makes brilliant use of a literary example of meta-
representation that has great relevance to the subject of this book. Everyone 
knows the famous first sentence of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813): 
“It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a 
fortune, must be in want of a wife” (5). Quoted in isolation as a flat asser-
tion, it does not look like a very promising example of metarepresentation. 
However, as Zunshine explains, it is transformed when viewed in the context 
of the overlooked second sentence: “However little known the feelings or 
views of such a man may be on his first entering a neighbourhood, this truth 
is so well fixed in the minds of the surrounding families, that he is considered 
as the rightful property of some one or other of their daughters” (quoted in 
Zunshine 2006, 62; her emphasis). The italicized phrase points out that this 
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is no universally acknowledged truth at all, merely a collective belief held 
by a specific group of people. The reader will have to take the initial state-
ment under advisement while following the rest of the narrative. There is a 
striking similarity between the language used here and that to be found in 
the first few pages of Middlemarch. For example, the Austen sentence is a 
statement of the views of “surrounding families” while the passage from the 
Eliot novel that is analyzed at the beginning of chapter 3 is about the atti-
tudes of “neighbouring families” (4).
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO BOOKS
I would now like to say a little about the relationship between this book and 
Fictional Minds and also about some of the reactions to the earlier book that 
are relevant to this one.
 As I have said, Fictional Minds used the real-mind discourses of phi-
losophy, psychology, psycholinguistics, and the other cognitive sciences to 
construct a theoretical framework for the study of characters’ minds. The 
purpose of this book is to put that framework into practice. This time, there-
fore, the primary focus is on fictional-mind rather than real-mind texts. This 
study will be more “literary” than the first one and will consist of sustained 
close readings of a small group of novels. From chapter 3 onwards, there 
will be few explicit references to such figures as Antonio Damasio, Daniel 
Dennett, and John Searle. The same is true of the great Russian narrative 
theorist Mikhail Bakhtin, another all-pervasive influence on everything that 
follows. The rather paradoxical reason is that the only alternative is to refer 
to them continuously, and so the relative absence of their names and the 
names of other, similar theorists should be regarded as a kind of backhanded 
compliment to them. However, I should stress that Social Minds in the Novel 
is completely self-contained, and an understanding of it does not depend 
in any way on a prior knowledge of Fictional Minds. In her review of that 
work in the journal Anglia, the narratologist Jarmila Mildorf suggested that 
“the question arises to what extent this new approach is applicable in actual 
analyses of narrative texts” (2006, 776). This book is intended to provide 
an answer to that question. She also expressed a concern that my approach 
“involves the danger of making narrative analysis fuzzier and perhaps less 
reliable” (2006, 776) than traditional narrative approaches. I hope that the 
chapters that follow will meet this concern by displaying a precision and reli-
ability that is equal to, albeit very different from, traditional narrative theory.
 I now have a confession to make. I said at the end of Fictional Minds 
that it was the first of a pair. The second book would look at the historical 
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development of constructions of fictional minds over a long period of time 
and a wide range of narratives in order to see what similarities and differ-
ences could be found between these various constructions. As you can see 
from a glance at the contents page of this book, I have broken my promise. 
My excuse is that, on reflection, I regretted being so headstrong, and decided 
that the original intention was wildly overambitious. I had missed a stage, 
and another book was required first. What was needed initially was a study 
that would focus specifically on social minds in the novel. Only then, I now 
think, would it be the right time to implement a fully historicized approach. 
In any event, luckily for me, a book is now available that is precisely what I 
had in mind. Indeed, it is a far more comprehensive treatment of the subject 
than I could have produced. It is David Herman’s excellent edited collection 
The Emergence of Mind: Representations of Consciousness in Narrative Dis-
course in English (2010), which covers the period 700 to the present day.
 Now for the reactions to Fictional Minds. I have been asked whether 
fictional minds form part of the story level (the content plane, the narrated, 
the “what,” the fabula) or the discourse level (the expression plane, the nar-
rating, the “how,” the sjuzhet). The answer is that the detailed discussions in 
the chapters that follow will consider two separate but related issues. One is 
the story-level issue of the nature of the fictional minds constructed by the 
texts, the what that is the content of those minds. The other is the discourse-
level issue of the techniques used to represent consciousness in narrative, 
how minds are presented in the discourse. It will, however, soon become 
apparent that it is difficult in practice to maintain a distinction between the 
two. I will focus primarily on the first issue, the what, but it is impossible to 
talk about the what without detailed consideration of the how. To describe 
the contents of fictional minds is to focus on how those minds are presented 
in the text. Also, the techniques that are used for fictional-mind presenta-
tions will determine, to a certain extent, what thoughts are described. The 
workings of minds in nineteenth-century novels, for example, are shaped, 
colored, and limited by the heterodiegetic narration in which many of them 
are presented.
 Another question that has been asked is this one: Am I saying that the 
process of following characters’ fictional mental functioning is both a neces-
sary and a sufficient condition for narrative comprehension? This is not an 
easy question to answer in those terms. My preferred formulation would be 
to say that it is the fundamental and principal way by which we understand 
narrative. In the terms of the question, my feeling is that it is too weak to say 
that it is necessary and certainly too strong to say that it is sufficient, because 
there are several other features that are also necessary for narrative compre-
hension. These include a good understanding of the physical makeup of a 
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storyworld and the events that occur in it, and a sensitive appreciation of the 
thematic component of narrative. On the other hand, I do not wish to com-
promise on the claim that the ability to follow fictional mental functioning 
is always necessary for narrative comprehension. I would concede too much 
by saying, for example, that it is only typically necessary. As I said earlier, an 
understanding of characters’ thought processes is as necessary for Tom Jones 
as it is for Ulysses. I cannot find any way of retreating from the universality 
of my claim. Equally, I do not see any way in which this claim is a refusal 
to acknowledge the astonishing and endless variety of narrative. To say so 
would be like suggesting that I am trying to flatten out fictional variation by 
pointing out that Ulysses and Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code use exactly the 
same 26 letters of the alphabet.
 Am I talking about how readers in fact read novels, or am I attempting 
to advance a radically new way of reading? The answer is the former—I aim 
to show how readers make sense of fiction, to explain the processes that we 
all engage in, to make explicit what we all intuitively do in practice. In addi-
tion, though, I hope to offer a radically new way of studying novels. These 
two aims are not as contradictory as may at first appear. The reason why they 
are consistent with each other is that, in my view, narrative theory has in this 
respect taken insufficient account of the practice of actual readers.
 One question that I ask myself occasionally, and I am surprised that 
no one else has, is this one: Can the approach that I have outlined above 
be described as behaviorist? The unsurprising and rather dull answer is: It 
depends on what you mean. If you mean what may be called strong behav-
iorism—the discredited doctrine of early behaviorist psychologists such as 
B. F. Skinner who appeared to argue that there are no mental processes, 
there is no consciousness, there are only dispositions to behave in certain 
ways—the answer is: Of course not. If, however, you are referring to what 
may be termed weak behaviorism—the argument that a surprisingly large 
number of statements about minds are, in fact, statements about dispo-
sitions and behavior—the answer is: Yes. (Incidentally, this discussion is 
an illustration of a widespread problem with “isms” such as behaviorism 
and poststructuralism. They often take two forms: a strong form that is 
heavily counterintuitive and unsustainable, and a weak form that is simply 
a restatement of the obvious. Confusion reigns when proponents and 
opponents argue over different forms without realizing it. This frequently 
happens because proponents start with the strong form and then retreat to 
the weak one under pressure, but without telling their opponents that they 
have done so.)
 The next question (“Am I saying that fictional minds are the same as real 
minds?”) is so important that I am going to put my answer to it in italics: I 
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am not saying that fictional minds are the same as real minds. I am saying that 
fictional minds are similar to real minds in some ways and different from them 
in other ways. We will not understand fictional minds unless we understand 
both of these aspects: both their similarities to, and their differences from, real 
minds.
 My first book focused on the similarities for two reasons: one was that 
they had been neglected by traditional narrative theory; the other was that I 
am particularly interested in them. This emphasis may have given the unfor-
tunate impression that I was arguing that fictional minds are the same as 
real minds. I emphatically do not believe this. Indeed, I believe that to say so 
makes no sense. It seems obvious to me that fictional minds are similar to 
real minds in some ways but profoundly different from them in other ways. 
Equally, though, to go to the other extreme and argue that fictional minds 
are semiotic constructs and are therefore utterly and unbridgeably different 
from real minds does not work either. Fictional minds are certainly semiotic 
constructs, but many of the semiotic operations that are necessary to recover 
meaning from them involve their similarity to real minds. Some of these 
operations are the subject of this book. It is, however, true to say that, when 
examining challenging and experimental postmodern novels (as well as 
other “unnatural narratives,” as Brian Richardson [2006], Jan Alber [2009], 
and others term them), the emphasis will change. The stress will probably 
then be more on the differences. I welcome the challenge provided by texts 
that defamiliarize, question, modify, complicate, distort, subvert, or contra-
dict our default assumptions about the similarities between fictional minds 
and real minds. We find out more about the semiotics of fictional minds by 
taking up, rather than avoiding, this challenge. These narratives derive their 
power to shock precisely from their attempts to withhold what we take for 
granted in the presentation of consciousness in fiction. But the norms have 
to exist, and they have to apply to the majority of novels, and they have to be 
well studied and well understood, for the transgressions to have any impact.
 In a famous essay, “The Hedgehog and the Fox” (1953), Isaiah Berlin 
muses on the remark of the Greek poet Archilochus that while the fox knows 
many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing. More recently, Stephen Jay 
Gould wrote a book called The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox 
(2003). The remark is gnomic enough to be capable of different interpreta-
tions. What it suggests to me is a continuum in which, at the fox end of 
the scale, can be found those scholars who, within a particular field such 
as narratology, are able to turn their hands to a number of different issues 
and achieve a broad mastery over the whole area. At the hedgehog end are 
those who are content to plow a deep furrow, and pursue a single issue. It is 
then possible to discern a logic or a thread that ties together all of the work 
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of hedgehog scholars and gives their books and essays a satisfying sense of 
coherence. Most people, of course, are in the middle of the spectrum, com-
bining particular interests with a broad knowledge. On the evidence of the 
previous few paragraphs, it seems to me that I must be a hedgehog.
ATTRIBUTION THEORY
A key tool for analyzing the process of recovering and reassembling fictional 
storyworlds is the application of attribution theory: the study of how we 
ascribe states of mind to others and also to ourselves (Heider 1958, Kelley 
1973, Wilson 2002). In relation to real minds, when we are coming to a view 
on why someone acted as he or she did in a particular situation, we ask our-
selves such questions as: Would other people have acted in the same way in 
this situation? Did this individual act in the way that they would normally do 
in similar situations? Would this person have acted in the same way if some 
of the circumstances had been different? Attribution theory can be used to 
formulate tentative answers to questions such as these: How do readers attri-
bute states of mind such as emotions, dispositions, and reasons for action to 
characters? What, in precise terms, do readers do with the explicit evidence 
that is made available to them in texts, together with any implicit or inferen-
tial evidence that they might have on characters’ patterns of behavior? How 
do heterodiegetic narrators attribute states of mind to their characters? By 
what means do homodiegetic (or first-person) narrators attribute states of 
mind to themselves and also to other characters? How do characters attri-
bute mental states to themselves and to other characters? With regard to 
the issue of characterization, how does an attribution of a mental state help 
to build up in the reader a sense of the whole personality of that character? 
And, finally, a question that forms the subject matter of this book: How do 
readers, narrators, and individual characters attribute mental functioning to 
groups?
 Attribution theory rests on the concept of theory of mind, the term 
used by philosophers and psychologists to describe our awareness of the 
existence of other minds, our knowledge of how to interpret our own and 
other people’s thought processes, our ability to make sense of other people’s 
actions by understanding the reasons for those actions. (Philosophers and 
psychologists also use the terms folk psychology and intersubjectivity to refer 
to this ability.) We are able to attribute states of mind to others because we 
have a theory of mind. Readers of novels have to use their theory of mind 
in order to try to follow the workings of characters’ minds by attributing 
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states of minds to them. In particular, readers have to follow the attempts 
that characters make to read other characters’ minds. Anyone who has a 
condition such as autism or Asperger syndrome, and who therefore suffers 
from what is called mind blindness, will find it difficult to understand a novel. 
Novel reading is mind reading. (However, it should be borne in mind that 
there are different sorts of autism spectrum disorders and the degree of diffi-
culty with theory of mind will vary greatly between disorders.) There is now 
a lot of interest in narratives about autism and Asperger syndrome. Mark 
Haddon’s novel The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003) is 
a well-known example. (For more on theory of mind and the novel, see the 
compelling accounts by Lisa Zunshine [2006, 2008]).
 The philosopher Peter Carruthers has put theory of mind into a his-
torical context by emphasizing the importance of the tracking function in 
the evolution of human consciousness. He points out that the “early homi-
nids [who] engaged in hunting and gathering  .  .  .  would have needed to 
keep track of the movements and properties of a great many individuals—
both human and non-human—updating their representations accordingly” 
(2000, 272). He then links this tracking argument to the development of a 
theory of mind. “The central task of the mind-reading faculty is to work out 
and remember who perceives what, who thinks what, who wants what, who 
feels what, and how different people are likely to reason and respond in a 
wide variety of circumstances” (2000, 273). I mention his argument because 
it seems to me that it also works perfectly as a description of the reading 
process. We comprehend narrative by working out and remembering which 
character perceives, thinks, wants, and feels what, and how the different 
characters are likely to reason and respond to the circumstances of the sto-
ryworld in which they find themselves.
 Theory of mind is as relevant to first-person as to third-person attribu-
tion, and first-person attribution plays an important role in the philosoph-
ical concept of action. (There is more on this in chapter 4.) We sometimes 
find it difficult to know exactly why we have acted in the way we have. We 
ask ourselves, “What made me do that?!” In other words, our first-person 
theory of mind is not as efficient as we often assume it to be. Nevertheless, a 
certain minimal level of reading of one’s own mind is necessary for us to take 
responsibility for our actions. A valuable perspective on this issue has been 
provided by the well-known American socialite Paris Hilton. In a character-
istically oblique intervention in debates in the philosophy of action, she once 
remarked, “In the future, I plan on taking more of an active role in the deci-
sions I make.” There is much food for thought there, I think you will agree. 
However, this rich and subtle reference to the mental network of causes, 
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reasons, motives, and intentions that lies behind our actions (provocatively 
hinting, even, at the possibility of the absence of this network in this case) 
cannot be pursued further here. Within Zen Buddhism, a kōan is a story, 
question, or statement that is inaccessible to rational understanding but may 
be accessible to intuition. The one that everyone knows is “What is the sound 
of one hand clapping?” To me, Hilton’s statement has some of the quality of 
a kōan. Whenever I think that I have fully grasped its meaning, I find that it 
eludes me still.
 There are two rival explanations for our theory of mind: the oddly 
termed theory-theory holds that we all have a theory of sorts about the nature 
of behavior, albeit not a full-fledged scientific one. The simulation theory, 
by contrast, maintains that we simply simulate the thinking of others by 
trying to imagine what it would be like to be them in particular circum-
stances. However, some philosophers and psychologists have recently made 
a commendable effort to go beyond the theory-theory/simulation theory 
debate. In fact, some use the term intersubjectivity in preference to theory of 
mind because they feel that the latter term is misleading. A summary of the 
latest thinking on the subject can be found in The Shared Mind: Perspectives 
on Intersubjectivity, edited by Jordan Zlatev et al. (2008). The philosopher 
Daniel Hutto, in Folk Psychological Narratives (2008), suggests that, for most 
of the time, when we understand the actions of others we are not employing 
a theory of mind at all. Nor are we mind reading. And both the standard 
explanations of our ability to understand others (theory-theory and simula-
tion theory) are, he thinks, misconceived. Hutto argues that our capacity to 
understand the actions of others in terms of their reasons has a sociocul-
tural basis. Because many of the social roles and rules governing our rou-
tine encounters are well-established in standard narrative patterns of human 
behavior, folk psychology, theory of mind, and mind reading are usually 
unnecessary. We have many other, more basic and embodied means than 
mentalistic predictions or explanations. We generally do not need to specu-
late on the innermost thoughts of others because their behavior is immedi-
ately explicable by means of the expectations and scripts that are provided by 
cultural practices. 
 Hutto thinks that children develop their interpretative skills not by 
means of a theory, but by being exposed to and engaging in stories about per-
sons who act for reasons. These narratives serve as exemplars and teaching 
tools. In their guided encounters with stories, children come to understand 
the relations that hold between beliefs, desires, reasons, and actions. As a 
result, children acquire not the set of abstract rules implied by the term 
theory of mind, but an appreciation of how actions actually occur in socio-
cultural contexts. He calls this argument the narrative practice hypothesis. 
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According to this view, use of a theory of mind is a supplementary method 
that only comes into play on those comparatively rare occasions when the 
actions of others do require explanation and we do not have direct and reli-
able access to their narratives, for example by asking them. In those cases, 
we construct narratives for others. Hutto calls these folk psychological narra-
tives. Folk psychology, for Hutto, is essentially a distinctive kind of narrative 
practice.
 Hutto is certainly to be commended for his radical and challenging 
thesis. Die-hard cognitivists may not be totally convinced, of course, and 
may insist that all he has done is to show that narratives play a key role in 
the acquisition of a theory of mind. Hutto meets this objection head on, 
but I suspect that his book is not the last word. For example, a significant 
issue here is the quantity and quality of narrative that children are actually 
exposed to. Some people may not be as sanguine as Hutto is that children 
typically get sufficient acting-for-reasons roughage in their narrative diet. As 
Hutto is a philosopher and not a narratologist he does not explore the impli-
cations of his work for the study of literary narratives. However, he defines 
the narratives told to children as stories about people who act for reasons, 
and this sounds to me like a good definition of adult novels too.
 Hutto is unusual in drawing attention to the importance of what 
people say as a source of information about what they think. He stresses 
that these second-person explanations are at least as common as the third-
person kind and may be more reliable. In Anthony Trollope’s The Warden 
(1855), Mr Harding quotes an old proverb: “Every one knows where his own 
shoe pinches!” (175). This is an internalist motto because it is a vivid way 
of expressing the apparent truth that we cannot know what another person 
is experiencing. But suppose that you are out walking with someone and 
you notice that they are hobbling. They stop, take their shoe off and inspect 
it, rub their foot in a particular place, put a plaster on it, and so on. That is 
fairly close to knowing where their shoe is pinching, is it not? In addition, 
as Hutto says, information can be obtained directly from the other person. 
Your companion might simply tell you where their shoe is pinching. This 
perspective on mental functioning raises issues of authority and reliability 
that go to the heart of our experience of reading novels. You may say that 
people lie, just as characters do. Well, they do, sometimes. Or that they are 
unreliable, just as narrators can be. Well, they are, sometimes. But how likely 
is that, in this case? Obviously, you can make up scenarios based on pre-
tence, perhaps caused by a reluctance to walk any further, but would you not 
be likely to spot subterfuges of that sort? People often tell the truth about 
what they are thinking, just as characters do, and it is often perfectly pos-
sible to know when they are not doing so. We should not apply standards to 
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second- and third-person knowledge about mental states that are unreason-
ably and inconsistently higher than the standards we require for other areas 
of knowledge.
 Although I find Hutto’s approach completely convincing, I intend to 
continue to use the term theory of mind for three reasons. First, it is here to 
stay, especially now in literary studies, and to avoid it would cause unneces-
sary confusion. Next, he appears to use the term in a fairly narrow sense 
by tying it closely to the two rival explanations for it (theory-theory and 
simulation). That is, in asserting that we rarely need to use our theory of 
mind, he often seems simply to be rejecting the two rival explanations. I see 
no harm, then, in continuing to use the term, but in a more general sense, 
as a kind of umbrella or generic label for our ability to understand others. 
Used in this way, it would not necessarily commit us to either of the pre-
vious rival explanations, and would leave open the possibility of adopting 
Hutto’s alternative sociocultural and narrative approach. However, anyone 
employing this inclusive use of the word theory should make every attempt 
not to give the mistaken impression that we are self-consciously employing 
a fully worked-out theoretical position whenever we try to work out what 
someone else is thinking. Finally, as Hutto admits, we do use our theory of 
mind (in the narrow or restrictive sense) for particularly puzzling examples 
of behavior that are not amenable to fast, easy explanations by means of 
sociocultural scripts. This is just the sort of behavior that is characteristic of 
people in novels. Fictional mind-reading tends to involve characters, often 
in moments of crisis, who are self-consciously using complex theory of mind 
to try to interpret the opaque intentions and motives of another.
CHARACTERIZATION
Characterization theory is based on the insight that a reader’s construction 
of a character in a novel is a process that is both frame-driven (top-down in 
direction) and data-driven (bottom-up). As is now well known, frames or 
schemas are cognitive structures or mental templates that represent generic 
concepts stored in our memory (Schank and Abelson 1977). They are 
arrangements of knowledge about objects, people, or situations that are used 
to predict and classify new data. We use frames to simplify reality, organize 
our knowledge, assist recall, make sense of our current experiences, guide 
our everyday behavior, and predict likely happenings in the future. By cap-
turing the essence of stereotypical situations such as being in a living room 
or going out for dinner, frames allow us to use default assumptions about 
what is likely to happen in those situations. That way, it is only when our 
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assumptions are proved wrong that we have to improvise. Frames are hierar-
chical arrangements that have slots for variables. Once the most appropriate 
frame (say, a cat) has been activated, some slots are filled with compulsory 
values (a cat is an animal), or with default values (a cat has four legs), or are 
empty until filled with values from the current situation (the cat is black). 
Frame processing is top-down, in that it guides a selective search for data 
relevant to the expectations set up by the frame, and also bottom-up, because 
the data contained in an actual situation will often lead to the modification 
of the frame, or even the generation of a new frame. The concept of homeo-
stasis, as used in the social sciences, has marked similarities. It refers to the 
predicable and expected patterns of behavior to be found in, for example, 
restaurants and theaters, and also to the maintenance of the specific roles 
assigned to individuals in families and other social groups.
 Narrative theorists such as Monika Fludernik (1996), David Herman 
(1997), and Manfred Jahn (1997) have used frame theory to illuminate pre-
cisely how readers are able to follow narrative texts. They have shown that 
story frames are sets of expectations about the internal structure of stories 
that enable readers to recognize a text as a narrative. Comprehension of a 
story means building a representation of the text by using the prototypical 
structural patterns that are stored in memory. We acquire the textual frames 
relating to our knowledge of genre and other narrative conventions pri-
marily by reading a wide range of stories, and our resulting awareness of 
the appropriate genre prefocuses our understanding of, and response to, a 
particular text. During the reading process, events in the story are marked as 
salient and acquire significance because of the expectations that are defined 
by frames. In particular, we use frames as part of our literary competence 
and performance to reconstruct from fictional narratives the storyworlds 
that are described in those narratives. Frames allow readers to fill in the 
gaps in storyworlds because the appropriate ingredients for extracting the 
meaning of a sentence in a narrative are often nowhere to be found within 
that sentence. This sort of gap-filling helps readers to track the movements of 
characters and objects through storyworld time and space. (For more detail 
on tracking of this sort, see Emmott 1997.)
 Frame theory evaluates how incoming data are put into the relevant 
slots, the order in which slots are filled, the classification of the informa-
tion contained in the slots (into, say, rules, events, and characters), how sto-
ries can be broken down into component parts, the types of causal relations 
that connect these components, and, importantly, how we repair unfounded 
assumptions about the direction of the story. As with our use of real-life 
frames, this is both a top-down and a bottom-up process. It is also dynamic in 
that when a reader fills a new slot, changes to existing slots may be required. 
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A reader’s attention does not spread equally and evenly throughout a text, 
but continually works forwards and backwards to make adjustments to 
frames. Novels often challenge readers’ expectations and thereby force them 
to abandon established frames in favor of new, refreshed ones. Specifically, 
cognitive frames are essential to the construction of fictional minds. As dis-
cussed earlier, when a reader meets or hears of a character for the first time, 
a continuing-consciousness frame is established (top-down) which is then 
fed (bottom-up) by specific information about the character from the text, 
and so on. These initial character frames usually involve stereotypes: either 
those that are based on real-world knowledge, or those that are to be found 
in various literary genres, or a combination of the two. As more bottom-up 
information on a particular character is processed, frame refreshment or 
subcategorization may take place. More radically, frame disruption, decat-
egorization, invalidation of previous inferences, or even a focused search for 
a new, more adequate character category might occur. (For an illuminating 
application of this sort of approach to drama, see Jonathan Culpeper’s book 
Language and Characterisation: People in Plays and Other Texts [2001]).
 It seems to me that this characterization process has been interpreted 
up until now in a rather constrained and limiting way. In particular, it has 
been generally assumed that the character frames that are used in the ways 
described above consist only of the cultural and literary stereotypes that 
relate to individual types such as the rake, the fallen woman, and the brag-
gart. I will try to extend in some new and possibly unexpected directions 
our understanding of character theory by examining some of the different 
sorts of cognitive frames that are also used by the reader in the construction 
of character. This can be done by making use of the insights relating to the 
social nature of cognition that have emerged from the soft cognitive sciences 
of social and discursive psychology, philosophy of mind, and theoretical 
anthropology.
 The aim of deepening and widening characterization theory in order to 
provide a richer and fuller account of how readers actually construct char-
acters can be achieved in two stages. The first stage (the subject of the next 
chapter) is to recognize that the minds belonging to characters in novels 
do not function in a vacuum. As with real minds, fictional minds are only 
partially understood if only an internalist perspective is applied to them. 
Characterization theory will always be incomplete until it also takes account 
of the externalist aspects of the character construction process. Fictional 
minds, like real minds, form part of extended cognitive networks. We will 
never understand how individual minds work if we cut them off from the 
larger, collective units to which they belong. To adapt the title of Edwin 
Hutchins’s important book Cognition in the Wild (1995), we need to study 
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fictional cognition in the wild. The study of the presentation of conscious-
ness in fiction should take place not only within individual characters but 
also in the spaces between them.
 The second stage is to recognize that there is a deep fault line within 
narratology between the theories relating to characterization and the theo-
ries relating to the representation of consciousness, and that the existence of 
this fault line has seriously distorted our understanding of fictional mental 
functioning. The theory of social minds presented in this book is intended 
to be a contribution as much to characterization theory as to the theory on 
the representation of consciousness. The gap that currently exists between 
the analyses of characterization and consciousness is particularly difficult 
to understand since a good deal of fictional discourse is, in my experience, 
situated precisely within this theoretical hole. Future chapters will analyze 
the process of characterization by discussing the representation of the con-
sciousnesses of Tertius Lydgate in Middlemarch, Anne Elliot in Jane Aus-
ten’s Persuasion (1818), and Joe and Clarissa in Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love 
(1997). There are several strategies, it seems to me, for bringing character-
ization and consciousness together. In this book, I shall discuss three: dis-
positions (that is, a person’s abilities and inclinations to act in certain ways), 
action, and emotions. Action is investigated in chapter 4 (using a passage 
from Little Dorrit as an example text) and emotions in chapter 5 (looking at 
chapter 23 of Persuasion). Dispositions are the subject of the following sec-
tion.
DISPOSITIONS
A good deal of illuminating work has been done on characterization by nar-
ratologists and literary theorists such as Mieke Bal (1997), Jonathan Culler 
(1975), Umberto Eco (1981), Uri Margolin (1995, 1996a), and Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan (1983). However, despite the first-rate quality of this 
research, a serious concern remains. It is the fault line mentioned just now 
that has developed within narrative theory between the study of character-
ization and the study of the presentation of consciousness. It is my conten-
tion that the introduction into narratology of the concept of dispositions will 
help to some extent to mend this fault line.
 Consider this sentence from Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady 
(1882): “Isabel felt some emotion, for she had always thought highly of her 
grandmother’s house” (81). Is this not the sort of sentence that readers fre-
quently encounter in fictional texts? It reports a single mental event—Isabel 
feeling emotion—but, at the same time, it puts this single event into the 
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context of Isabel’s personality, her character, her self. As readers, we accept 
this sentence as a whole, as a gestalt, as a coherent explanation of a single 
aspect of Isabel’s whole mind. We do not think to ourselves, “That’s a strange 
sentence—yoking together two completely separate classes of statements!” 
However, look at any of the excellent introductions to narrative, new and 
old. Narratology is well served by having several, really first-class introduc-
tory teaching texts by Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (1983), Mieke Bal (1997), 
Jacob Lothe (2000), Suzanne Keen (2003), Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck 
(2005), Porter Abbott (2008), and Monika Fludernik (2009). Unfortunately, 
though, I have been unable to find any evidence that they have anything to 
say about that sentence as a whole. They typically contain a chapter about 
the representation of speech and consciousness, and a completely separate 
chapter about characterization. As a result, what you find, in effect, is that 
the first half of the sentence is classified under one category, as the represen-
tation of consciousness, while the second half is classified under another, as 
characterization. And, to make the division even deeper, the chapters that 
are devoted to characterization will rarely refer to consciousness, and the 
chapters on consciousness have almost nothing to say about characteriza-
tion. This wholly artificial and arbitrary division completely fails to capture 
the readers’ experience of that completely typical sentence about Isabel.
 This seems strange. Narrative texts are full of statements such as the one 
just quoted that present an episode of immediate consciousness within the 
context of the character’s dispositions. These statements often fulfill a pivotal 
role in guiding the direction of the narrative by showing that a particular 
mental event is a manifestation of a disposition and that the disposition is a 
causal factor in the event. The event and the disposition are linked together. 
It is by interpreting episodes of consciousness within a context of disposi-
tions that the reader builds up a convincing and coherent sense of character. 
It is through the central, linking concept of dispositions that characterization 
and thought presentation can be seen as different aspects of the same phe-
nomenon. However, within narrative theory, character traits belong to the 
subject area of characterization, and mental events belong to the subject area 
of thought presentation. The absence of a holistic approach makes a recogni-
tion of the whole fictional mind difficult to achieve.
 In making this criticism, I need to stress emphatically that I am not 
talking about the practice of nonintroductory narratology texts, such as those 
on the representation of consciousness (Dorrit Cohn’s Transparent Minds 
[1978]) and those about character (James Phelan’s Reading People, Reading 
Plots [1989] and Alex Woloch’s The One vs. the Many [2003]). For example, 
although Phelan’s book is about characterization and does not explicitly 
address the relationship between that topic and the representation of con-
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sciousness, it does sometimes draw on representations of characters’ minds 
in its discussions of their mimetic functions. My argument is that there is a 
problem with the standard introductions to narratology. This problem is less 
obvious in other work in the field because, in practice, it is not possible to 
draw a coherent distinction between character and consciousness. However, 
the distinction is still being made in the introductory theory.
 Now let us look at the solution—dispositions—from a number of dif-
ferent angles: real minds, theories about real minds, actual fictional narra-
tives, and theories about fictional narrative. I will then go on to a brief dis-
cussion of some of the statements about dispositions to be found in a chapter 
from The Portrait of a Lady.
 First, our experience of real minds, both our own and others’. Appeals to 
introspection are always dangerous because people’s minds work in different 
ways, but I will take the risk anyway. When you become self-consciously 
aware of having had a particular mental event—a thought, sensation, emo-
tion, or feeling—do you find that you often tend to link it to your char-
acter traits, your habits of thought, your dispositions? You may experience 
a single feeling of irritation with someone and then think, “he really does 
annoy me when he starts talking like that!” You notice a recurring pattern 
there regarding your reactions to his behavior. Or you have a memory of an 
embarrassing moment and think, “I really do wish I could stop remembering 
things like that and think more positively!” In other words, are you inclined 
to locate your current thought processes within the context of your whole 
mind? Here is another question: Do you do the same to other people? That 
is, when you are engaged in third-person, rather than first-person attribu-
tion? A colleague suggests moving a meeting from Friday afternoon to ear-
lier in the week and you think, “That’s only because he likes to get away early 
on Fridays to have a long weekend!” You are linking the assumed mental 
event behind his action to an assumed disposition to act in a certain way.
 The answers that I am hoping for, by the way, are “yes” in every case. 
And assuming they really are yes, the conclusion that we can draw is that 
a person’s dispositions are important to the workings of their mind. They 
form the links between the aspects that endure over time—their beliefs and 
attitudes, their personality, their character, their self—and the immediate 
mental events of their consciousness. Most mental events—admittedly not 
all, but most—are manifestations of a person’s dispositions. And a person’s 
actions and behavior, how they interact with their physical and social envi-
ronment, will also arise out of their dispositions. Let us look again at the 
notion of the self in this context. What tools should we use to measure the 
self that is located between the individual and others? On the one hand, 
individual mental events are too small-scale. We need a concept to link indi-
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vidual mental events together. On the other hand, the concepts of character 
or personality are too large-scale and too contestable to do the job either. As 
I said earlier when introducing the concept of situated identity, think how 
much disagreement there often is over someone’s personality. What is most 
help, I suggest, is the medium-sized area in the middle—dispositions.
 Now to turn to formal theories about real minds. That dispositions play 
such a central role in considerations of a person’s whole mind is the reason 
why they are so important in both philosophy and psychology. In chapter 5 
of his Principles of Psychology, the psychologist William James (the brother of 
Henry) called them bundles of habits (1983, 109). In a particularly evocative 
phrase, the philosopher Daniel Dennett terms them mind-ruts (1991, 300). 
The concept has great explanatory power within the behaviorist perspective 
of such philosophers as Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to 
Ryle, “to talk of a person’s mind is . . . to talk of the person’s abilities, liabili-
ties, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the 
doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world” (1963, 190). 
He also suggested that a “number of the words which we commonly use to 
describe and explain people’s behavior signify dispositions and not episodes” 
(1963, 112). The philosopher Stephen Priest explains that, for Ryle, “it is a 
mistake to think of a belief as any kind of occurrence at all. Beliefs are dis-
positions. According to Ryle’s account, a person has a disposition if he or she 
has a tendency or propensity to behave in a particular way” (1991, 48). This 
emphasis by philosophers and psychologists on the importance of disposi-
tions is shared by scholars in other disciplines. The anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz maintains that “the term mind denotes a class of skills, propensi-
ties, capacities, tendencies, habits” (1993, 58)—another list of dispositions. 
Antonio Damasio believes that “What we usually describe as a ‘personality’ 
depends on multiple contributions . . . anything from trivial preferences to 
ethical principles” (2000, 222). In the first book on cognitive science that I 
read after drafting this passage (Merlin Donald’s A Mind So Rare [2002]) I 
had to wait until only the second page before coming across a reference to 
dispositions. I may have been lucky, but I do not think so.
 All these theorists are saying that when we talk about a mind, we are 
talking in the main about dispositions. They argue that our emphasis should 
not be on specific mental occurrences such as single thoughts, but on states 
of mind that exist over time. We often think that we are talking about mental 
events when what we are really talking about is mental states. You may find 
some of this implausible, but it is salutary at the very least, I think, to be 
aware of a discourse about minds that is so different from what we are used 
to as narrative theorists.
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 So, dispositions are as important in theories about real minds as they 
are in our folk psychological beliefs about ourselves and others. Are they 
important in fictional narrative too? Surely they are. As I have already sug-
gested, narrative texts are full of statements that present an episode of imme-
diate consciousness within the context of a character’s dispositions. Con-
sider again the example that I used earlier (“Isabel felt some emotion, for 
she had always thought highly of her grandmother’s house”) in the light of 
my comments on real minds. This statement places the single mental event 
of Isabel feeling emotion within the context of Isabel’s disposition to think 
highly of her grandmother’s house. The second half of the sentence is given 
as an explanation for the first. The mental event occurs, in part, because of 
the disposition. That is the force of the word “for” in that sentence. It is by 
means of frequently encountered sentences such as these that we are able to 
build up a sense of Isabel’s whole mind—her consciousness, her emotions, 
her beliefs, her personality, her self, her character.
 But what happens when we leave behind the real minds of both folk and 
academic psychology and the fictional minds of narratives and turn to nar-
rative theory? Well, in my experience, a strange thing happens: dispositions 
disappear. It is rare indeed for works of narrative theory even to mention the 
word. Obviously, discussions of character traits arise within the passages of 
practical criticism that are contained in theoretically oriented works, but the 
notion of dispositions has, as far as I am aware, never been explicitly theo-
rized, either in relation to characterization or to the representation of con-
sciousness. But if dispositions are so important to the theory and practice of 
real minds and to the actual constructions of fictional minds, why are they so 
neglected when it comes to theories of fictional minds? My guess is that it is 
because characterization theory began life as a semiotic study, a specific area 
of inquiry with a conceptual apparatus of intertextual stereotypes, actants, 
functions, and so on. Meanwhile, the representation of consciousness devel-
oped along parallel lines as a linguistic study, a completely separate subject 
area with a different conceptual apparatus of free indirect discourse, stream 
of consciousness, interior monologue, et cetera. As neither semiotics nor 
linguistics is comfortable with the concept of dispositions, what is needed is 
a cognitive study of fictional minds that is.
 John V. Knapp is absolutely right to say that “the application of dispo-
sitional research to literary study  .  .  . will in its own right open new and, 
I hope, fertile ground for literary criticism and the teaching of literature” 
(1996, 16). To show what the study of fictional dispositions might look like, 
I have listed below some of the statements about them that are to be found 
in chapter 3 of The Portrait of a Lady. Although this is a short chapter, I 
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found in it so much material that I was obliged to use only a selection. There 
is a gloss for each disposition-description that explains its function. Many 
of the sentences describe actions too and are also presentations of social 
minds.
Being a high-tempered man he had requested her to mind her own busi-
ness. (80)
The disposition (being high-tempered) is given as the reason for the action 
(the request).
Mrs Touchett’s behavior was, as usual, perfectly deliberate. (80)
The phrase “as usual” shows that her deliberate behavior on this occasion 
arises from her disposition to behave in this way.
To say [Isabel] was so occupied is to say that her solitude did not press 
upon her; for her love of knowledge had a fertilising quality and her 
imagination was strong. (76)
The two dispositions (love of knowledge and strong imagination) are the 
reasons for her current state of mind (solitary occupation). The word “for” 
establishes the connection.
There was no need of writing, for she should attach no importance to any 
account of them she should elicit by letter: she believed, always, in seeing 
for one’s self. (80)
Mrs Touchett’s general background disposition (wanting to see for oneself) 
explains a current, hypothetical one (attaching no importance to accounts 
of others). The causal connection is made clear, very concisely, by a colon.
She was not fond of the English style of life, and had three or four reasons 
for it to which she currently alluded; they bore upon minor points of that 
ancient order, but for Mrs Touchett they amply justified non-residence. 
(76)
The statement presents a character’s self-conscious awareness of her own 
motive (disposition to dislike the English way of life) for her action (non-
residence).
The opportunity of listening to the conversation of one’s elders (which 
[for] Isabel was a highly-valued pleasure) [was] almost unbounded. (77)
Even as a child she thought her grandmother’s home romantic. (77)
These two descriptions explain the background to the workings of Isabel’s 
mind by describing her childhood dispositions.
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Isabel felt some emotion, for she had always thought highly of her grand-
mother’s house.
But the emotion was of a kind which led her to say: “I should like very 
much to go to Florence.” (81)
As discussed earlier, the first sentence relates a specific and current mental 
event (feeling emotion) to the background disposition (thinking highly). 
Then the disposition and the mental event are used to explain the action 
(making a statement). Again, the word “for” has an explanatory role.
She was as eccentric as Isabel had always supposed; and hitherto, when-
ever the girl had heard people described as eccentric, she had thought of 
them as offensive or alarming . . . But her aunt made it a matter of high 
but easy irony . . . (82)
This illustrates Isobel’s evolving character and personality as she finds that 
her previous disposition (to find eccentric people offensive) was mistaken. 
The development of dispositions has a role in the explanation of character 
change.
[Mrs Touchett] was virtually separated from her husband.  .  .  .  This 
arrangement greatly pleased her; it was so felicitously definite. It struck 
her husband in the same light, in a foggy square in London, where it was 
at times the most definite fact he discerned; but he would have preferred 
that such unnatural things should have a greater vagueness. (75–76)
This is the background to the characters’ joint disposition to live apart. It 
also explains the different attitudes of Mr and Mrs Touchett toward their 
shared decision.
She had her own way of doing all that she did, and this is the simplest 
description of a character which, although by no means without lib-
eral motions, rarely succeeded in giving an impression of suavity. Mrs 
Touchett might do a good deal of good, but she never pleased. (75)
This statement describes other characters’ perceptions of Mrs Touchett’s 
dispositions.
She was usually prepared to explain [her motives]—when the explana-
tion was asked as a favor; and in such a case they proved totally different 
from those that had been attributed to her. (75)
Mrs Touchett’s disposition to explain her motives makes clear the sub-
stantial differences between her constructions of her own mind and other     
characters’ constructions of it.
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Mrs Touchett was certainly a person of many oddities, of which her 
behavior on returning to her husband’s house after many months was a 
noticeable specimen. (75)
A specific action (returning home) is put in the context of her “odd” disposi-
tions.
It had lately occurred to her that her mind was a good deal of a vagabond, 
and she had spent much ingenuity in training it to a military step and 
teaching it to advance, to halt, to retreat, to perform even more compli-
cated maneuvers. (79)
This sentence illustrates Isabel’s highly self-conscious awareness of her hab-
its of thought.
 Despite, I hope, finding this exercise of interest, you may be thinking 
that the notion of dispositions will be of less value when it comes to the 
study of the modernist novel, where there is an intense focus on the indi-
vidual mental events that make up the stream of consciousness. In Ulysses, 
for example, Leopold Bloom’s consciousness is directly presented as a stream 
of thought. Well, up to a point. Recall the famous introduction to Bloom: 
“Mr Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He 
liked thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liver slices fried 
with breadcrumbs. Most of all he liked grilled mutton kidneys which gave to 
his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine” (45). This is a description of a 
disposition.
 I have been talking so far only about explicit disposition sentences. I 
have not mentioned yet the fact that readers are predisposed (note my use 
of the term) to infer dispositions from statements about individual mental 
events. The alert reader will quickly notice from the two streams of con-
sciousness that make up the bulk of some, but only some, of the eighteen epi-
sodes in Ulysses that, despite the fact that it is not openly stated, Bloom has a 
disposition to think scientifically while Stephen’s is to think philosophically.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The next chapter provides the theoretical context for the detailed work on 
social minds that will occupy the rest of the book. It goes into more detail on 
such concepts as the internalist and the externalist perspectives, intermental 
and intramental thought, and intermental units. The chapter then presents a 
short taxonomy of intermentality before attempting to justify this potentially 
unfamiliar way of thinking to any literary scholars who may have reserva-
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tions about it. To conclude it, I present a case study—a passage from Evelyn 
Waugh’s Men at Arms (1952)—in order to give an initial indication of what 
an analysis of social minds in the novel might look like. This one focuses 
specifically on the notion of unconscious thought.
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 consist of discussions of the social minds to be 
found in those magnificent canonical warhorses Middlemarch, Little Dorrit, 
and Persuasion. As your heart may well be sinking at the thought of yet more 
readings of these great, but undeniably well-studied, novels, I think I should 
explain my choice of texts. I wish to show that cognitive analyses really can 
reveal fresh insights, even into apparently overanalyzed novels such as these. 
My aim is to ensure that the next time you read these three novels with which 
you thought you were completely familiar, you will read them differently.
 In chapter 3, I argue that Middlemarch is a mosaic of intermentality. The 
various intermental units portrayed in it are so integral to the plot of the 
novel that it would not be possible for a reader to follow that plot without 
an understanding of them. The chapter is divided into three parts: the ini-
tial construction of the Middlemarch mind (in the singular), the subsequent 
development of (plural) Middlemarch minds, and the Lydgate storyworld. 
This arrangement is, I think, true to the actual experience of reading Middle-
march. The existence of the apparently monolithic, single, large intermental 
unit that I call the Middlemarch mind is established in the first few pages of 
the novel before it becomes apparent that what appears at first to be a single 
mind consists in fact of several different Middlemarch minds. In the final 
section I describe the construction of an individual character, Lydgate, and 
analyze the most important small intermental unit to which he belongs: his 
marriage to Rosamond. This section explains how the reader brings together 
attributions from various sources in order to construct a single, easily iden-
tifiable fictional mind. This section is placed last because I think that the 
individual characters and small units in the novel are best understood within 
the wider intermental context that is established by the first two sections of 
this chapter.
 The discussion of Little Dorrit in chapter 4 starts with some general issues 
such as the importance of the externalist perspective on private thought and 
the concept of physically distributed cognition. It then looks at three of the 
ways in which the social minds in the novel communicate with each other: 
the face, nonverbal communication, and the look. I go on to scrutinize the 
workings of some large, medium, and small intermental units, the last-
named starting with the Dorrit family and including some of its individuals 
(such as Mr Dorrit and Fanny) as well as its subunits (for example, Little 
Dorrit and Mr Dorrit, and Little Dorrit and Fanny). Next, I look at the most 
important intermental pairing in the novel—the relationship between Little 
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Dorrit and Clennam—first from the point of view of Clennam’s knowledge 
of Little Dorrit’s mind and then of her knowledge of his. This is followed by 
a discussion of some other small units such as Clennam and Mrs Clennam, 
Mrs Clennam and Flintwinch, and Little Dorrit and Pet. The chapter then 
makes use of attribution theory in relation to a key element of narrative fic-
tion, action, by analyzing a short passage from the novel. I aim to show how 
the presentations of actions contained in novels are extremely informative 
about the mental functioning of fictional characters. In particular, I will dis-
cuss what discursive purposes are served by these presentations. By looking 
at an apparently internalist issue such as action within an externalist context, 
I reveal that some of the actions described in this passage are undertaken by 
groups and that Clennam’s actions can best be understood as a response to 
their intermental behavior.
 Chapter 5 consists of four parts, the first two of which relate to Persua-
sion. In the first, I focus on Anne Elliot’s social mind by examining some of 
the small intermental units to which she belongs, in particular her relation-
ship with Wentworth. In its second part, the chapter will follow the same 
pattern as the two previous ones in placing an apparently internalist nar-
rative feature after the analysis of social minds. In this case it is emotions. 
I argue that much of the mental functioning in novels consists of emotions 
and feelings. Emotions drive narratives. A novel with all of the emotions 
and feelings taken out would not make much sense. Then, after commenting 
briefly in the third part of the chapter on some other nineteenth-century 
novels such as Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley (1849), Elizabeth Gaskell’s Wives 
and Daughters (1865), and The Warden in order to widen the perspective a 
little, I return in the fourth part to the three main texts in order to summa-
rize some of the similarities and differences in the social minds contained in 
them.
 Chapter 6, the final chapter, is again divided into four parts. In the 
first, I discuss the need for a rigorously diachronic approach to the study of 
social minds in the novel and comment briefly on some of the issues that 
would arise from the writing of such a history. The second part consists of an 
analysis of the intermental thought to be found in Enduring Love (together 
with a brief mention of another of Ian McEwan’s novels, Atonement [2001]). 
This discussion is placed at this point in the chapter in order to give a brief 
indication of what a social-minds perspective on the modern novel might 
look like. The book is undeniably “nineteenth-century-centric” and I even 
thought about making this bias explicit by calling it Social Minds in the 
Nineteenth-Century Novel. However, on reflection, I decided to stay with the 
more general title. Although my sort of approach is particularly suited to the 
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novels of that century (as well as the eighteenth century), I believe that it can 
also be productively applied to the twentieth- and twenty-first-century novel 
too, the experimental as well as the formally conservative kind. The discus-
sion of fractured, dislocated intermentality in Enduring Love is an attempt to 
“moderate [this book’s] implicit nineteenth-century-novel-centric vision of 
the ‘natural’ narrative transaction” (I owe this splendid formulation to Porter 
Abbott [personal communication]). In the third section of this chapter I dis-
cuss possible future developments in the study of social minds in other nar-
rative media such as film. The fourth and final section is a rhetorical flourish.
 As you will see from a glance at the contents page, this book is not sys-
tematically chronological. It is not possible for a single study to be exhaustive 
in its analyses of the workings of social minds in even a few case studies. 
The subject is simply too big. What I do, therefore, in chapters 3 to 5 is to 
highlight different aspects of the three texts under discussion. The decisions 
as to which aspects to highlight in which novels were evidence-led rather 
than theory-imposed, bottom-up rather than top-down. In each case, the 
evidence took me in directions that differed markedly from those indicated 
by the other two novels. Every text established its own, distinctive inter-
mental personality. However, it would not be true to say that the aspects of 
social minds that are highlighted in one text never occur in another. Quite 
the contrary. This is why, at the end of chapter 5, I summarize some of the 
shared features of the three texts.
 I start with Middlemarch because it is the best way into the subject of 
social minds in the nineteenth-century novel. It is the fulcrum around which 
the subject turns. In particular, an analysis of its opening few pages is an 
excellent introduction to the study of social minds in practice. It is also a good 
place to begin because its language is more obviously cognitive than any other 
novel of the period. Finally, it is an opportunity to show how the identity of 
an individual character (my example is Lydgate) is constructed in terms of a 
socially situated and distributed network of other minds. Individual charac-
ters and small units are investigated in this chapter within the context of the 
large unit of the whole Middlemarch mind and the medium-sized units of the 
various town minds. The emphasis in the analysis of Little Dorrit is rather dif-
ferent. There, I focus much more on the mechanics of small intermental units 
such as the look, facial expressions, and bodily movement. The chapter also 
goes into some detail on the dynamics of several small intermental units such 
as the Dorrit family and the relationship between Clennam and Little Dorrit. 
I then go back in time to Persuasion to return to the key issue of how a char-
acter (Anne Elliot being the example in this case) is necessarily embedded 
within networks of social minds. The treatment of Anne differs, though, from 
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that of Lydgate. With Anne, I focus less on the basics of character construc-
tion and more on the role that this kind of approach to character plays in our 
overall understanding of the whole novel.
 To implement the externalist perspective fully, it is necessary to examine 
within it not only obviously external topics such as social minds and inter-
mental thought but also some apparently more internalist issues. To achieve 
this aim, it is necessary to establish the externalist perspective first. In Fic-
tional Minds, I adopted the usual order of internalist first and externalist 
second. For this book, I have made a conscious decision to work in the 
reverse direction. This is why chapters 3 to 5 start with social minds before 
going on to three concepts that are generally thought of as belonging more 
naturally within the internalist perspective: the construction of character in 
Middlemarch, action in Little Dorrit, and emotions in Persuasion. My aim is 
to show, in every case, that these issues benefit greatly from being seen from 
within an externalist perspective.
 I have been told that this kind of analysis is “infectious.” In other words, 
after you finish this book you will find social minds at work in whatever 
novel you next read. I was pleased to hear this and hope that it is always the 
case. (This process has already begun for me. My holiday reading during a 
well-earned break from the final revisions for this book included a novel by 
the excellent Irish writer John McGahern called Amongst Women [1991]. I 
found the following description of three sisters on page two: “Apart, they 
could be breathtakingly sharp on the others’ shortcomings but together their 
individual selves gathered into something very close to a single presence” 
[2]). On the face of it, the infectious nature of the analysis might sound like 
an argument for going easy on the amount of evidence to be presented in 
this book. I have, however, not done so. I was reluctant to prune the quota-
tions in chapters 3 to 5 and, as a result, a substantial amount of evidence has 
been assembled in them. The danger is that you may start to think, “OK! 
We’ve got the picture, now!” But my intention in quoting so frequently from 
the texts is to show that social minds are woven into the fabric of their dis-
courses. I hope that the weight of evidence presented in them is sufficient to 
demonstrate the point. In fact, the following chapters contain only a sample; 
there was insufficient room to use it all. I would like this book to represent a 
paradigm shift. I want readers to say of it, “Wow! There was so much of this 
stuff going on and we never saw it!”
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S PEAKING BROADLY, there are two perspectives on the mind: the inter-nalist and the externalist. These two perspectives form more of a con-tinuum than an either/or dichotomy, but the distinction is, in general, 
a valid one.
•	 An internalist perspective on the mind stresses those aspects that are 
inner, introspective, private, solitary, individual, psychological, myste-
rious, and detached.
•	 An externalist perspective on the mind stresses those aspects that are 
outer, active, public, social, behavioral, evident, embodied, and engaged.
I use the term social mind to describe those aspects of the whole mind that 
are revealed through the externalist perspective.
 It seems to me that the traditional narratological approach to the rep-
resentation of fictional character is an internalist one that stresses those 
aspects that are inner, passive, introspective, and individual. This undue 
emphasis on private, solitary, and highly verbalized thought at the expense 
of all the other types of mental functioning has resulted in a preoccupation 
with such concepts as free indirect discourse, stream of consciousness, and 
interior monologue. As a result, the social nature of fictional thought has 
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been neglected. But, as Antonio Damasio suggests, “the study of human con-
sciousness requires both internal and external views” (2000, 82), and so an 
externalist perspective is required as well, one that stresses the public, social, 
concrete, and located aspects of mental life in the novel.
 As table 2.1 shows, a number of the concepts that are used to analyze 
the workings of fictional minds tend to fit easily into one or other of these 
perspectives. Some of these pairs oppose each other precisely; other pairings 
are much looser. The types of relationships within the pairings include oppo-
sition, complementarity, and intersection (as, for example, when an interior 
monologue shows evidence of Bakhtinian dialogicality). The term aspectu-
ality, as mentioned in the previous chapter, refers to the fact that storyworlds 
are always experienced under some aspects and not others by the charac-
ters who inhabit them. People experience the same events in different ways. 
Within the internalist/externalist framework, I see focalization and aspectu-
ality as complementing each other. Focalization occurs when the reader is 
presented with the aspect of the storyworld that is being experienced by the 
focalizer at that moment. In this context, the concept of aspectuality serves 
as a reminder that, meanwhile, the storyworld is also being experienced dif-
ferently, under other aspects, by all of the characters who are not currently 
being focalized in the text. Any of those other characters could have been 
focalized if the author had chosen to do so. The term continuing conscious-
ness, as I have said, stands for the process whereby readers create a con-
tinuing consciousness for a character out of the scattered, isolated mentions 
of that character in the text. The idea of continuing consciousnesses links 
nicely with the concepts of aspectuality and focalization. Other characters’ 
TABLE 2.1 
INTERNALIST PERSPECTIVE EXTERNALIST PERSPECTIVE
Private minds Social minds
Intramental thought Intermental thought
Personal identity Situated identity
First-person attribution Third-person attribution
Subjectivity of self Subjectivity of others
Focalization Aspectuality
Introspection Theory of mind
Stream of consciousness Continuing consciousness
Interior monologue Bakhtinian dialogicality
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consciousnesses are continuing while, at any single point in the narrative, 
only one consciousness is being focalized.
 The internalist/externalist framework is also helpful in expanding our 
awareness of the implications of the concept of subjectivity. As the list sug-
gests, the term can be used in both a first-person way (subjectivity of self) and 
a third-person way (subjectivity of others). The term situated identity locates 
selfhood and identity between the two. Aspectuality acts as a reminder here 
too, this time of the existence of the subjectivity of others, as available to us 
through the use of our theory of mind. The concept of aspectuality is a way 
of bringing to center stage previously marginalized characters whose voices 
may not often be heard. Knapp (1996) has applied the techniques of family 
systems therapy to D. H. Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers (1913) in order to rein-
terpret the emotional landscape of that storyworld from the point of view 
of Paul’s father. This is an unusual perspective because the focalization in 
the novel (through Paul, who has a difficult relationship with his father and 
tends to side with his mother) does not encourage it.
 An important part of the social mind is our capacity for intermental 
thought. Such thinking is joint, group, shared, or collective, as opposed to 
intramental, or individual or private thought. It is also known as socially 
distributed, situated, or extended cognition, and also as intersubjectivity. 
Intermental thought is a crucially important component of fictional nar-
rative because, just as in real life, where much of our thinking is done in 
groups, much of the mental functioning that occurs in novels is done by 
large organizations, small groups, work colleagues, friends, families, couples, 
and other intermental units. Notable examples include the army in Evelyn 
Waugh’s Men at Arms, the town in William Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily” 
(1930), the group of friends in Donna Tartt’s The Secret History (1992), the 
villainous Marchioness de Merteuil and the Viscount de Valmont in Laclos’ 
Les liaisons dangereuses (1782), and Kitty and Levin in Tolstoy’s Anna Kar-
enina (1877), who, in a famous scene, write out only the initial letters of the 
words that they wish to use but who nevertheless understand each other 
perfectly. However, these are only a few of the most notable examples. My 
argument is that intermental units are to be found in nearly all novels. It 
could plausibly be argued that a large amount of the subject matter of novels 
is the formation, development, maintenance, modification, and breakdown 
of these intermental systems. As storyworlds are profoundly social in nature 
(even Robinson Crusoe has his Friday), novels necessarily contain a good 
deal of collective thinking. However, intermental thought in the novel has 
been invisible to traditional narrative approaches. Indeed, many of the 
samples of this sort of thought that follow in later chapters would not even 
count as examples of thought and consciousness within these approaches. 
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But shared minds become clearly visible within the cognitive approach to 
literature that underpins this book.
 A good deal of the significance of the thought that occurs in novels is 
lost if only the internalist perspective is employed. Both perspectives are 
required, because a major preoccupation of novels is precisely this bal-
ance between public and private thought, intermental and intramental 
functioning, and social and individual minds. Within this balance, I will 
be emphasizing social minds because of their past neglect. In illustrating 
the importance of the functioning of the social minds in my main example 
texts, Middlemarch, Little Dorrit, and Persuasion, I aim to show that it is not 
possible to understand these novels without an awareness of these minds as 
they operate within their storyworlds. They are one of the chief means by 
which the plots are advanced. If you were to take all of the social thought 
out of these three novels, they would not be comprehensible. So, given the 
importance of this subject to the study of the novel, it seems to me that it is 
necessary to find room for it at the center of narrative theory.
 I will take one example from many in order to illustrate the issues that 
may arise from an overreliance by literary critics on the internalist perspec-
tive. I have chosen Reading the Nineteenth-Century Novel: Austen to Eliot 
(2008) by Alison Case and Harry E. Shaw, because it is an excellent study 
that contains many valuable internalist insights. (For example, it points out 
that Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre [1847] starts with a tight, uncontextualized 
focus on Jane’s consciousness and explains how revolutionary this decision 
was within the evolution of the nineteenth-century novel.) But, more trou-
bling from an externalist perspective, Case and Shaw also remark on “how 
difficult it is for people to be simply themselves in any social setting” (2008, 
24). These questions occur to me: Why assume that the self can only be 
found (or easily found) in solitude? Could it not be the other way round? Is 
it possible that we are only really ourselves when with others? When we are 
alone, are we not more easily tempted to construct convenient, comfortable, 
easy-to-live-with narratives for ourselves that may be distortions of reality? 
Similarly, Case and Shaw talk about Wuthering Heights’s “conflicting fan-
tasies of escape from, or reconciliation with, the multiple restraints of self-
hood that enable a stable, social world” (2008, 68; my emphasis). (Although 
this appears to be an objective description of the novel, I sense authorial 
agreement too.) Well, that is one way of looking at selfhood. Another, more 
externalist way is to see the social world as providing the possibilities for, or 
affordances for, the expression of selfhood.
 Within the real-mind disciplines of psychology and philosophy there is 
a good deal of interest in the mind beyond the skin (as opposed to the mind 
inside the skull): the realization that mental functioning cannot be under-
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stood merely by analyzing what goes on within the skull but can only be 
fully comprehended once it has been seen in its social and physical context. 
Case and Shaw put the point nicely in their otherwise internalist study when 
they speculate about Walter Scott’s wish to “reveal human nature, not from 
the skin in, but from the skin out” (2008, 37). Social psychologists routinely 
use the terms mind and mental action not only about individuals but also 
about groups of people working as intermental units. So, it is appropriate to 
say of these groups that they think or that they remember. James Wertsch 
explains that “the notion of mental function can properly be applied to social 
as well as individual forms of activity” (1991, 27). As he puts it, a dyad (that 
is, two people working as a cognitive system) can carry out such functions 
as problem solving on an intermental plane (1991, 27). It is significant that 
cognitive scientists are now beginning to share the interest of social psychol-
ogists in the mind beyond the skin. For an overview of the work being done 
in the new research area called social neuroscience, see The Neuroscience of 
Social Interaction: Decoding, Influencing and Imitating the Actions of Others, 
edited by Chris Frith and Daniel Wolpert (2004).
 You may be asking what is achieved by talking in this way, instead 
of simply referring to individuals pooling their resources and working in 
cooperation together. The advocates of the concept of distributed cogni-
tion such as the theoretical anthropologists Gregory Bateson (1972) and 
Clifford Geertz (1993), the philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers 
(1998) and (2009) and Daniel Dennett (1996), and the psychologists Edwin 
Hutchins (1995) and James Wertsch all stress that the purpose of the concept 
is increased explanatory power. They argue that the way to delineate a cogni-
tive system is to draw the limiting line so that you do not cut out anything 
whose absence leaves things inexplicable (Bateson 1972, 465). To illustrate, 
Wertsch tells the story of how his daughter lost her shoes and he helped 
her to remember where she had left them. Wertsch asks: Who is doing the 
remembering here? He is not, because he had no prior knowledge of where 
they were, and she is not, because she had forgotten where they were and was 
only able to remember by means of her father’s promptings. It was therefore 
the intermental unit formed by the two of them that remembered (Sperber 
and Hirschfeld 1999, cxxiv). If you draw the line narrowly around single per-
sons, and maintain that cognition can only be individual, then things remain 
inexplicable. Neither on their own remembered. If you draw the line more 
widely, and accept the concept of an intermental cognitive system, then 
things are explained. The intermental unit remembered. The same applies 
not just to problem solving but also to joint decision making and group 
action. Here is a simple example from Evelyn Waugh’s Vile Bodies (1930) 
that I will use again when explaining the philosophical concept of action in 
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chapter 4: “The three statesmen hid themselves” (86). The decision to hide 
is an intermental one that is taken together by all three individuals, and the 
action of hiding is also one that they perform together.
 Intermental cognitive systems are, to some extent, independent of the 
individual elements that go to make them up. This is not to say that the 
whole is necessarily greater than the sum of its parts; it is simply to say that 
it is different from the sum of its parts. One example of this difference is the 
vivid metaphor with which I began this chapter and which was used by the 
author Edith Somerville to describe her writing partnership with Martin 
Ross: a question of “mixing blue and yellow which together makes green.” 
Something similar happened when the poet John Ashbery wrote a novel 
with James Schuyler in the 1950s, each contributing a line or two at a time. 
In the diary section of the Times Literary Supplement (5 December 2008), the 
diarist wondered which of the two wrote the line “Why don’t you admit that 
you enjoy my unhappiness?” The following response from Ashbery was pub-
lished two weeks later: “In regard to the line in question, I can’t remember. 
Schuyler and I were often unable to remember who had written what, as 
our lines seemed to emerge from an invisible third person” (Times Literary 
Supplement [19 December 2008]). There are musical examples too. Keith 
Rowe, a member of the free improvisation group AMM, once told me that 
while the group was playing, he would sometimes not know whether it was 
he or another member of the group who was producing the sounds that he 
could hear.
 However, in considering the wide-ranging nature of intermental func-
tioning (problem solving, decision making, coming to ethical judgments, 
and so on), it should be borne in mind that analyses of this sort of thought 
should involve no preconceptions about its quality. Intermental thought is as 
beautiful and ugly, destructive and creative, exceptional and commonplace 
as intramental thought. The communal creativity described in the previous 
paragraph should be balanced against, for example, the scapegoating ten-
dencies of many groups, and also against Pentagon “groupthink.”
 An emphasis on social minds will inevitably question these twin 
assumptions: first, that the workings of our own minds are never accessible 
to others; and, second, that the workings of our own minds are always and 
unproblematically accessible to ourselves. This book will, in the main, ques-
tion the first assumption and will make much less reference to the equally 
questionable second, although the subject does come up occasionally (as in 
the Men at Arms case study that follows). But in disputing the first-named 
assumption by discussing the public minds that are to be found in Middle-
march, Little Dorrit, and Persuasion, I must stress that I am certainly not 
saying that fictional minds are always easily readable. Sometimes, they are; 
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sometimes, they are not. In these three novels, I will argue, they frequently 
are. In other novels, especially those of the twentieth and twenty-first cen-
turies, however, different levels of readability and unreadability will apply. 
For more discussion on this, see Porter Abbott’s “Unreadable Minds and the 
Captive Reader” (2009).
 In an illuminating article titled “Diagramming Narrative,” Marie-Laure 
Ryan uses diagrams as a semiotic tool for the understanding of narrative 
in relation to three aspects of plot—time, space, and mind. On the ques-
tion of mind, she refers to the subject matter of narrative as the “evolution 
of a network of interpersonal relations” (2007, 29) and convincingly shows 
how diagrammatic representations of these networks can add a good deal 
to our understanding of the narrative process. She illustrates this approach 
with two highly technical analyses, one of a minimal, two-sentence narrative 
and the other of the fable “The Fox and the Crow” (which was also used in 
Ryan 1991). It seems to me that a modified and necessarily greatly simpli-
fied variant of this sort of approach could be used to analyze the workings 
of social minds in whole novels. For example, the complex interrelations 
between different intermental units can be thought of as resembling the 
patterns made by Venn diagrams, in which overlapping circles are used to 
express the relationships between classes of objects. Such a diagram would 
show that the memberships of some groups are completely included within 
larger ones, some might have no overlap of membership with any others, 
others would have partial membership overlaps, and so on. With at least 
some of the novels to be discussed later, it would be possible, though diffi-
cult, to construct Venn diagrams that could vividly illustrate this complexity 
in visual terms.
 Little narratological work has been done on social minds in the novel. 
Exceptions include studies of aspects of distributed cognition by John V. 
Knapp (for example, 1996) and also by the postclassical narrative theorists 
David Herman (2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2008, and 2010) and Uri Margolin 
(1996b and 2000). The exploration of “we” narratives (that is, narratives 
written predominantly in the first-person plural) that was initiated by Mar-
golin and continued by Brian Richardson (2006) has produced rewarding 
results (see, for example, Marcus 2008). A welcome and related develop-
ment has been the important work done by the literary critic Susan Sniader 
Lanser in Fictions of Authority (1992), in which she focuses on the concept 
of communal voice. Her use of the term voice shows that she is concerned 
with the relationship between “we” narration and “I” narration in which 
one speaker represents others. That is to say, she explores the telling, the 
mode of narration, the discursive practices of the novels that she discusses. 
Lanser writes persuasively about some of the important issues raised by the 
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notion of communal thought such as the problematic erasure of differences 
between individuals and the need to make speculative and potentially mis-
taken assumptions about the thoughts of others. I want to take a more inclu-
sive approach, however, and set these issues as well as some of the more 
positive ones arising from intermentality into a wider context. Most of the 
nineteenth-century novels that feature plentiful evidence of shared thought 
have heterodiegetic narrators and are not therefore examples of a communal 
voice. The studies mentioned above are pioneering, but they have focused 
in the main only on the relatively small number of narratives written in the 
“we” form; my point is that little attention has been given to the much larger 
group of what, in response, I would call “they” narratives: that is, narratives 
that feature social minds.
 You may be feeling some doubt about this claim regarding the neglect 
of intermental thought. Surely we have always known about the impor-
tance of groups right from the beginning of Western literature. What about 
the role of the chorus in Greek tragedy? Well, yes, undoubtedly, but my 
claim is that this knowledge has not been reflected in the theory on mental 
functioning in narrative. Obviously, we all know about the proverbial vox 
populi, both in literature (especially in drama) and also in our daily lives, 
but the purpose of the present book is to examine the socially situated or 
intermental cognition lying at its basis and the various ways in which it is 
represented in narrative. What about Menakhem Perry’s masterly analysis 
of William Faulkner’s short story “A Rose for Emily” (1979), in which the 
townspeople as a group play such an important role? Perry’s article is a 
groundbreaking contribution to our knowledge of the role of cognitive 
frames in the reading process, but I do not think that it was part of his 
intention explicitly to recognize the status of the town as an intermental 
unit. That is the purpose of this book.
A TYPOLOGY
Obviously the extent, duration, and success of intermental activity will vary 
greatly from occasion to occasion. Because this is such a wide, relatively 
uncharted area in the context of literary studies, the following, rather basic 
typology may be of some value.
1. Intermental encounters. At the minimal level, this consists of the group 
thought that is necessary for conversations between individuals to take 
place. It is not possible to have a coherent dialogue without at least some 
intermental communication. A minimal level of mind reading and 
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theory of mind is required for characters to understand each other and 
thereby make everyday life possible. It is made easier or more difficult 
by a variety of factors such as solipsistic versus emotionally intelligent 
individuals, easily readable versus impenetrable minds, familiar versus 
unfamiliar contexts, similar versus different sorts of social background, 
and so on. A heightened awareness of the mental functioning of another 
can occur within random encounters between people who do not know 
each other particularly well or even between complete strangers. I am 
sure that most readers of this book will have had the experience of 
meeting somebody for the first time and instantly feeling that you are 
both on the same wavelength. A focus on the workings of long-term, 
stable intermental units such as couples and families as itemized below 
can give a misleading impression if it suggests that intermental thought 
can only occur within such units. As we know from our real-life experi-
ence, mind reading can occur in a variety of situations. Sometimes, it is 
what might be called reciprocal: there is a conscious and fully intended 
sharing of thought and so people will know that others know what they 
are thinking. At other times, it is inadvertent: someone may reveal their 
thoughts without meaning to. In these cases, that person may not know 
that their mind has been read by another person, or they may notice 
that it has been, for example by the other’s facial expression.
  In addition to our various encounters with countless strangers and 
acquaintances over the course of our lives, we all belong to intermental 
units. I would define these as stable, fairly long-lasting groups that 
regularly employ intermental thinking. They vary greatly in size, and I 
will adopt the rather simplistic approach of referring to them as small, 
medium, and large units. Obviously, many other, rather more sophisti-
cated typologies are possible. John V. Knapp (personal communication) 
has suggested one that would measure group membership along a scale 
of interpersonal intensity. For example, someone may feel an intense 
involvement in the unit formed by their work colleagues but may have a 
much more distant relationship with their own family.
2.  Small intermental units. Characters tend to form intermental pairs and 
small groups of various sorts such as marriages, close friendships, and 
nuclear families. It is likely that, over time, the people in these units 
will get to know quite well what the others are thinking. However, these 
small groups will obviously vary greatly in the quality of their inter-
mental thought, and readers’ expectations may not be met. Many fic-
tional marriages have much less intermental thought than one might 
think (depending on the level of one’s expectations in this matter, of 
course). For an excellent analysis of the small intermental unit of a mar-
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riage, see Elena Semino’s “Blending and Characters’ Mental Functioning 
in Virginia Woolf ’s ‘Lappin and Lapinova’” (2006).
3.  Medium-sized intermental units. The intermentality that occurs between 
the individuals in medium-sized units such as work colleagues, networks 
of friendships, and neighborhoods is rather different from the one that 
arises in random encounters and small units. Here, the emphasis is less 
on individuals knowing what another person is thinking, and more on 
people thinking the same way (whether or not they know that others are 
also thinking that way). Examples that are highlighted in later chapters 
include some of the subgroups of the Middlemarch mind in chapter 3, 
the Circumlocution Office in chapter 4, and the party to which Anne 
Elliot belongs in chapter 5.
4.  Large intermental units. Individuals are also likely to belong to larger 
groups that will also have a tendency to think together on certain issues 
and so produce a collective opinion or consensus view on a particular 
topic. To pursue this point in greater depth would be to take this study 
into concepts such as ideology that are well beyond the scope of this 
book. The dynamics involved in large groups are similar to those that 
govern medium-sized units. Examples from the novels studied in future 
chapters include the town of Middlemarch, “Society” in Bath (Persua-
sion), and the important role that the public plays in the passage from 
Little Dorrit that is discussed at the end of chapter 4.
5.  Intermental minds. These are intermental units, large, medium, or small, 
that are so well defined and long-lasting, and where so much successful 
intermental thought takes place, that they can plausibly be considered 
as group minds. Couples who have been together for a long time, who 
know each other’s minds well, and who are able to work well together 
on such joint activities as decision making and problem solving are the 
best examples. However, larger groups may also acquire some of these 
characteristics. Though well defined, these groups will contain individ-
uals who will often be completely different from each other. Opinions 
will inevitably differ widely on the point at which a particular collection 
of people can be regarded as sufficiently stable, well-functioning, and 
distinctive to be defined as an intermental mind. I will argue that the 
town of Middlemarch, a large unit, may be called an intermental mind, 
together with some marriages such as the Crofts in Persuasion and the 
Meagles in Little Dorrit.
 The simplicity of this typology hardly begins to do justice to the com-
plexity and range of the intermental units to be found in novels. Neverthe-
less, it does have some value in providing a map, however rudimentary, by 
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which this unfamiliar territory may be initially explored. It is obvious that 
there is a wide spectrum of phenomena covered by the term intermental 
thought and also by this typology: it ranges from chance encounters between 
two strangers to the life of a whole town over a long period. I do not see 
any harm in this, as long as we remain conscious of it. The priority is to 
establish the viability of the externalist perspective on fictional minds as a 
whole. Then it will be possible to specify the intricate complexities that can 
be revealed by that perspective. In his review of Dorrit Cohn’s inspirational 
study Transparent Minds, the narratologist Brian McHale said that the “his-
tory of our poetics of prose is essentially a history of successive differen-
tiations of types of discourse from the undifferentiated ‘block’ of narrative 
prose” (1981, 185). These wise words have guided me throughout my narra-
tological studies. I see the first book as having hacked off a huge, previously 
undifferentiated block of prose and labeled it fictional minds. This current 
stage involves detaching a smaller but still sizeable chunk (labeled social 
minds) from the fictional-minds block, for the purpose of reducing it further 
into ever smaller and finer fragments. The intention is that, by these means, 
the work may eventually, over time, become progressively less industrial and 
heavy-duty in nature and rather more craftsmanlike.
 As with all other aspects of the reading process, we bring our real-world 
cognitive frames to bear when we encounter fictional intermental units. As I 
say, these frames will entail the default assumption that our theory of mind 
works better with spouses, close friends, and immediate family than it does 
with total strangers. We assume that the attributional success rate will be 
higher than average in such relationships. Within the externalist perspective, 
it is not surprising that we often know what other people are thinking. It is 
not a question of occasional sudden flashes of insight, but of a steady pattern 
of shared thought processes resulting in fairly accurate prediction rates. This 
pattern is, of course, regularly disrupted by intermental breakdowns, some-
times serious, and my intention is certainly not to minimize the importance 
of these breakdowns. As I will repeat at regular intervals throughout this 
book, it is a balance. Sometimes, as we shall see, the default slots are filled; 
sometimes, when our assumptions are wrong, they are not. When there are 
frequent misunderstandings or a fundamental lack of communication, the 
reader has to reconsider the nature of the relationship and amend the frame. 
In extreme cases, such as Anne Elliot’s relationship with her father and older 
sister, and Clennam’s with his mother, major reconstruction, such as the use 
of a new, dysfunctional-family frame, is quickly required.
 I have found that some literary scholars tend to react with initial skepti-
cism and even hostility to the idea of intermental thought. However, it is my 
experience that this hostility tends to wear off with time, to be replaced by 
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curiosity and even enthusiasm. Others are interested from the beginning in 
the concept of intermental thought, but resist the concept of an intermental 
mind. It is a step too far. But there is really little difference between what I 
have in mind for the concept of an intermental mind and what these skep-
tics are prepared to accept. Intermental minds consist simply of individual 
minds pooling their resources and producing different results. Have a look 
again at the definition of an intermental mind that I gave above and ask 
yourself whether you disagree that couples can get to know each other so 
well that they are frequently “of one mind” and can solve problems together 
very efficiently. I doubt that you do. So what we are really talking about is 
whether the use of the term mind is appropriate for this mutual cooperation.
 While considering this question, it is worth bearing in mind the func-
tionalist perspective on mental life that is characteristic of a good deal of 
the cognitive sciences and that asks what thinking does, what it is for. In 
questioning what constitutes a mind and what does not, this perspective has 
an extremely liberating effect because it leads you to question what is meant 
by a mind. Artificial-intelligence (AI) researchers look at the mind in term 
of outputs, or what the brain does. They therefore investigate whether these 
outputs can only be produced by wetware (that is, the physical composition 
of the brain) or whether the same results can also be obtained from com-
puter hardware. And once your concept of mind is flexible enough for you to 
question the commonsense assumption that the physical brain is necessary 
to the production of a mind, you are then free to wonder whether a mind can 
also consist of more than one brain.
 In his famous “Chinese Room” thought experiment, John Searle (1980) 
asks us to imagine someone who cannot understand Chinese but who is put 
into a room containing some Chinese writing together with instructions for 
handling this writing. The instructions say what writing should be passed 
out of the room as answers to particular questions. Using these instructions, 
the person is able to “answer” questions written in Chinese even though he 
or she does not understand that language. From the outside, the room looks 
like a thinking mind because when questions are submitted to it, they are 
correctly answered. (I can cite a similar sort of case from my day job. I am 
able to produce perfectly adequate minutes of meetings despite having had 
very little understanding of what was being discussed. I am being serious.) 
Searle’s point is that computers function in the same way as the Chinese 
room. They appear to work as minds do, but in fact they do not. He wishes 
to undermine the claim of the “strong AI” argument that computers can 
have minds. John Searle’s Chinese Room experiment is controversial, and 
people disagree vehemently over its significance. Can you regard the (non-
Chinese-speaking) individual-plus-the-writing-plus-the-instructions as a 
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“mind”? Most people would not. But if you are one of those, how do you 
explain the fact that the brain is also made up of equally blind, unknowing 
elements? Within the brain, consciousness is distributed across constituent 
modules that are just as incapable of independent cognition as the various 
elements that go to make up the Chinese room. Why not just talk of these 
individual modules pooling their resources to produce better results? Well, 
we do, except that we have a single word for this process—the mind.
 Some of the philosophers and psychologists who subscribe to the notion 
of socially distributed cognition are also interested in another aspect of the 
mind that is called physically distributed cognition: “our habit of off-loading 
as much as possible of our cognitive tasks into the environment itself ” (Den-
nett 1996, 134). Andy Clark calls this process Supersizing the Mind (2009). 
It is achieved mainly through tools such as pen and paper and computers. 
However, in a less obvious sense, we also make use of our whole environment 
as a cognitive aid. In her seminal study The Art of Memory, the historian 
Frances Yates describes how ancient orators used parts of the auditorium as 
memorial reference points for sections of their oratory. On a more mundane 
level, when we are in our own homes, we know where everything is and our 
cognitive functioning runs smoothly; when we are put into an alien environ-
ment, the quality of our thinking can suffer. Dennett convincingly illustrates 
the importance of physically distributed cognition to old people when he 
describes how they tend to become disoriented when taken out of their own 
homes and put into the unfamiliar environment of a nursing home. As Den-
nett says, “Taking them out of their homes is literally separating them from 
large parts of their minds” (1996, 128). Examples of physically distributed 
cognition are mentioned in the following chapters. Within the context of the 
present discussion, it may be regarded as the argument that a mind can cor-
respond to a brain plus inanimate objects. Yet another opportunity for flex-
ibility in one’s conception of the mind is the doctrine of behaviorism, which 
can be interpreted, in a certain sense, as the argument that when we talk of 
the mind, we are talking of (the behavior of) the body.
 The more you read of philosophical and psychological debates such as 
these, the more flexible your concept of mind becomes, whether by breaking 
it down into its constituent elements, or by building it up (that is, distrib-
uting it) to include external elements. To summarize, there are at least four 
different ways in which the cognitive sciences can open up our thinking 
about the mind and, in particular, loosen the rigid correspondence of one 
mind to one brain. These are as follows:
•	 A mind can be realized by machinery: one mind corresponding to 
no (wetware) brain;
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•	 A mind can be interpreted in terms of behavior: one mind corre-
sponding, in a certain sense, to one body;
•	 A mind can be physically distributed: one mind corresponding to 
one brain plus inanimate objects; and
•	 A mind can be socially distributed: one mind corresponding to 
more than one brain.
Within this context, I hope that the use of the term mind to refer to a group 
may not seem so surprising. To put the point simply: the mind is a fuzzy 
concept.
 Even so, you may be wondering how intermental units are able to 
survive Occam’s razor, the principle that entities should not be multiplied 
beyond necessity. Why create a new entity of an intermental unit instead of 
simply talking of individuals? I would turn the question around and point 
out that the advocates of socially distributed cognition are postulating one 
theoretical entity (the intermental unit, made up of two or more different 
elements) to explain a joint mental operation, whereas the traditional view 
posits at least two (the sum of the individuals involved). So Occam’s razor 
should apply to the internalist rather than to the externalist position.
 Some skeptics argue that cognitivists put old wine into new bottles. 
I acknowledge that there are points in this book where an analysis in the 
noncognitive language of mainstream literary theory would produce sim-
ilar results (for example, the discussions in chapter 4 of the role of the face, 
nonverbal communication, and the look). However, I would argue that the 
cognitive orientation displayed in this study links together disparate, previ-
ously only partially visible aspects of the novel and combines them into a 
complete cognitive theory of social fictional minds. Within this theoretical 
framework, new insights into these various elements, even those that are 
capable of noncognitive explanations, will, I think, emerge.
CASE STUDY: MEN AT ARMS
I will now illustrate some of the concepts discussed so far in this chapter and 
the previous one by applying them to a short passage of text. I will attempt to 
reveal what I think are important insights into this passage by approaching 
it from the following four perspectives: storyworlds, theory of mind, inter-
mental thought, and unconscious thought. My example text is one of the 
great passages of twentieth-century English literature: the description of Guy 
Crouchback’s departure from Italy at the beginning of Evelyn Waugh’s Men 
at Arms. Crouchback is leaving his family home outside the Italian village 
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of Santa Dulcina delle Rocce on the eve of the Second World War in order 
to go to London to enlist in the army. As he is driven away, he thinks about 
the Italian word simpatico (meaning sympathetic in the sense of congenial, 
compatible, or of similar mind or temperament):
He was not loved, Guy knew, either by his household or in the town. He 
was accepted and respected but he was not simpatico. Grafin von Gluck, 
who spoke no word of Italian and lived in undisguised concubinage with 
her butler, was simpatica. Mrs Garry was simpatica, who distributed Prot-
estant tracts, interfered with the fishermen’s methods of killing octopuses 
and filled her house with stray cats.
Guy’s uncle, Peregrine, a bore of international repute whose dreaded pres-
ence could empty the room in any centre of civilization—Uncle Peregrine 
was considered molto simpatico. The Wilmots were gross vulgarians; they 
used Santa Dulcina purely as a pleasure resort, subscribed to no local 
funds, gave rowdy parties and wore indecent clothes, talked of “wops” 
and often left after the summer with their bills to the tradesmen unpaid; 
but they had four boisterous and ill-favoured daughters whom the Santa-
Dulcinesi had watched grow up. Better than this, they had lost a son bath-
ing from the rocks. The Santa-Dulcinesi participated in these joys and 
sorrows. They observed with relish their hasty and unobtrusive departures 
at the end of the holidays. They were simpatici. Even Musgrave who had the 
castelletto before the Wilmots and bequeathed it his name, Musgrave who, 
it was said, could not go to England or America because of warrants for his 
arrest, “Musgrave the Monster,” as the Crouchbacks used to call him—he 
was simpatico. Guy alone, whom they had known from infancy, who spoke 
their language and conformed to their religion, who was open-handed 
in all his dealings and scrupulously respectful of all their ways, whose 
grandfather built their school, whose mother had given a set of vestments 
embroidered by the Royal School of Needlework for the annual procession 
of St. Dulcina’s bones—Guy alone was a stranger among them. (15–16)
The four issues (storyworlds, theory of mind, intermental thought, and 
unconscious thought) resolve themselves into the following simple state-
ments:
•	 The passage constructs a fictional storyworld that readers have to gain 
access to in order to understand the narrative.
•	 Readers gain access to this storyworld primarily by trying to follow the 
workings of the minds of the characters described in it, and, in par-
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ticular, by following how these characters try to follow the workings of 
each other’s minds.
•	 One of the minds that is active in the passage is the collective or group 
mind of the inhabitants of the town. 
•	 Some of the thinking that this group mind does is unconscious.
I will now explain the background to each of these statements in turn.
 Readers employ the notion of the storyworld when they say of novels, 
as we all do, that they are “true to life” or “realistic,” or that they are “incon-
sistent” or “farfetched,” and so on. When we say things such as these we are 
positing the existence of a storyworld and then comparing it to our own real 
world. Let us try the real-world/storyworld comparison on this beautiful 
piece of writing. I think it is likely that, when we do, the reaction of many 
readers will be “How true! It’s so accurate, so true-to-life. That is how people 
behave! Life is unfair!” But what do we mean when we say these things? 
After all, we are talking about a semiotic construct: an imaginary town peo-
pled by imaginary characters. Well, we mean that this imaginary world is like 
the real world in certain important ways, but what is the relationship that is 
conveyed by that single, simple word “like”?
 The storyworld described in the passage consists in part of physical 
spaces containing various objects. Let us have a detailed look at this world. It 
is set in Italy and the Second World War is about to begin. It contains taxis, 
households, towns, butlers, fishermen and fishing nets, octopuses, houses, 
cats, uncles, bores, pleasure resorts, funds, parties, clothes, bills, tradesmen, 
rocks, holidays, arrest warrants, language, religion, ways of doing things, 
grandfathers, schools, mothers, vestments, processions, bones, and strangers. 
I have listed these elements in such exhaustive and slightly surreal detail in 
order to illustrate how dense even short descriptions of storyworlds can be. 
The passage that contains these thirty-odd elements is less than three hun-
dred words long. Even the most apparently simple reading process involves 
a number of complex cognitive operations. An obvious point follows, but it 
is one that is well worth making explicit: in order to understand the passage, 
in order to reconstruct this storyworld, the reader has to know what taxis, 
butlers, and fishing nets are. As the length of the list shows, a good deal of 
this sort of real-world knowledge is required for narrative comprehension. 
But, in addition to knowing what these things are, we also have to be capable 
of the many inferences contained in the language that describes them if we 
are to achieve full understanding. When the text says that Uncle Peregrine 
could empty a room, we have to work out what this really means: everybody 
knows that he is so boring that people leave the room hastily when they see 
him in it.
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 Because it is obvious that this storyworld is like the real world in the 
sense that all of the objects contained in it exist in reality, we are able to 
apply to it what Marie-Laure Ryan calls the principle of minimal departure 
(1991). That is, we assume that any narrative storyworld is like our own 
until the text provides evidence of such departures from the real world as 
magical or supernatural entities or events. Her concept is a description in 
different terms of the default values contained in the frames that we apply 
to fictional texts. Our assumption that the storyworld will not depart from 
the real world unless we are told otherwise is a default position. So, when 
we study a narrative, we look for the clues that will tell us in what ways, if 
at all, the storyworld created by that narrative differs from the real world. 
The default position applies in the case of Men at Arms, where there are no 
magical beings with supernatural powers.
 However, a further comparison between the storyworld and the real 
world is required. In addition to consisting of physical spaces and objects, 
storyworlds also comprise the minds of the characters who inhabit those 
spaces: Guy and the other people who live in the town. Although the sense 
of place and the existence of objects are important, these fictional minds 
are far more so. If I am right that reader responses to the passage will tend 
to go along the lines of “Life’s just like that!” then these responses would 
be concerned with fictional minds. Spaces and objects usually have signifi-
cance only insofar as they affect the mental functioning of the characters in 
the storyworld. Just as our real minds always operate within a physical and 
social context, so fictional minds always operate within the specific social 
and physical context of their storyworld. The fishing nets, the taxis, the cats, 
and the location of the town are important because they mean something to 
the fictional minds of the characters who experience those things. Does the 
principle of minimal departure apply to these fictional minds just as it does 
to the physical objects? How do the minds described in the text correspond 
to what we know of our own minds and what we know of the minds of other 
people? Do the characters behave like real people? These questions bring us 
to the next issue: theory of mind.
 Just as the physical spaces and objects of the storyworld are experienced 
by characters, so readers also interpret the events that take place there as 
characters’ experiences. The Wilmots’ flight from the town is not simply 
an event. It is something that is experienced by the Wilmots because it is 
an action that they take. They arrive at the belief that they have run out 
of money; they have the desire to escape the consequences of their lack of 
money; and they come to the decision that it would be in their best interests 
to take the action of leaving the town. It is also an experience for the town. 
It watches the departure with relish because it is using its own theory of 
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mind on the Wilmots. It has followed the causal mental network that I have 
just described, and therefore understands why they are leaving. Finally, and 
more indirectly, it is an experience for Guy. He, presumably, has also fol-
lowed the thinking behind the Wilmots’ action, and he is also aware of the 
inexplicably tolerant attitude of the town toward it. The death of the son is 
another obvious example of an experience for both the family and the town. 
(By the way, to get back to intermental minds for a moment: please note that 
I have been talking quite naturally here about both the Wilmot family and 
the town as joint or group minds. I wonder whether any reader of this book 
who was having difficulty with the theory presented earlier in this chapter 
thought to themselves while reading this paragraph: “How can a group of 
people such as a town or a family have a collective mind?” I doubt it. What 
may seem bizarre in theory can often seem perfectly natural in practice.)
 The Men at Arms storyworld is aspectual. Like the real world, it varies 
depending on the diverse aspects under which it is viewed, and its charac-
ters can experience it only from a particular perceptual and cognitive aspect 
at any one time. The storyworld will therefore appear different to, and be 
experienced differently by, the various minds of the characters. Guy has a 
set of knowledge, values, opinions, beliefs, and so on that differs substan-
tially from those of the other people in the passage. The notion of simpatico 
forms an important part of his mind because he so keenly feels its absence, 
whereas it appears that it does not form part of theirs. Guy obviously knows 
much more about the town than the Wilmots do as he has taken the trouble 
to study it. He is respectful and knowledgeable about it; they flaunt the fact 
that they are not. He therefore views the storyworld as it relates to the town 
completely differently from them. In fact, the whole Men at Arms storyworld 
is so aspectual in nature that the Guy storyworld is a substantially different 
one from the Wilmots’ storyworld. His town is a different town from theirs. 
(I pursue this point further when I talk about the “Lydgate storyworld” in 
chapter 3.) Even this, though, is an oversimplification. The contrast so far 
has been with the Wilmots, but they are not the only other people in this 
passage. More generally, the notion of simpatico is one that Guy shares with 
the whole community. Indeed, it is plausible to speculate that he gets it from 
that community. In other words, even his intramental thought has an inter-
mental component.
 You may be thinking that I have gone too far. “We are only talking here 
about 298 words on the page. The proper names contained in those words 
refer only to literary constructs. We should not talk about them as though 
they’re real people.” I would fundamentally disagree. In recognizing their 
status as semiotic constructs, we do have to approach fictional characters in 
similar ways to real people. We have to hypothesize, speculate, and theorize 
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in precisely the way I have been doing and will be doing in order to make 
any sense of the 298 words. When we enter a storyworld, we have to try to 
fill the gaps in it. Guy’s relationship with the town is a prelude to the rest of 
the novel, which is concerned with his relationship with his army regiment. 
If we do not understand the former, we will not understand the latter. The 
relationship with the army is explored in much greater depth and over a 
longer period, but the initial cognitive frame provided by the passage I am 
discussing here helpfully illuminates the problematical nature of his future 
army career.
 As the passage represents Guy’s thoughts and is seen from Guy’s point of 
view, it is focalized through Guy. But look again at this sentence: “Better than 
this, they had lost a son bathing from the rocks.” If the sentence is taken in 
isolation, the phrase “better than this” is extraordinary. How can it be better 
for a young boy to die? It cannot be better for the narrator that the Wilmots 
have lost their son, and it is obviously not better for the Wilmots that they 
have. The focalization in this case is complex. One approach is to say that it 
is better for the town, in the sense that his death makes the Wilmots even 
more simpatico. On this view, the Wilmots are being presented from the 
town’s point of view: the description of the event is focalized through the 
town. So, although the whole passage is focalized through Guy, this spe-
cific intermental focalization is embedded within Guy’s focalization. But an 
alternative and richer interpretation is that the focalization continues to be 
Guy’s: it is he, not the villagers, who is thinking (resentfully) “better than the 
daughters, there is the dead son” because that loss makes the vulgar Wilmots 
more simpatico with the villagers than he is. His awareness of the villagers’ 
response to the son’s death influences his judgment here, but it is he, not the 
villagers, who is the focalizer. Saying that it is the villagers who are thinking 
“better than this” makes them seem awfully callous, and that runs counter 
to what we learn in the next sentence: “The Santa-Dulcinesi participated in 
these joys and sorrows.” A further complication is that you can also hear in 
that sentence the ironic timbre of the voice of the cool and dispassionate nar-
rator of the novel.
 To put my general point another way, it is revealing to analyze fiction 
in terms of levels of intentionality. (This term is used in the philosophy of 
mind quite differently from its usual meaning to refer to the “aboutness” of 
mental states. Such states nearly always have some content, are directed at 
something, are about something.) In this sentence, I have counted five levels 
of intentionality:
1.  The narrator presents
2.  how Guy experiences
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3.  how the town experiences
4.  how the Wilmot family experiences
5.  the fact that the son experienced his fatal accident.
So, this apparently simple sentence of only twelve words (“Better than this, 
they had lost a son bathing from the rocks”) contains a complex set of several 
different levels of thought. Note in particular, though, that the second and 
fifth levels relate to individual minds while the third and fourth levels relate 
to group minds. This leads us on to the next point.
 An internalist perspective will not by itself tell us much about the mental 
functioning that is going on in this passage. True, it will show that the text 
is describing Guy’s individual, private feelings, but after that, it is not much 
use. Only an externalist perspective will reveal, for example, that the town 
has an intermental mind, that the cognitive functioning of the individual 
characters is apparent to the town from their action and behavior, and that 
Guy’s feelings make sense only when understood as a reaction to the feelings 
of the town. The passage is not just about the intramental functioning of one 
individual, and not just about the intermental functioning of the town: it is 
about the complex, dialogical relationship between the two. What do I mean 
by referring to the mind of this town? Look again at the passage and at the 
range of cognitive functioning of which this group mind is capable. It has 
known Guy since infancy. It does not love him because it does not find him 
simpatico, but it does accept and respect him. It finds Guy still a stranger. 
It does find simpatico the other individuals who are listed in the passage. It 
can forgive those others their faults. It watches the Wilmot daughters grow 
up. It participates in the joys and sorrows of the Wilmots. It observes “with 
relish” their departures. It has its language, its religion, and its ways. How can 
an entity that is capable of such wide-ranging and sophisticated cognitive 
functioning not be called a mind?
 I would now like to talk about some of the ideas on unconscious thought 
that are developed in a fascinating book by the psychologist Timothy Wilson 
called Strangers to Ourselves (2002). The notion of unconscious thought is 
not central to this book. I am talking about it here simply to illustrate that 
the social-minds approach is a versatile one that can be taken in many dif-
ferent directions. A good deal of work has been done by a number of psy-
chologists on unconscious thought, but I am using Wilson because he syn-
thesizes this work in a clear and approachable way. Although he discusses 
only individuals, it will be illuminating, I hope, to apply his ideas on the role 
of the unconscious to the thinking of groups. I will be arguing that, because 
the workings of the town’s mind have a significant unconscious element, the 
town judges people in the same way as the intramental unconscious mind, 
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the town’s attitudes to individuals are conditioned by feeling rules, and, as 
a result, the town has dual attitudes toward Guy and the other individuals. 
(The two italicized terms are explained below.) And, most importantly, these 
features account for what is most remarkable and distinctive about the pas-
sage—its counterintuitive and apparently paradoxical quality.
 The unconscious thought that I will be discussing consists of much more 
than just the Freudian unconscious of psychoanalytical theory. (I referred to 
this wider concept in Fictional Minds as nonconscious thought, precisely in 
order to differentiate it from the Freudian unconscious. However, I will talk 
about “the unconscious” here because that is what Wilson calls it.) Here are 
three examples of this much wider category of unconscious thought. First 
(2002, 164), Wilson quotes an estate agent as saying that she always listens 
carefully to what her clients tell her about the sort of house they want to buy. 
She then completely ignores what they have said and simply watches them 
as they react to the different sorts of houses they visit. Often, a very different 
picture of their real wants emerges. The estate agent finds the evidence of 
what customers do much more reliable than the evidence of what they say. 
In the second example (2002, 85), students were asked if they would buy a 
flower as part of a campus charity event and eighty-three percent said they 
would. In fact, only forty-three percent did. When they were asked whether 
other people would buy a flower, their prediction (of fifty-six percent) was 
much more accurate. In a similar sort of study, people predicted that they 
would donate an average of $2.44 of their earnings to charity and that other 
people would donate $1.83. The actual figure was $1.53. The final example 
(2002, 101–2) is an extraordinary one. Young men were approached by an 
attractive young woman in a park and asked to take part in an experiment. 
During the discussion, she gave them her phone number. Some of the men 
were approached while negotiating a flimsy and scary footbridge over a deep 
gorge and others while sitting on a park bench. Sixty-five percent of the men 
on the footbridge called her and asked for a date, while only thirty percent of 
the men on the bench did so. Why the difference? The researchers predicted 
that the men on the footbridge would mistakenly attribute their beating 
hearts, shortness of breath, and perspiration to physical attraction rather 
than just fear of falling off the bridge, and this appears to be exactly what 
happened.
 Psychologists such as Wilson conclude from this evidence that people 
are often simply mistaken about the nature of their own mental functioning. 
They think with their conscious mind that they are going to do one thing, 
but, because the decisions are in fact taken by their unconscious mind, they 
end up doing another. For this reason, we are often much more accurate 
in predicting other people’s behavior than we are in predicting our own. 
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According to Wilson, “There is no direct access to the  .  .  .  unconscious, 
no matter how hard we try  .  .  .  It can thus be fruitless to try to examine 
the . . . unconscious by looking inward. It is often better to deduce the nature 
of our hidden minds by looking outward at our behaviour and how others 
react to us and coming up with a good narrative” (2002, 16). What Wilson 
is saying is that our private thought is often not immediately accessible and 
available to us. We have to infer what we ourselves are thinking in much the 
same way as we infer what other people are thinking. We deduce the nature 
of the workings of our unconscious mind by looking outward at the behavior 
that results from it. That is what Guy does in deducing that his behavior has 
made him non simpatico to the town even though his conscious mind has 
tried so hard to be simpatico. So, although thought can be private and inac-
cessible to others (no one else will know exactly what thoughts Guy is having 
in the precise form in which he is having them), thought can also be public 
and available to others. The workings of the individual minds of Grafin von 
Gluck, Mrs Garry, and the Wilmots are visible to the town and to Guy, and 
the workings of the town’s intermental mind are visible to Guy as well. In 
particular, he believes from the behavior of the townspeople that they find 
others simpatico but not him. This is the externalist perspective in practice.
 The notion of unconscious thought can also usefully be linked, not just 
to specific mental events, but also to the concept of dispositions. According 
to Wilson, the nineteenth-century psychologist William Hamilton “wrote 
extensively about the way in which habits acquired early in life become 
an indispensable part of one’s personality. These mental processes are said 
to constitute a kind of ‘automatic self ’ to which people had no conscious 
access—an idea that was not to reappear in psychology for more than 100 
years” (2002, 11–12). Hamilton argued that our dispositions become part of 
our unconscious mind. It is in this way that the town has acquired habits of 
thought that have become an indispensible though unconscious part of its 
intermental personality.
 Am I right in saying that the town has unconscious feelings and does not 
have any direct access to them? Let us speculate. Imagine an inhabitant of the 
town being asked to make his or her feelings explicit, and therefore conscious: 
“How do you feel about Mr Crouchback? Do you like Mr Musgrave more?” 
I find it quite likely that they would then be conscious of what they are sup-
posed to feel and so reply that certainly they like Mr Crouchback as much as 
Mr Musgrave, if not more. However, that is the sort of insincere reassurance 
that people feel they have to produce in order to be polite. So let us put the 
hypothetical question to the inhabitants in a different way and ask them, as 
Wilson suggests, to analyze their behavior. “Do you behave in a less open and 
more reserved way towards Mr Crouchback than towards Mr Musgrave?” It 
seems quite plausible to me that they would be genuinely surprised to hear 
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that this was a possibility and that Mr Crouchback had noticed any differ-
ence. Their conscious minds would find it difficult to recognize the behavior 
that has resulted from the workings of their unconscious minds.
 The unconscious is “a spin doctor that interprets information outside 
of awareness [and that] does a reasonably accurate job of interpreting other 
people’s behaviour” (Wilson 2002, 31). “One of the most interesting prop-
erties of the  .  .  .  unconscious is that it uses stereotypes to categorize and 
evaluate people” (2002, 11). In doing so, it is fast, unintentional, uncontrol-
lable, and effortless (2002, 49). Specifically, it has a tendency to jump to con-
clusions, and often fails to change its mind in the face of contrary evidence 
(2002, 55–56). This sounds to me like a fairly good description of the cogni-
tive functioning of the town. It certainly categorizes and evaluates people. 
Precisely how it arrives at its views is a gap in the storyworld, but I would 
suggest that it is likely to be done in a fast, unintentional, uncontrollable, and 
effortless way. It is difficult to imagine the townspeople agonizing at length 
about what they should think about Guy, Grafin von Gluck, and the others. 
It also seems that the town tends to jump to conclusions and fails to change 
its mind in the face of contrary evidence. Guy has been trying for twenty 
years to get the town to change its mind about him and has failed. On the 
other hand, as I will now go on to argue, it has done a reasonably accurate 
job of interpreting Guy’s mind.
 Wilson points out that, while forming its views, the unconscious can 
produce feelings and preferences that are not always “rational.” That is to say, 
the workings of the unconscious have their own rationality, which is often 
different from the alternative rationality of the workings of the conscious 
mind (2002, chapter 8). He then draws attention to the resulting difficulty 
in recognizing the feelings generated by the unconscious mind: “The con-
scious system is quite sensitive to personal and cultural prescriptions about 
how one is supposed to feel . . . People might assume that their feelings con-
form to these prescriptions and fail to notice instances in which they do not. 
These ‘feeling rules’ can make it difficult to perceive how one’s  .  .  . uncon-
scious feels about the matter” (2002, 129; my emphasis). Wilson refers to the 
resulting “phenomenon in which people have two feelings towards the same 
topic, one more conscious than the other, as ‘dual attitudes’” (2002, 132; my 
emphasis). To illustrate, he quotes from a short story in which two adult 
cousins reminisce about their childhoods. One of them, Blake, says that he 
was about thirty before he realized that he had always hated their child-
hood pony, Topper. “It wasn’t until Blake said it that Kate realized that she, 
too, had always hated Topper. For years they had been conned into loving 
him, because children love their pony, and their dog, and their parents, and 
picnics, and the ocean, and the lovely chocolate cake” (quoted in 2002, 118). 
This last sentence is a list of feeling rules: children must have positive feelings 
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about their pony, their dog, and so on. As a result, the cousins had a dual 
attitude toward the pony: the positive feelings that they knew they were sup-
posed to have according to the feeling rules; and the negative feelings that 
they subsequently and consciously discovered that they had unconsciously 
had all along.
 The Men at Arms passage is a list of feeling rules and also of dual atti-
tudes. It is a list of the reasons why Guy thinks that the conscious mind of the 
town ought to find him simpatico. It is also two other lists: why Guy thinks 
that the town ought to find the others less so, and why the town nevertheless 
finds the others more so.
 As with individual minds, collective minds can also experience feeling 
rules and dual attitudes. These feeling rules are implied in all the details 
that are given about Guy and the others. Every one of the descriptions of 
the individuals is a reason for disapproval: not bothering to learn Italian, 
interfering with the fishing, being boring, being gross vulgarians, being a 
criminal. Every one of the descriptions of Guy is a reason for approval: he 
speaks their language and follows their religion, and he is open-handed and 
scrupulously respectful of all their ways. Nevertheless, each of these descrip-
tions is balanced by a conclusion that contradicts it: the others are simpatico; 
Guy is not. The unconscious mind of the town feels the opposite of what it 
should feel. It is in this way that every sentence in the passage contains a 
dual attitude toward Guy or toward the others. This conflict gives the pas-
sage its characteristic sense of tension and unease, which arises, as I said 
earlier, from its apparently paradoxical and counterintuitive nature. The one 
who seems most likely to be found simpatico is not; all those who seem least 
likely to be, are. So there are deeper, unspecified reasons at work that must 
account for the feelings of the town.
 I talked just now about the fact that the apparent irrationality of uncon-
scious thought is simply a different rationality from conscious thought. The 
narrator exploits this difference by making use of readers’ assumptions about 
what they would think the villagers might find simpatico on the conscious 
level: this is the list of feeling rules. But in the case of the town of Santa 
Dulcina delle Rocce, these considerations do not seem to rate very highly. 
Another apparent irrationality is the disregard for the importance of the 
theory of mind that I discussed earlier. The individuals who are simpatico 
are not aware of the fact that they are. They do not give the impression that 
they are particularly self-aware or aware of the feelings of others. Otherwise, 
they would not behave in such antisocial ways. Guy, on the contrary, tries 
hard to read the mind of the village and is found to be non simpatico. The 
moral seems to be that the less you care about being simpatico, the more 
likely it is that you will be. The reader may then be tempted to conclude that 
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the fictional mind of the town is irrational. But it is clear, I think, that this is 
not so. It is simply that the town is employing a different rationality. What 
is this unconscious rationality? In my view, it is simply a love of life. They 
favor humanity, facing life with gusto, with self-confidence, with self-belief, 
and, as the passage says, “with relish.” They like generosity of spirit. Guy is 
not simpatico because, for all his timid efforts to be liked, he has a poverty 
of spirit, a meanness of the soul, a meagerness about him that they recog-
nize. This poverty of spirit is evident in the way that he thinks resentfully of 
the others and especially in the “better than this” phrase that was discussed 
above. To use a vulgar British expression, he is “tight-arsed.” His life is sterile. 
In the words of Deuteronomy (30:19), and also of the opening sequence of 
the film Trainspotting, he should “Choose life!” Once this point is realized, 
the apparent paradoxes dissolve, it is counterintuitive no longer, and the pas-
sage makes perfect sense.
CONCLUSION
It may be helpful if I conclude this chapter by specifying how much I want 
to claim for the significance of the topic of social minds in the novel. I argue 
that this issue looms large as a technique and as a subject matter in all of the 
novels that I discuss, but techniques and subject matters are parts of novels, 
not purposes of them. They are means rather than ends. What matters, ulti-
mately, is the purpose to which a particular sort of consciousness representa-
tion is put. So my concern in the chapters that follow is with the purposes of 
presentations of social minds. These chapters are opportunities to expand on 
the relationship between analyses of collective consciousness and our larger 
understanding of the whole novel. Put in general terms, I would summarize 
the purposes of fictional presentations of social minds as follows:
1.  Social minds exist in storyworlds because they exist in real life. Our lives 
consist of a balance between publicly available thought processes and 
secret and private thoughts. For novels to be worth reading, they have to 
reflect that balance. Villages and towns tend to behave in reality in the 
way that Santa Dulcina delle Rocce behaves. An important part of the 
pleasure that the Men at Arms passage gives its readers is the recogni-
tion of this fact.
2.  The study of social minds sheds a good deal of light on the workings of 
individual minds. Characters can only be fully understood as elements 
in complex social networks. Guy’s relationships first with the town and 
then with his regiment have a key role in his situated identity. People 
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may have many different sorts of relationships with intermental units: 
fully assimilated into them; within them, but in conflict with other parts 
of the unit; outside, and in opposition to them; acting as a public mouth-
piece for them; and so on. Some of these relationships will be explored 
in the chapters to come.
3.  Narrative progression is regulated by the flow of information that the 
narrator of a novel makes available to its reader. This information fre-
quently concerns the workings of fictional minds. Characters have dif-
ferent levels of knowledge of, and understanding of, the storyworld they 
inhabit. The narrative theorist Lubomír Doležel refers to the storyworld 
knowledge that characters possess as their encyclopedias (1998). These 
encyclopedias are basic plot motors. Storylines tend to revolve around 
the consequences of some characters knowing more than others. Char-
acters have an interest in keeping secrets in order to keep the balance of 
knowledge, and therefore power, in their favor. However, the tendency of 
social minds is toward the sharing of knowledge. As explored in chapter 
5, many nineteenth-century novels are concerned with the practical 
problems that arise when characters attempt to practice secrecy within 
distributed cognitive networks in which people can see very easily what 
other people are thinking.
4.  As I said at the beginning of this book, a fierce debate took place within 
the nineteenth-century novel on the nature of social minds. The epis-
temological aspect related to the extent to which it is possible to have 
knowledge of the workings of other minds. The ethical aspect ques-
tioned the purposes to which our knowledge of other minds should be 
put. Social minds raise complex and difficult ethical issues. Characters 
face sharp and painful dilemmas relating to attempts to exercise control 
over other minds and the motives in trying to doing so. Guy’s predica-
ment has just been discussed. Should Dorothea bend to the will of the 
Middlemarch mind? Should Anne Elliot in Persuasion have been so per-
suadable? What are the moral purposes behind the gaining of informa-
tion about other characters’ thoughts? (For example, in Little Dorrit, 
Henry Gowan uses this knowledge to manipulate others.) What are the 
moral purposes behind trying to conceal one’s own? The reasons for the 
latter can be immoral (Gowan again) or moral (Anne Elliot concealing 
her continued feelings for Wentworth). Anne prefers openness except 
where it would harm herself or others. She knows that Mr Elliot prefers 
secrecy because he can make use of the resulting control of information 
and knowledge for his own purposes. Other perplexities will be investi-
gated in the chapters that follow.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MIDDLEMARCH MIND
O NE OF THE most important characters in Middlemarch is the town of Middlemarch itself. I call the intermental functioning of the inhabitants of the town the Middlemarch mind. I go much further 
than simply suggesting that the town provides a social context within which 
individual characters operate, and argue that, just as in the case of Santa 
Dulcina delle Rocce in the previous chapter, the town literally and not just 
metaphorically has a mind of its own. The Middlemarch mind is complex, 
interesting, clearly visible to a close reader of the text, and vitally impor-
tant to an understanding of the novel because it explains a good deal of the 
motivation behind the actions of the other main characters. In discussing 
the construction of the Middlemarch mind in the opening few pages of the 
novel, I aim to show that these pages are saturated with this group mind, and 
that the initial descriptions by the narrator of the three individual minds of 
Dorothea, Celia, and Mr Brooke are focalized through it.
 Here is an edited, unformatted version of the opening section of the 
novel:
. . . [Dorothea Brooke] was usually spoken of as being remarkably clever, 
but with the addition that her sister Celia had more common sense. Nev-
ertheless, Celia wore scarcely more trimmings; and it was only to close 
Middlemarch
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observers that her dress differed from her sister’s, and had a shade of 
coquetry in its arrangements; for Miss Brooke’s plain dressing was due to 
mixed conditions, in most of which her sister shared. The pride of being 
ladies had something to do with it: the Brooke connections, though not 
exactly aristocratic, were unquestionably “good”: if you inquired back-
ward for a generation or two, you would not find any yard-measuring 
or parcel-tying forefathers—anything lower than an admiral or clergy-
man  .  .  . Young women of such birth, living in a quiet country-house, 
and attending a village church hardly larger than a parlour, naturally 
regarded frippery as the ambition of a huckster’s daughter. Then there 
was well-bred economy, which in those days made show in dress the first 
item to be deducted from, when any margin was required for expenses 
more distinctive of rank . . .
[Dorothea’s] mind was theoretic, and yearned by its nature after some 
lofty conception of the world which might frankly include the parish of 
Tipton and her own rule of conduct there . . . Certainly such elements in 
the character of a marriageable girl tended to interfere with her lot, and 
hinder it from being decided according to custom, by good looks, vanity, 
and merely canine affection . . .
It was hardly a year since [Dorothea and Celia] had come to live at 
Tipton Grange with their uncle, a man nearly sixty, of acquiescent tem-
per, miscellaneous opinions, and uncertain vote. He had travelled in his 
younger years, and was held in this part of the county to have contracted 
a too rambling habit of mind. Mr Brooke’s conclusions were as difficult 
to predict as the weather: it was only safe to say that he would act with 
benevolent intentions, and that he would spend as little money as pos-
sible in carrying them out . . . [Dorothea] was regarded as an heiress, for 
not only had the sisters seven hundred a year each from their parents, but 
if Dorothea married and had a son, that son would inherit Mr Brooke’s 
estate, presumably worth about three thousand a year—a rental which 
seemed wealth to provincial families . . .
And how should Dorothea not marry?—a girl so handsome and with 
such prospects? Nothing could hinder it but her love of extremes, and 
her insistence on regulating life according to notions which might cause 
a wary man to hesitate before he made her an offer, or even might lead 
her at last to refuse all offers . . . A man would naturally think twice before 
he risked himself in such fellowship. Women were expected to have weak 
opinions; but the great safeguard of society and of domestic life was, that 
opinions were not acted on. Sane people did what their neighbours did, 
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so that if any lunatics were at large, one might know and avoid them.
The rural opinion about the new young ladies, even among the cottagers, 
was generally in favour of Celia, as being so amiable and innocent-look-
ing, while Miss Brooke’s large eyes seemed, like her religion, too unusual 
and striking . . . Yet those who approached Dorothea, though prejudiced 
against her by this alarming hearsay, found that she had a charm unac-
countably reconcilable with it. Most men thought her bewitching when 
she was on horseback . . .
These peculiarities of Dorothea’s character caused Mr Brooke to be all the 
more blamed in neighboring families for not securing some middle-aged 
lady as guide and companion to his nieces. But he himself dreaded so 
much the sort of superior woman likely to be available for such a posi-
tion, that he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Dorothea’s objections, 
and was in this case brave enough to defy the world—that is to say, Mrs 
Cadwallader the Rector’s wife, and the small group of gentry with whom 
he visited in the north-east corner of Loamshire. So Miss Brooke pre-
sided in her uncle’s household, and did not at all dislike her new author-
ity, with the homage that belonged to it. (1–4)
 Let us look at this passage first from an internalist perspective. I would 
guess that it would strike most casual readers simply as a description of the 
intramental minds of three characters—Dorothea, her sister Celia, and her 
uncle Mr Brooke—in a straightforward piece of omniscient characteriza-
tion. So, within this perspective, is there much here for the classical narrative 
approaches to sink their teeth into?
 I will start with the representation of consciousness in the text. First, 
there is no intramental free indirect thought. (I put it like this because, as I 
mention below, the passage contains some intermental free indirect thought, 
but you have to have acquired the concept of intermental thought in order 
to be able to see it.) Obviously, given the time of writing, there is no stream 
of consciousness or interior monologue either. In fact, there is no directly 
quoted thought at all. The passage consists almost entirely of authorial 
thought report of general descriptions of consciousness. So that does not 
tell us much. Is characterization theory any more informative? The initial 
cognitive frames that can be put in place immediately reveal quite a lot about 
the characters of Dorothea, Celia, and Mr Brooke. As there are two sisters, 
one studious and the other (relatively) flighty, looked after by a vague, dilet-
tante bachelor uncle, there is certainly potential there for analysis in terms 
of cultural and literary stereotypes. And we learn a lot about initial insta-
bilities within the storyworld, especially the one resulting from Dorothea’s 
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yearning for a lofty conception of the world, despite her current condition. 
Focalization can be revealing too. The internal focalization from Dorothea’s 
perspective highlights the instabilities just referred to. The same is true of 
Mr. Brooke’s mind: “he himself dreaded” et cetera. Finally, will story analysis 
help? Not so much. We are looking at the first three pages of an eight-hun-
dred-page novel, and so the respective roles of the three actants are as yet 
unclear. Celia and Mr Brooke may turn out to be helpers or obstacles, for 
example, but we will not know which for quite a while.
 However, here is a reformatted version of the same passage, edited as 
before:
[Dorothea Brooke] was usually spoken of (1) as being remarkably clever, 
but with the addition that her sister Celia had more common sense. Nev-
ertheless, Celia wore scarcely more trimmings; and it was only to close 
observers (2) that her dress differed from her sister’s, and had a shade of 
coquetry in its arrangements; for Miss Brooke’s plain dressing was due to 
mixed conditions, in most of which her sister shared. The pride of being 
ladies had something to do with it: the Brooke connections, though not 
exactly aristocratic, were unquestionably (3) “good”: if you (4) inquired 
backward for a generation or two, you would not find any yard-measur-
ing or parcel-tying forefathers—anything lower than an admiral or cler-
gyman. . . . Young women of such birth, living in a quiet country-house, 
and attending a village church hardly larger than a parlour, naturally (5) 
regarded frippery as the ambition of a huckster’s daughter. Then there 
was well-bred economy, which in those days (6) made show in dress 
the first item to be deducted from, when any margin was required for 
expenses more distinctive of rank . . .
[Dorothea’s] mind was theoretic, and yearned by its nature after some 
lofty conception of the world which might frankly include the parish 
of Tipton (7) and her own rule of conduct there. . . . Certainly such ele-
ments in the character of a marriageable girl tended to interfere with her 
lot, and hinder it from being decided according to custom (8), by good 
looks, vanity, and merely canine affection. . . .
It was hardly a year since [Dorothea and Celia] had come to live at Tipton 
Grange with their uncle, a man nearly sixty, of acquiescent temper, mis-
cellaneous opinions, and uncertain vote. He had travelled in his younger 
years, and was held in this part of the county (9) to have contracted a 
too rambling habit of mind. Mr Brooke’s conclusions were as difficult to 
predict (10) as the weather: it was only safe to say (11) that he would 
act with benevolent intentions, and that he would spend as little money 
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as possible in carrying them out. . . . [Dorothea] was regarded as (12) an 
heiress, for not only had the sisters seven hundred a year each from their 
parents, but if Dorothea married and had a son, that son would inherit 
Mr Brooke’s estate, presumably worth about three thousand a year—a 
rental which seemed wealth to provincial families (13) . . .
And how should Dorothea not marry?—a girl so handsome and with 
such prospects? (14) Nothing could hinder it but her love of extremes, 
and her insistence on regulating life according to notions which might 
cause a wary man (15) to hesitate before he made her an offer, or even 
might lead her at last to refuse all offers. . . . A man would naturally (16) 
think twice before he risked himself in such fellowship. Women were 
expected (17) to have weak opinions; but the great safeguard of society 
and of domestic life was, that opinions were not acted on. Sane people 
did (18) what their neighbours did (19), so that if any lunatics (20) were 
at large, one (21) might know and avoid them.
The rural opinion about the new young ladies, even among the cot-
tagers (22), was generally in favour of Celia, as being so amiable and 
innocent-looking, while Miss Brooke’s large eyes seemed, like her reli-
gion, too unusual and striking. . . . Yet those who (23) approached Doro-
thea, though prejudiced against her by this alarming hearsay (24), found 
that she had a charm unaccountably reconcilable with it. Most men (25) 
thought her bewitching when she was on horseback . . .
These peculiarities of Dorothea’s character caused Mr Brooke to be all 
the more blamed in neighbouring families (26) for not securing some 
middle-aged lady as guide and companion to his nieces. But he himself 
dreaded so much the sort of superior woman likely to be available for 
such a position, that he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Dorothea’s 
objections, and was in this case brave enough to defy the world—that 
is to say, Mrs Cadwallader the Rector’s wife, and the small group of 
gentry with whom he visited in the north-east corner of Loamshire 
(27). So Miss Brooke presided in her uncle’s household, and did not at 
all dislike her new authority, with the homage that belonged to it. (1–4)
 I hope that you found that, seen from the externalist perspective, much 
of the passage now reads very differently. The formatting in bold type trans-
forms the text into a much more complex and interesting discourse by 
drawing attention to the intermental functioning of the group of people who 
form the consensus opinion of the town and surrounding area. In partic-
ular, the formatting shows that the descriptions by the narrator of the three 
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individual minds of Dorothea, Celia, and Mr Brooke are presented through 
the intermental Middlemarch mind by means of the various cues that I will 
analyze presently. In other words, the point of view is that of the Middle-
march mind, and the passage is primarily focalized through it. The anno-
tated passage shows that there is a good deal of evidence for the existence 
of the Middlemarch mind: twenty-six references in sixty-one lines (plus the 
hypothetical lunatics, a separate group, in item 20) is a substantial number. 
For aesthetic reasons, I have put in bold only the linguistic markers of its 
presence. If I had included all of the content of its views, almost the whole 
passage would have been in bold. I have used boldface type for the references 
to the agents responsible for intermental activity where these agents are 
explicitly mentioned, and, where they are not, I have used boldface for refer-
ences to the intermental activities themselves. The following paragraphs will 
make this point clearer. I will now discuss in more detail how the Middle-
march mind has been constructed by asking these questions in turn: Who? 
How? What? Why?
 The first question then is: Who? Who are the individuals who make up 
the intermental Middlemarch mind? At this stage, in the first few pages of a 
long novel, the narrator is not able to reflect the complexities of the various 
intermental minds in the town that are examined later in this chapter (for 
example, the landed gentry, the middle classes including the professionals, 
and the working classes). The emphasis in the passage is almost exclusively 
on the first of these groups, the landed gentry. This group is explicitly named 
in examples (9) and (22), while the clearest reference to it is in the final 
example (27): “the world—that is to say, Mrs Cadwallader the Rector’s wife, 
and the small group of gentry with whom [Mr. Brooke] visited in the north-
east corner of Loamshire.” With a few exceptions, all of the numbered refer-
ences are to this powerful, norm-establishing core group. Exceptions include 
some neutral or nonspecific groups (“close observers” [2] and “those who 
approached Dorothea” [23]). The only transgressive or norm-threatening 
group, apart from the hypothetical lunatics constructed by the Middlemarch 
mind (20), is the group of men who find Dorothea attractive on horseback 
despite being told not to (25). This is an example, indicated early in the 
novel, of the kind of sexual energy that is traditionally seen as a threat to 
well-established social norms, and which often results in the sort of norm-
disrupting events that are so common in nineteenth-century novels: elope-
ments, secret engagements, unintended pregnancies, and so on.
 The second question is: How? How are the views of this group conveyed? 
In particular, it may not be apparent in all cases precisely how the bold pas-
sages indicate the presence of intermental thought. You may be puzzled as 
to why such items as “unquestionably” (3) and “naturally” (5) have been 
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included as examples of references to the Middlemarch mind. So, a small 
typology is required. I have identified four types of the means of expression 
of the views of the Middlemarch mind and I will list them now in order of 
degree of directness.
 The first is explicit reference to the main landed gentry group. This 
group is referred to either in geographical terms (“the parish of Tipton” [7] 
and “part of this county” [9]); or in social terms (“provincial families” [13]); 
or in both geographical and social terms (“neighbouring families” [26], 
“rural opinion” including the cottagers [22], “the world” et cetera [27]). In 
fact, the two categories of geographical and social are closely interrelated and 
difficult to disentangle, and so are best thought of as a spectrum. However, 
even the areas referred to in simply geographical terms (such as the parish of 
Tipton [7]) have to be included in this survey because the social implications 
of naming them, albeit implicit, are potent. The second means of expression 
is reference to a hypothetical group in order to make a particular rhetorical 
point. For example, “close observers” (2); “those who approached Dorothea” 
(23); “men” (15 and 16); and “sane people,” “neighbours,” “lunatics,” and 
“one” (18–21). Apart from the lunatics, these hypothetical groups tend to be 
norm-reinforcing: the “close observers” in (2) feel like landed-gentry close 
observers; the men who might be reluctant to marry Dorothea if she con-
tinues to be willful must also belong to the gentry.
 The third is the use of the passive voice. There are five examples: “was 
spoken of ” (1); “being decided” (8); “was held” (11); “was regarded” (12); 
and “were expected” (17). In every case, it is the Middlemarch mind that is 
doing the speaking, deciding, holding, regarding, and expecting. The fourth 
and final means of expression is also the most oblique. It is the use of presup-
position. Again, there are five examples: “unquestionably” (3); “naturally” 
(5); “in those days” (6); “And how should Dorothea not marry?” (14); and 
“hearsay” (24). The use of these phrases by the narrator presupposes some 
person or group who holds these views, who thinks that the statements are 
unquestionably or naturally so and who would ask such a loaded question 
as: “And how should Dorothea not marry?” In Bakhtinian terms, they are 
examples of double-voiced discourse. More specifically, (3), (5), and (14) 
feature intermental free indirect thought. The narrator expresses a view that, 
it soon becomes apparent from the context, is the view of the townspeople. 
The important point is that, with a few exceptions, the last three means of 
expression (hypothetical groups, the passive voice, and presupposition) are 
all different sorts of rhetorical devices for referring, however indirectly, to 
the controlling social group that expresses the Middlemarch mind. These 
devices add to the sense that the Middlemarch mind is omnipresent and 
pervades the whole fabric of the society, and so explicit reference to it is 
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unnecessary.
 The following passage from later in the novel neatly illustrates all of the 
four linguistic techniques:
(1) Doctor Sprague (a) was more than suspected of having no religion, 
but somehow (b) Middlemarch tolerated this deficiency in him . . . it was 
perhaps this negation in the doctor which made (c) his neighbours call 
him hard-headed and dry-witted . . . At all events, it is certain that if any 
medical man had come to Middlemarch with (d) the reputation of hav-
ing very definite religious views . . . (e) there would have been a general 
presumption against his medical skill. (125)
(a) is the passive voice: it is the Middlemarch mind that is doing the sus-
pecting; (b) and (c) are explicit references; (d) is presupposition—a Mid-
dlemarch mind is presupposed because it is that mind that would create 
Sprague’s reputation. Although (e) is also an example of presupposition (a 
group would do the presuming), it is there to make a specific rhetorical point 
about intermental views on medicine and religion.
 The next question is: What? What are these examples of intermental 
functioning about, and what are the different types of judgments that are 
being made? Only one judgment appears to be factual, the one concerning the 
extent of Dorothea’s wealth (12). Some of the intermental functioning relates 
to action. There are decisions regarding marriage that are made “according 
to custom” (8) and behavior such as doing as neighbors do and avoiding 
lunatics (18–21). Next, there is some mind reading involved in judgments 
on characters’ dispositions. Dorothea has a clever mind although Celia has 
common sense (1), while Mr Brooke’s mind is too rambling and unpredict-
able (9–11). This mind reading involves predictions regarding intramental 
minds and actions: What will Mr Brooke think next (10)? Will Dorothea 
marry (14)? Many of the judgments relate to various aspects of social class. 
They concern the social standing of individuals and groups, including their 
connections (3–6); their wealth (12 and 13); etiquette, such as the need for 
a governess (26 and 27); and manners, such as the need for women to have 
weak opinions (17). There is also a strong emphasis on aesthetic judgments. 
There are references to dress sense such as the coquetry in Celia’s appearance 
(2) and frippery (5 and 6); and references to Dorothea’s looks and charm 
(22–25).
 Underpinning all of these judgments is a strong moral and ethical 
impulse. Individuals ought to think predictably, behave in a socially respon-
sible way, marry well, and look aesthetically pleasing because these are all the 
right thing to do. Common sense is more important than cleverness; weak, 
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predictable, and conforming opinions are desirable; good connections and 
background are important; young women should ensure that they marry 
well; and they should have the guidance that is necessary to ensure that 
they do. The types of judgments made by the Middlemarch mind are closely 
interconnected and all relate to the moral and political necessity for a closely 
confined consensus within clearly defined social and aesthetic norms. Class 
and morality in particular, but also aesthetics and mind reading, are closely 
linked. It may appear that aesthetic or social or moral elements predominate 
at any one time, but as soon as you start to pull at a single thread, all of the 
others unravel with it. The underlying logic is that individuals should behave 
in certain, well-specified ways and not in other ways, so that social relations 
will be stable and will continue to benefit those who benefit from them at 
present.
 The last question is: Why? The answer is that the novel consists of an 
exploration of the pressures that the Middlemarch mind exerts on the indi-
vidual minds and actions of just about all of the characters in the novel, and 
especially those who want to do something more than conform to the town’s 
norms and values. In particular, the workings of the Middlemarch mind 
have a profound effect on the lives of the two main characters, Dorothea and 
Lydgate, and so on the plot of the novel. The book would be unrecognizable 
without its presence. For example, the three individuals, Dorothea, Celia, 
and Mr Brooke, are subject to a continual interrogation by the Middlemarch 
mind. Are they sufficiently deferential, orthodox in their opinions, and 
reliable in their social behavior? They, in turn, cast a continual and uneasy 
“word with a sideways glance” (1984, 32), to use Mikhail Bakhtin’s phrase, 
at the potential approval or disapproval of the town. Dorothea’s defiance, 
Celia’s compliance, and Mr. Brooke’s unpredictability are, in effect, dialogues 
with the norms of the large intermental unit. Dorothea’s disposition is to 
defy those norms; Celia’s is to comply with them; Mr. Brooke’s behavior is 
unpredictable when measured against them. Even within this opening pas-
sage of a long novel, it is obvious that conflicts will arise between Dorothea’s 
intelligence and “lofty conception of the world” on the one hand and, on the 
other, her sense of duty to her neighbors and her consideration for the feel-
ings of her family. Her mind is a dialogue between her own inclinations and 
her responses to the various intermental pressures on her.
 A number of narrative theorists, in particular Menakhem Perry (1979), 
have drawn attention to the notion of the primacy effect. This suggests that 
the cognitive frames that are set up by readers at the beginning of a narra-
tive are tenacious and long-lasting, and are abandoned only when there is 
enough compelling evidence for readers to want to adopt other frames. As I 
hope to have shown, the primacy effect of the cognitive frame set up by the 
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frequent references to the Middlemarch mind in the opening few pages of 
the novel is very strong. And, as I will demonstrate later, the rest of the text 
betrays a fascination with the intermental process: its complexity; how units 
form, maintain, and modify themselves; their causes and their effects; the 
dialogical relationships between the units and the individuals they comprise; 
and, finally, how units fracture and disintegrate.
 As stated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the claim that I am 
making regarding the role of the town of Middlemarch is a strong one. It 
should be distinguished from two much weaker arguments. First, I am cer-
tainly not simply saying that the town has an important role in providing a 
social context within which individual characters operate and is thereby a 
pervasive influence on their intramental thought. Who would disagree with 
such an anodyne claim? Second, I am not referring to this mind in any meta-
phorical sense. I am going much further than these two positions in saying 
that, within the Middlemarch storyworld, the town actually and literally does 
have a mind of its own.
 You may still be unconvinced by my arguments so far and so be won-
dering: What is he talking about? Within a novel, thinking is what individual 
characters do! It is what happens inside the skull. It is what goes on in free 
indirect thought, stream of consciousness, and interior monologue. It is this 
sort of thing, for example—a straightforward piece of thought report about 
a character’s inner thought processes: “Rosamond, in fact, counted on swal-
lowing Lydgate and assimilating him very comfortably.” However, there is a 
simple way to demonstrate that, as readers, we do all know what intermental 
functioning is and that we unthinkingly accept it as perfectly natural when 
we are presented with it. The proof is this. I cheated with that quote. The 
actual words in the text are these: “Middlemarch, in fact, counted on swal-
lowing Lydgate and assimilating him very comfortably” (105). We under-
stand very easily what that sentence means when we encounter it in the con-
text of the surrounding narrative. I doubt whether anybody has ever read it 
and decided that it has no meaning. So, just as with the town of Santa Dul-
cina delle Rocce, we know perfectly well what it is to ascribe mental func-
tioning to a whole town. You may now be thinking—well, all right, that was 
very clever with the made-up quote just then, but any thinking that a town 
does must surely be different from the thinking that an individual does. But 
of course! It would be silly to disagree. I am not saying that intermental and 
intramental minds are the same. I am saying that they are similar in some 
ways, different in others, but they are both still minds. Just different kinds of 
minds.
 As the Middlemarch mind is not completely monolithic and can be soft 
or fuzzy round the edges, it follows that some of the minds that go to make 
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up the intermental mind or that would normally acquiesce in its findings 
can depart from the common view under certain circumstances. Most men, 
when they come into contact with Dorothea, enjoy the experience, despite 
the intermental prejudice against her. There is also intramental dissent 
involved in Dorothea’s reluctance to get married. Dorothea and Mr Brooke 
form a small unit in defiance of the larger one when they agree together that 
a companion is not necessary. (Celia’s views are not mentioned, I notice.) 
These are small examples of the various intramental and intermental rela-
tionships that, as I will now explain, become extremely complex later in the 
novel. I am therefore using the phrase the Middlemarch mind as a conve-
nient shorthand. It is misleading if it suggests that there is only ever one 
mind that the town possesses. In fact, as the novel progresses, the reader 
becomes aware that there are several different Middlemarch minds. Disputes 
frequently occur. There is usually a variety of different opinions on any one 
subject. Sometimes the town appears to be of one mind, but more often there 
are references to differences of view between the various social, geograph-
ical, and professional groups. So, the town can be in two or more minds at 
any one time (just as individuals can be, come to think of it).
 Studying the Middlemarch mind is like looking at a painting by Turner, 
Seurat, or Cezanne. Close up, all you see is a mass of apparently incoherent 
brushstrokes; move away, and you are aware of shapes emerging and the 
subject of the whole picture materializes. Close up, the individuals that com-
pose this large intermental unit are unique and all have slightly different per-
spectives on their storyworld. The thought of them collectively swallowing 
Lydgate makes no sense at all. Move away, however, and the consensus 
emerges, and it then feels absolutely right to say that Middlemarch intends 
to swallow Lydgate whole.
MIDDLEMARCH MINDS
I wish now to try to convey the subtlety of the fine shades of intermental 
thought and the complexity of the relationships between intermental and 
intramental thought in the rest of the novel. First, I will discuss the various 
ways in which, over the course of the whole text, readers are able to identify 
a number of distinct, separate Middlemarch minds within the single unit 
that is initially constructed. After saying a little about the techniques used 
for the constructions of these various minds, I suggest that an analysis of 
the class structure of the town reveals the existence of separate and well-
defined upper-class, middle-class, and working-class minds. I then refer to 
the complexity and fluidity of the myriad other units that occur at various 
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points in the text and introduce a tentative typology for the sorts of inter-
mental focalization to be found in the novel. The rest of this section then 
turns to the roles played by individuals: not only those inside the large units 
who act as spokespeople or mouthpieces for their views but also those who, 
like Lydgate, Dorothea, and Ladislaw, find themselves outside of them and 
become the object of their judgments.
 As with the opening passage, in the longer, indented quotes that follow, I 
will put all examples of intermental thought in bold. I do this for ease of ref-
erence, but also to emphasize in visual form their sheer number. I sometimes 
continue to refer to the Middlemarch mind to denote the large intermental 
unit of the whole town; I will also refer to a Middlemarch mind when a sub-
group of the whole town mind is being discussed. This chapter is primarily 
about large and medium-sized units and much less about small units such 
as marriages, friendships, and families (with the exception of Lydgate and 
Rosamond). It is no exaggeration to say that a short book could be written 
about all of the intermental functioning in Middlemarch. The only problem 
with such a book would be the difficulty, I imagine, in getting it published.
 A close study of Middlemarch reveals that George Eliot was obviously 
fascinated by the intermental process: its complexity, its causes and effects, 
its relationship with individuals. Thought in general and intermental thought 
in particular are frequently discussed. Many different cognitive terms are 
used to describe intermental activity in the novel: knowing, thinking, con-
sidering, believing, noticing, conjecturing, implying, suspecting, tolerating, 
hating, opposing, liking, and wanting. These and the many other examples 
that are to be found throughout the rest of this chapter are verbs of thought 
and of consciousness. The whole novel is saturated with clear evidence of 
the variety of communal thought. As with Little Dorrit and Persuasion, the 
evidence that is presented in this chapter composes only a small proportion 
of the total. Much of the language used in Middlemarch explicitly invites 
the sort of cognitive reading that is a feature of this book. It refers several 
times to “other minds” (401, 504, and 530) and also to “other people’s states 
of mind” (536), “mental action” (546), “social action” (124), “the boundaries 
of social intercourse” (64), and “consciousness of interdependence” (64). In 
addition, the language regularly anticipates Bakhtin’s already-mentioned 
notion of the word with a sideways glance: “The vicar’s frankness seemed 
not of the repulsive sort that comes from an uneasy consciousness seeking 
to forestall the judgment of others” (119); and: “an uneasy consciousness 
heareth innuendoes” (206).
 Other examples of George Eliot’s fondness for openly acknowledging 
the cognitive element in her novel, particularly as it applies to social minds, 
include “civic mind” (65), “public mind” (99 and 246), “the unreformed pro-
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vincial mind” (424), and the rather judgmental “many crass minds in Mid-
dlemarch” (106). At other times, general terms are used such as “that part of 
the world” (151), “midland-bred souls” (71), “mortals generally” (105), “the 
company” (to refer to a party) (107), “vulgar people” (114), “all people young 
and old” (16), it was “sure to strike others” (17), and “public feeling required” 
(16). The most obvious names for the intermental groups in the town relate 
to the town itself. There are a number of variations: “the Middlemarchers” 
(106 and 114), “good Middlemarch society” (108), “Middlemarch company” 
(463); “the town” (112), “the respectable townsfolk” (105), et cetera. Refer-
ences to Middlemarch can also be more specific when related to a particular 
context. During a discussion of the political situation, the text mentions 
“buyers of the Middlemarch newspapers” (246). During consideration of 
Bulstrode’s possible hypocrisy in example (18) below, there is an ironical 
reference to “the publicans and sinners in Middlemarch” (83). A description 
of Rosamond’s popularity talks about “all Middlemarch admirers.”
 Sometimes the descriptions are neutral: “his neighbours” (96) and “the 
town’s talk” (204). At other times they are rather arch constructions that 
are characteristic of the distinctive voice of the narrator: “the public belief ” 
(527), “all the world round Tipton” (32), “in various quarters” (314), “family 
party” (240), “in Middlemarch phraseology” (511), and “the laity” (306). 
Some of the constructions betray the bitterness and frustration of the indi-
vidual who is on the receiving end of the consensus: “the petty medium 
of Middlemarch” (129) and “Middlemarch gossip” (240). In addition, as 
already mentioned, the Middlemarch mind is sometimes presented in inter-
mental free indirect thought: “It was clear that Lydgate . . . intended to cast 
imputations on his equals” (126), when this thought would be clear only 
to the Middlemarch mind and no one else. I referred earlier to a particu-
larly striking form of words that identifies Middlemarch as a group mind: 
“Middlemarch, in fact, counted on swallowing Lydgate and assimilating him 
very comfortably” (105). This sentence beautifully frames the relationship 
between Lydgate and Middlemarch for the remainder of the novel. Middle-
march has a double cognitive narrative of Lydgate as the idealistic young 
doctor who comes to the town and wishes to mould it into conformity with 
his wishes. However, he will be taught a lesson, and will discover that it is he 
who has to change.
 Some of the general and vague descriptions of the workings of the Mid-
dlemarch mind involve oblique references to speech. These include “gossip” 
(344), “the air seemed to be filled with gossip” (344), “the conversation 
seemed to imply” (124), “general conversation in Middlemarch” (181), and 
“It’s openly said” (72). The reporting of this speech may be focalized through 
an individual: Mr Featherstone “had it from most undeniable authority, and 
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not one, but many” (73), Lydgate “heard it discussed” (106), and (an example 
of what David Herman [1994] calls hypothetical focalization) “If Will Ladis-
law could have overheard some of the talk at Freshitt that morning . . .” (433). 
Later, the reader is told what he would have heard being said:
(2) “Young Ladislaw the grandson of a thieving Jew pawnbroker” was 
a phrase which had entered emphatically into the dialogues about the 
Bulstrode business at Lowick, Tipton and Freshitt. (533)
I refer below to the use made of multiparty talk to convey this sort of gossip.
 The three locations mentioned in example (2) deserve further attention. 
Although we can only know what happens in a storyworld if we follow the 
mental functioning of its inhabitants, it is also essential to have a certain 
amount of knowledge, however rudimentary, of its geography (see Moretti 
1998). In this case, we need to have a rough idea in our heads of the fact that 
Middlemarch is a town surrounded by large country houses with accom-
panying parishes or villages. These include Tipton (home of Mr. Brooke, 
and also Dorothea and Celia before they marry), Freshitt (the home of Sir 
James Chettam and then Celia after they marry), and Lowick (the home of 
Casaubon and then Dorothea after they marry). However, as this list shows, 
a knowledge of the geographical storyworld is closely linked to a knowl-
edge of the mental and social storyworld. Tipton, Freshitt, and Lowick are 
important only because they are the homes of the members of the gentry or 
upper classes who are leading characters in the story. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that references to the upper classes are couched in geographical 
terms, as in example (2), as well as in more obviously social terms. In other 
words, these place names function as metonymies for the upper classes or 
the gentry. References to the town of Middlemarch itself sometimes act in 
the same way for the middle classes, as the Tankard pub does for the working 
classes.
 As this discussion shows, the three social classes are among the most 
prominent of the subgroups of the Middlemarch mind. The upper classes 
consist primarily of the Brookes, the Chettams, the Cadwalladers, and the 
other members of the local landed gentry. The middle classes comprise the 
professional classes and, in particular, the various medical men. The working 
classes are much less well represented and are confined mainly to Mrs Dol-
lop’s pub, the Tankard. Sometimes the text refers to the upper classes as the 
“Middlemarch gentry” (186), the “county” (4), or “the county people who 
looked down on the Middlemarchers” (114). At other times, there are more 
specific references to the place names: “all Tipton and its neighbourhood” 
(151), “no persons then living—certainly none in the neighbourhood of 
Tipton” (17), “the unfriendly mediums of Tipton and Freshitt” (24), “all the 
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world around Tipton” (32), and “opinion in the neighbourhood of Freshitt 
and Tipton” (58). Occasionally, it is established that these place names 
describe the middle or working classes who live in them, as in “both the 
farmers and labourers in the parishes of Freshitt and Tipton” (34). The fol-
lowing single sentence illustrates the class structure behind the intermental 
functioning in the town by containing references to the whole social spec-
trum:
(3) The heads of this discussion at “Dollop’s” had been the common 
theme among all classes in the town, had been carried to Lowick Par-
sonage on one side and to Tipton Grange on the other, had come fully 
to the ears of the Vincy family, and had been discussed with sad refer-
ence to “poor Harriet” by all Mrs Bulstrode’s friends, before Lydgate 
knew distinctly why people were looking strangely at him, and before 
Bulstrode himself suspected the betrayal of his secrets. (500)
“All classes” can be subdivided into upper (Lowick Parsonage and Tipton 
Grange), middle (the Vincy family and Mrs Bulstrode’s friends), and lower 
(Dollop’s pub).
 At several points in the discourse Middlemarch gossip is conveyed 
through what the narrative theorist Bronwen Thomas (2002) calls multiparty 
talk (that is, conversations between more than two people). A surprisingly 
large number of conversations in the novel, at least twenty I would say, fea-
ture three or more people. Scenes of this sort in which Middlemarch minds 
are at work include the following:
A The dinner party at which Lydgate is introduced to Middle-
march society (60–63)
B The public meeting at which the vote on the chaplaincy takes 
place (126–29)
C Sir James Chettam, the Cadwalladers, and Mr Brooke talk 
about politics (261–67)
D Hackbutt, Toller, and Hawley discuss Lydgate (308–9)
E The Chettams, the Cadwalladers, Dorothea, and Celia have a 
discussion about widowhood (378–79)
F The Bulstrode scandal breaks and comes to a climax at the 
public meeting (494–505)
G The Chettams, the Cadwalladers, and Mr Brooke exchange 
views on Dorothea’s second marriage (560–65)
There are two sorts of multiparty talk here. C, E, and G are conversations 
between members of the gentry that establish a set of characteristically 
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upper-class views on Dorothea’s marriages and on politics. By contrast, B, D, 
and F are the town or middle-class views on Lydgate and Bulstrode (together 
with the addition of a working-class view in F). A is, as the text states, an 
uneasy mixture of both the upper and middle classes. In most cases, but 
particularly in F, there is a mixture of direct speech in the form of dialogue 
and multiparty talk, and intermental thought report. The hypothetical book 
devoted to social minds in Middlemarch alone that I referred to earlier would 
allow space for a detailed analysis of the endlessly fascinating ways in which 
the intricately shifting dynamics of the various group minds are traced in 
passages such as these.
 In addition to these big set-piece occasions there are many short pas-
sages, often only a paragraph in length, in which intermental views are pre-
sented. These paragraphs act as a kind of low-level, continuous communal 
commentary on events. Several of these paragraphs are used for illustrative 
purposes during the rest of this chapter. In addition, there are dialogues in 
which intermental norms have been internalized to such an extent that they 
have a subtle and indirect, though still profound and pervasive, influence on 
intramental thought processes. This point is particularly true of concerns 
about reputation or honor. To take just one example, there is an important 
discussion between Sir James Chettam and Mr Brooke on the codicil to 
Casaubon’s will in which Mr Brooke says:
(4) As to gossip, you know, sending [Ladislaw] away won’t hinder gossip. 
People say what they like to say, not what they have chapter and verse for 
[ . . . ] In fact, if it were possible to pack him off . . . it would look all the 
worse for Dorothea. (336–37)
Every word spoken by Mr Brooke is informed by the need for intermental 
approval. It is apparent that all of the thoughts of both men are dominated 
by what must be the four most dreaded words in the English language: What 
will people think?
Subgroups and the Discursive Rhythm
Although the most common of the intermental minds at work in the town are 
divided along class lines, such a distinction comes nowhere near reflecting 
the complexity of intermental thought in the novel. A large number of 
other ephemeral, localized, contextually specific groups can be identified. 
In a number of the examples given in this section, there is a bewilderingly 
complex variety of perspectives, usually composing the whole Middlemarch 
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mind together with some of its subgroups. Sometimes the subgroups appear 
to be in agreement and therefore form the Middlemarch mind. They may be 
separate from each other but have an overlap in membership; they may be 
distinct from and even opposed to each other; sometimes sub-subgroups of 
a particular subgroup are featured. With the exception of the social classes, 
it is rare for subgroups to be referred to more than once. In the discussions 
that follow, it will be apparent that many of these groups are mentioned 
in a particular context in order to provide a specific perspective on a par-
ticular issue. They then vanish. I was originally tempted to try to create a 
kind of taxonomy or map of intermental thought in the novel by listing all 
the groups mentioned and analyzing their relations with each other. How-
ever, it took only a quick look at the large amount of evidence of intermental 
thought in Middlemarch to see that such a task would be impossible. The 
complexity would simply be overwhelming. In any event, little would be 
achieved because of the contextual nature of many of the references to sub-
groups.
 As was apparent in the reference in the opening passage to “the world—
that is to say, Mrs Cadwallader the Rector’s wife” et cetera, the narrator can 
sometimes be self-knowingly ironic about the imprecision that is required 
when discussing intermental thought:
(5) At Middlemarch in those times a large sale was regarded as a kind 
of festival  .  .  . The second day, when the best furniture was to be sold, 
“everybody” was there  .  .  . “Everybody” that day did not include Mr 
Bulstrode. (415)
The reader is alerted to the fact that locutions such as “the world,” “every-
body,” and “all Middlemarch” must not be taken literally. It is difficult to be 
precise about the membership of large intermental units. Generalizations 
are required even though they may not be strictly accurate. To pursue this 
line of thought, the narrator sometimes uses a particular example of inter-
mental thought, as in the discussion on prejudice in (6), to muse on the 
nature of intermentality generally and the imprecision of descriptions of it 
in particular:
(6) Prejudices about rank and status were easy enough to defy in the 
form of a tyrannical letter from Mr Casaubon; but prejudices, like odor-
ous bodies, have a double existence both solid and subtle. (300)
Intermental units have a double existence that is both solid and subtle. On 
the one hand, the Middlemarch minds are collections of completely dif-
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ferent individuals, all with slightly different perspectives on the social issues 
affecting the town: they are subtle. On the other hand, and at the same time, 
these groups come together with a collective force, particularly as it appears 
to an individual, that is far greater than the sums of their parts: they become 
solid.
 It follows that it is too simplistic to suggest that intermental units are 
so fixed and clearly bounded that individuals are either inside or outside of 
them. The situation is much more complex than that. Some people occupy 
ill-defined positions with regard to any consensus. The vicar, Farebrother, is 
one who is on the fringes of the town mind. He regrets the common view 
on the Bulstrode/Lydgate affair because he likes Lydgate and, although he 
dislikes Bulstrode, he does not wish to see him hounded. His case is made 
apparent because he is a major character and his views on the matter add to 
the complexity of the whole situation. However, the reader will know that 
other characters have their own, individual views even if the precise nature 
of these views is not articulated. When intermental thinking takes place, 
significant intramental variations will always occur within it.
 One example of this complex combination of intramental and inter-
mental functioning takes place at a dinner party at the Vincy household. The 
various members of the middle classes who are present discuss the chap-
laincy. Individual views are expressed and they are often in disagreement 
with each other. People are thinking intramentally. Then: “Lydgate’s remark, 
however, did not meet the sense of the company” (107). What happens here 
is that the individuals who were previously expressing conflicting views 
coalesce and close ranks in the presence of an outsider, as families tend to 
do. The presence of a “company” with a common view is explicitly acknowl-
edged. The party is no longer a random collection of intramental perspec-
tives; it becomes an intermental unit. From a literary studies standpoint, 
Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth (1998) has shown how the dominant authorial 
perspective in classical realism subsumes divergent voices and intramental 
dissent, as in this case, into a consensus narrative that constructs a social, 
embodied, engaged, and specific mind.
 The attention paid in the text of the novel to the bewildering variety of 
the intricately interlocking subgroups results in the presence of a character-
istic discursive rhythm. This highly distinctive rhythm is sometimes present 
in single sentences, sometimes in a group of two or three sentences, some-
times in a whole paragraph. Once it has been noticed, it is difficult to under-
stand how it could have been overlooked. Its tone is often ironic and even 
playful. The narrator regularly seems to backtrack on earlier statements and 
to qualify generalizations. The language meditates on the difficulty of pinning 
down precisely how these fluid and protean minds are initially and tempo-
rarily constituted, dissolve, reform and dissolve again, and so on. Example (1) 
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gives a flavor of this rhythm. Other examples include (18), (19), and (20).
 Note this discursive rhythm as illustrated in the following two pas-
sages—in particular, the careful balancing of different intermental perspec-
tives, all trained on a single intramental mind:
(7) However, Lydgate was installed as medical attendant on the Vincys, 
and the event was a subject of general conversation in Middlemarch. 
Some said, that the Vincys had behaved scandalously  .  .  . Others were 
of the opinion that Mr Lydgate’s passing by was providential  .  .  . Many 
people believed that Lydgate’s coming to the town at all was really due to 
Bulstrode; and Mrs Taft . . . had got it into her head that Mr Lydgate was 
a natural son of Mr Bulstrode’s. . . . (181–82)
(8) Patients who had chronic diseases  .  .  .  had been at once inclined 
to try him; also, many who did not like paying their doctor’s bills, 
thought agreeably of opening an account with a new doctor . . . and all 
persons thus inclined to employ Lydgate held it likely that he was clever. 
Some considered that he might do more than others “where there was 
liver” .  .  . But these were people of minor importance. Good Middle-
march families were of course not going to change their doctor without 
reason shown. (305–6)
In both (7) and (8), a large group is split into subgroups in what might be 
called a “many people thought  .  .  .  some said  .  .  .  others considered  .  .  .” 
rhythm. (7) is an excellent example because it starts with the whole Middle-
march mind, “general conversation in Middlemarch,” and then refers to three 
subgroups: some, others, and many people. The relationship between these 
three groups is unclear. Are they mutually exclusive, or is there an overlap 
in membership? We cannot be sure. Example (8) concerns an implicit sub-
group, patients, instead of the whole Middlemarch mind, but is otherwise 
similar in shape. Again, it would be difficult indeed to establish the precise 
relationship between the various sub-subgroups of patients: those willing to 
change to Lydgate for different reasons and those who are not. It would be 
tempting to try to express the relationships between these groups as Venn 
diagrams, but, as in many cases in this particular novel, I do not think it 
would be possible.
 The intermental rhythm is characteristic of descriptions of collective 
thinking in Middlemarch because it reflects George Eliot’s interest in the 
messiness or complexity of this kind of mental functioning. It is invariably 
inaccurate to claim that everybody in an intermental unit thinks in exactly 
the same way for exactly the same reasons. Within the Middlemarch minds, 
the strength of view on the Bulstrode/Lydgate case will vary. Some people 
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will be convinced of their guilt; others will be less so; some will care very 
much; others will not; some will be pleased at the general view because they 
dislike Bulstrode and/or Lydgate or because a loss of their status will benefit 
them; others, such as Farebrother, will regret it because they like one or both 
of them or have moral objections. (Note that I too have just unthinkingly 
slipped into the intermental rhythm.) The narrator is invariably scrupulous 
in reflecting these fine shades of opinion. The delicate balance between intra-
mental and intermental thought is always maintained.
Intermental Focalization
The point about the narrator being scrupulous in reflecting shades of opinion 
can be restated in terms of the concept of focalization. In what follows, I wish 
to propose the following three binary distinctions within the umbrella term 
focalization that, I think, go some way toward reflecting the complexity of 
the passages quoted in this chapter:
•	 intramental and intermental;
•	 single and multiple; and
•	 homogeneous and heterogeneous.
The difference between intramental and intermental focalization refers to the 
distinction between mental activity by one (intramental) and by more than 
one (intermental) consciousness. Single focalization occurs when there is one 
focalizer. The term multiple focalization refers to the presence of two or more 
focalizers of the same object. These multiple focalizers may be intramental 
individuals, or intermental groups, or a combination of the two. However, a 
further distinction is required. In the case of homogeneous focalization, the 
two focalizers have the same perspective, views, beliefs, and so on relating 
to the object. By contrast, heterogeneous focalization reflects the fact that the 
focalizers’ views differ, and their perspectives conflict with one another. For 
more on this issue of multiperspectivalism, see Nűnning (2000).
 If focalization is single, then it can be either intramental (one individual) 
or intermental (one single group), but it will be homogeneous and not het-
erogeneous unless an individual or group has conflicting views on an issue. 
One example of single focalization is (1) where all of the italicized phrases 
look superficially as though they are references to different groups, but are 
simply different ways of naming the Middlemarch mind. Other examples 
are (5) and (14). However, two points should be made. First, single focaliza-
tion is comparatively rare in this novel, and the majority of the examples 
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quoted in this chapter are multiple points of view that display a balance of 
distinct and distinctive collective views and fine shades of subtly differing 
judgments. Second, a succession of single focalizations will become multiple 
in a Bakhtinian effect on the reader when aggregated over the course of a 
novel.
 If focalization is multiple, then it can involve different individuals, or 
different groups, or a combination of both; and, completely independently, 
it can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous. Obviously, a fairly large 
number of potential combinations can be derived from these variables. I 
have not conducted an exhaustive analysis of the Middlemarch text to find 
out, but my guess is that most combinations are contained in it. Of the 
various examples of multiple intermental focalizations used in this chapter, 
some are homogeneous and some are heterogeneous. Multiple intermental 
heterogeneous focalization is featured in examples (7), (8), (11), (13), and 
(18). In all these cases, the various intermental units mentioned have dif-
ferent views on the object of their cognitive functioning. To be strictly accu-
rate, examples (7) and (11) have an intramental element as well and so are 
examples of multiple intermental and intramental heterogeneous focaliza-
tion. Multiple intermental homogeneous focalization is present in examples 
(2), (3), (10), (12), (16), (19), and (22). Again, examples (12) and (22) also 
have an intramental element. Apologies for the highly technical nature of 
this analysis, but it is a complex subject.
Individuals Inside Intermental Units
I will now focus on the relationships between groups and individuals. First 
I will say a little about how the leaders or spokespeople of each of the three 
social groups are used to present the results of their class-based mental func-
tioning. I will then discuss those individuals who are outside of the social 
groups in the sense that they are the objects of their intermental cognitive 
activity.
 Both Mrs Cadwallader and Sir James Chettam act as powerful mouth-
pieces for the upper-class mind. Here is a dramatic illustration of this func-
tion:
(9) But Sir James was a power in a way unguessed by himself. Entering 
at that moment [as Ladislaw is saying goodbye to Dorothea], he was 
an incorporation of the strongest reasons through which Will’s pride 
became a repellent force, keeping him asunder from Dorothea. (377)
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Chettam embodies, or represents or, to use the word chosen in the pas-
sage, “incorporates” the upper-class Middlemarch mind. It is stressed that 
he, thinking of himself as an individual, is not aware of this power and this 
may make his role even more influential. His mouthpiece role is also evi-
dent in example (22) below. Mrs Cadwallader has a similar role. Two whole 
pages are devoted to an explanation of it (39–40): “She was the diplomatist of 
Tipton and Freshitt, and for anything to happen in spite of her was an offen-
sive irregularity” (40). When something does happen in spite of her (the ref-
erence is to Dorothea’s engagement to Casaubon instead of to Chettam), “It 
followed that Mrs Cadwallader must decide on another match for Sir James” 
(40). This is intramental thought and action in the sense that it relates to a 
single individual, but her power to take this action results from her ability to 
represent the local consensus. Her intentionality is much more clearly fore-
grounded than with the Sir James quote. “It followed” to Mrs. Cadwallader 
in her capacity as a mouthpiece for the Middlemarch mind and, in addition, 
to her as an individual agent. Example (9) is different in that Sir James does 
not actually do, say, or even think anything. He simply has a representative 
role in Ladislaw’s uneasy consciousness. At that moment, for Ladislaw, Sir 
James is less an individual and more the “incorporation” of Bakhtin’s word 
with a sideways glance.
 The middle-class mind has several mouthpieces: they include at various 
times Sprague, Minchin, Toller, Chicheley, and Standish. They regard “them-
selves as Middlemarch institutions” (126). The following quote gives a useful 
insight into the dynamics of this particular group mind:
(10) What they [Sprague and Minchin] disliked was [Lydgate’s] arro-
gance, which nobody felt to be altogether deniable. They implied that he 
was insolent, pretentious, and given to that reckless innovation for the 
sake of noise and show which was the essence of the charlatan. The word 
charlatan once thrown on the air could not be let drop. (313)
Here we have a balance between a small unit (the pair formed by Sprague 
and Minchin) and the much larger middle-class mind. The wider group 
acquiesces in the views of the pair. The final sentence makes use of the pas-
sive voice and presupposition to give an accurate indication of how views 
spread. People seize on an idea or a word and hang on to it. It is in this way 
that the use of the term charlatan becomes attached to Lydgate. However, 
the thought also has individual characteristics. Fred’s illness “had given to 
Mr Wrench’s enmity towards Lydgate more definite personal ground” (312). 
Despite the fact that Mr Wrench is a mouthpiece for a medium-sized inter-
mental unit, his thinking here has a consciously intramental shading.
 Mrs Dollop is the acknowledged leader of the working-class mind. 
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This is a group that is based in the Tankard pub (the middle-class pub is the 
Green Dragon). As the passages describing the working classes are easily 
the weakest in the book and, to be honest, make quite painful reading, I will 
refer only briefly to this topic. Here are two passages that illustrate the work-
ings of the working-class mind and the leadership role of Mrs Dollop:
(11) This was the tone of thought chiefly sanctioned by Mrs Dollop, 
the spirited landlady of the Tankard in Slaughter Lane, who had often to 
resist the shallow pragmatism of customers disposed to think that their 
reports from the outer world were of equal force with what had “come 
up” in her mind. (498)
(12) If that was not reason, Mrs Dollop wishes to know what was; but 
there was a prevalent feeling in her audience that her opinion was a 
bulwark, and that if it were overthrown there would be no limits to the 
cutting-up of bodies, as had well been seen in Burke and Hare with 
their pitch-plaisters—such a hanging business as that was not wanted in 
Middlemarch. (305)
The use of a representative voice and a supporting chorus is a notable char-
acteristic of both passages. Regarding (11), the term sanctioned is revealing 
of Mrs Dollop’s power. The group-defining force of the phrase outer world is 
also worth noting. There is an occurrence toward the end of (12) of inter-
mental free indirect discourse. It is obvious from some of the phrases in this 
sentence (“Mrs Dollop wishes to know what was”; “as had well been seen in 
Burke and Hare with their pitch-plaisters”; and “such a hanging business as 
that was not wanted in Middlemarch”) that the narrator is making use of the 
distinctive speech and thought patterns of Mrs Dollop and her customers.
Individuals Outside Intermental Units
Having examined the role of the mouthpieces of the three class-based units, 
I will now scrutinize the ways in which the text presents the judgments of 
those units on individuals who are outside of them. Both Dorothea’s and 
also Lydgate’s character and behavior are, at various times, focalized through 
a variety of Middlemarch minds. The relentlessly judgmental quality of 
intermental thought in the novel remains fairly constant in relation to them 
both. However, focalization can work in the opposite direction, and inter-
mental units can be focalized through intramental cognitive functioning, 
too. Within Lydgate’s free indirect discourse, there are references to “Middle-
march gossip” (240) and to “the circles of Middlemarchers” (299). Dorothea 
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is critical of the “society around her” (23). Sometimes the two directions 
are at work simultaneously. In a good example of a reciprocal intermental/
intramental relationship, Lydgate comments that “I have made up my mind 
to take Middlemarch as it comes, and shall be much obliged if the town will 
take me in the same way” (112). Lydgate talks here of Middlemarch in the 
way that the narrator does in the final sentence of (19), as a sentient being 
that is capable of independent thought. In (13), the presentation of power 
relations in the town is focalized through Lydgate:
(13) The question whether Mr Tyke should be appointed as salaried 
chaplain to the hospital was an exciting topic to the Middlemarchers; 
and Lydgate heard it discussed in a way that threw much light on the 
power exercised in the town by Mr Bulstrode. The banker was evidently 
a ruler, but there was an opposition party, and even among his support-
ers, there were some who allowed it to be seen that their support was a 
compromise . . . (106)
Lydgate is aware that, on this question, the whole intermental mind (“Mid-
dlemarchers”) is subdivided into support for Bulstrode and opposition to 
him (and perhaps those who have no strong opinion?). The support is then 
further subdivided into strong and weak or “compromise” support.
 The term cognitive narrative, you will remember, designates a character’s 
whole perceptual, cognitive, ethical, and ideological viewpoint on the story-
world of the novel and is intended to be an inclusive term that conveys the 
fact that each character’s mental functioning is a narrative that is embedded 
within the whole narrative of the novel. Double cognitive narratives are ver-
sions of characters’ minds that exist within the minds of other characters. 
So, one way to describe the relationships that I am discussing is to say that 
Middlemarch minds regularly form double cognitive narratives of individ-
uals, especially Dorothea and Lydgate. Equally, these narratives can work in 
the reverse direction. As Lydgate’s wish that the town take him as it finds him 
shows, some individuals form their own double cognitive narratives for the 
Middlemarch mind.
 Theory of mind is usually thought to work in novels on the intramental 
level. In Persuasion, when Wentworth is snubbed by Anne Elliot’s father 
and sister, Anne knows that he feels contempt and anger, Wentworth knows 
that Anne knows what he feels, Anne knows that Wentworth knows that 
she knows, and so on. Theory of mind is operating here solely in relation 
to individuals. However, as we saw in the case of Santa Dulcina delle Rocce, 
groups use theory of mind too and, in addition, can be the subject of individ-
uals’ theory of mind. Various sorts of different attributions can be made by 
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intermental minds regarding the supposed workings of intramental minds. 
Throughout the novel, Middlemarch groups judge individuals and place 
them accordingly. “Most of those who saw Fred . . . thought that young Vincy 
was pleasure-seeking as usual” (163). So Fred is constructed as a pleasure 
seeker. In example (1), Sprague is defined as “hard-headed and dry-witted.” 
Attributions by large units also have a profound effect on smaller units such 
as marriages: “In Middlemarch a wife could not long remain ignorant that 
the town held a bad opinion of her husband” (511).
 When Lydgate takes Bulstrode out of the public meeting in which he, 
Bulstrode, has been humiliated,
(14) [i]t seemed to him [Lydgate] as if he were putting his sign-manual 
to that association of himself with Bulstrode, of which he now saw the 
full meaning as it must have presented itself to other minds. [And then, 
within Lydgate’s free indirect discourse.] The inferences were closely 
linked enough: the town knew of the loan, believed it to be a bribe, and 
believed that he took it as a bribe. (504)
In theory of mind terms, the passage can be decoded as follows:
 A Lydgate believes
 B that the Middlemarch mind believes
 C that Bulstrode believed
 D that Lydgate was bribable
 E and that Bulstrode intended to bribe him
 F and that Lydgate knew of Bulstrode’s intention
 G and that Lydgate did accept Bulstrode’s bribe.
Note that, as with the Men at Arms passage, this cognitive chain involves 
intermental (item B) as well as intramental reasoning.
 All this inter- and intramental complexity has a powerful teleological 
role in the development of the various plots in the novel. The two most 
important examples are the Lydgate and Bulstrode crisis and the Dorothea 
and Ladislaw relationship. Example (9) demonstrated that it is the upper-
class mind that keeps Dorothea and Ladislaw apart through her and espe-
cially his uneasy awareness of its workings.
(15) Will was in a defiant mood, his consciousness being deeply stung 
with the thought that the people who looked at him probably knew a 
fact tantamount to an accusation against him as a fellow with low designs 
which were to be frustrated by a disposal of property. (417)
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It is striking how many examples can be found in this novel of Bakhtin’s 
word with a sideways glance, the nervous and uneasy anticipation of the 
view of another. It was also apparent in example (4). The end result for Doro-
thea and Ladislaw is that they are kept apart for some time:
(16) His position [in Middlemarch] was threatening to divide him from 
her with those barriers of habitual sentiment which are more fatal to 
the persistence of mutual interest than all the distance between Rome 
and Britain. (300)
 Intermental units construct socially situated identities for individual 
characters:
(17) There was a general impression, however, that Lydgate was not 
altogether a common country doctor, and in Middlemarch at that time 
such an impression was significant of great things being expected from 
him. (96–97)
Lydgate is considered to be a gentleman doctor. His intramental identity 
emerges from the intermental consensus. In particular, group minds make 
use of the past lives of individuals. While cognitive narratives are being con-
structed for individuals, their origins are carefully examined for any clues 
relating to their identities. Here, Bulstrode’s lack of known social origins is 
held to be deeply suspicious:
(18) Hence Mr Bulstrode’s close attention was not agreeable to the pub-
licans and sinners in Middlemarch; it was attributed by some to his 
being a Pharisee, and by others to his being Evangelical. Less superficial 
reasoners among them wished to know who his father and grandfather 
were, observing that five-and-twenty years ago nobody had ever heard of 
a Bulstrode in Middlemarch. (83)
The establishment of a single, stable, assured social identity for poor Bul-
strode is not going to be possible. All of these groups (loud men, those 
persons who thought themselves worth hearing, others, the publicans and 
sinners in Middlemarch, some, others, the less superficial reasoners among 
them) have their own conflicting, colliding, contradictory perspectives on 
him.
 This interest in the past is even more obvious in the next example, which 
is revealing about the ways in which intermental constructions of intra-
mental cognitive narratives require individuals’ pasts to be filled out:
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(19) No one in Middlemarch was likely to have such a notion of Lydgate’s 
past as has here been faintly shadowed, and indeed the respectable 
townsfolk there were not more given than mortals generally to any eager 
attempt at exactness in the representation to themselves of what did not 
come under their own senses. Not only young virgins of that town, but 
grey-bearded men also, were often in haste to conjecture how a new 
acquaintance might be wrought into their purposes, contented with very 
vague knowledge as to the way in which life has been shaping him for that 
instrumentality. Middlemarch, in fact, counted on swallowing Lydgate 
and assimilating him very comfortably. (105)
The passage starts by saying, reasonably enough, that the Middlemarch mind 
does not know what happened to Lydgate before he arrived in the town. But 
it then goes on to say that the hypothetical construction of his cognitive nar-
rative (in the absence of real evidence) will owe more to the Middlemarch 
mind’s own needs (“wrought into their purposes”) than any disinterested 
pursuit of the actual truth of his real history. The previously discussed final 
sentence emphasizes the point. It will make use of Lydgate as it wishes. The 
need is to create a “Middlemarch Lydgate” who can be comfortably swal-
lowed and easily assimilated. That “Lydgate” need only have a tenuous rela-
tionship with the “real” Lydgate (whatever and whoever that is). This line of 
thinking regarding the creation of different Lydgates is pursued further in the 
next section on the Lydgate storyworld.
 In example (19) above, and also in examples (20) and (22) below, there 
is a strong emphasis on the almost mythic power of intermental, and also 
intramental, minds to modify reality to their own requirements. This is espe-
cially true, as can be seen above, of the construction of Lydgate’s cognitive 
narrative. The intricate and messy detail of a life as it is actually lived by 
a particular individual is smoothed and flattened out into a simple story, a 
narrative that is molded according to the collective desire for a simple moral 
to the tale. In (20) the narrator again uses the opportunity of some complex 
shared views of an individual, this time Bulstrode, for some general musings 
on how group minds create intramental cognitive narratives:
(20) But this vague conviction of interminable guilt, which was enough 
to keep up much head-shaking and biting innuendo even among sub-
stantial professional seniors, had for the general mind all the superior 
power of mystery over fact. Everybody liked better to conjecture how the 
thing was, than simply to know it; for conjecture soon became more con-
fident than knowledge, and had a more liberal allowance for the incom-
patible. Even the more definite scandal concerning Bulstrode’s earlier life 
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was, for some minds, melted into the mass of mystery, as so much lively 
metal to be poured out in dialogue, and to take such fantastic shapes as 
heaven pleased. (498)
This is a general assessment by the narrator of a certain type of intermental 
thought. Although it is related to the workings of the Middlemarch mind, it 
appears to have a wider application. The narrator seems to be suggesting that 
this is how intermental systems in general work. It is heavily ironic and rather 
jaundiced. It makes the obvious point that the investigations of the Middle-
march mind are not aimed at a pure disinterested pursuit of the objective 
truth. The driving force in this case is not the discovery of fact but, rather, the 
enjoyment of mystery. The facts might result in an uninteresting narrative for 
Bulstrode and Lydgate. Also, the result might not suit the purposes or inter-
ests of those people who are hostile to the two men. Even the “more definite” 
facts are warped to fit into a more satisfying story. A cognitive narrative that 
fits the needs of the group is created. As I said, this modification of reality is 
almost mythic in direction.
 In the next passage, the narrator warns the reader against the distor-
tions in the construction of individual identity that are inherent in the myth-
making process:
(21) For surely all must admit that a man may be puffed and belauded, 
envied, ridiculed, counted upon as a tool and fallen in love with, or at least 
selected as a future husband, and yet remain virtually unknown—known 
merely as a cluster of signs for his neighbours’ false suppositions. (96)
The mythmaking process continues even after death. The following passage 
occurs at the end of the book:
(22) Sir James never ceased to regard Dorothea’s second marriage as 
a mistake; and indeed this remained the tradition concerning it in 
Middlemarch, where she was spoken of to a younger generation as a 
fine girl who married a sickly clergyman, old enough to be her father, 
and in little more than a year after his death gave up her estate to marry 
his cousin—young enough to have been his son, with no property, and 
not well-born. Those who had not seen anything of Dorothea usually 
observed that she could not have been “a nice woman,” else she would 
not have married either the one or the other. (577)
It is Dorothea’s fate to be focalized though the Middlemarch mind for ever. 
Her life exists now only as a Middlemarch double cognitive narrative. In its 
reductive simplicity and naivety, this story is completely different from the 
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warm, sympathetic, complex one that is presented by the narrator over the 
course of the novel. It is a long way indeed from the woman described in the 
final paragraph of the novel, the one whose “finely-touched spirit had still its 
fine issues,” “who lived faithfully a hidden life,” and who rests in an unvisited 
tomb (578).
THE LYDGATE STORYWORLD
The Lydgate storyworld is the whole of Lydgate’s mind in action. When we 
attempt to follow his mental functioning, we experience the whole Middle-
march storyworld from his perceptual, cognitive, and ethical viewpoint. In 
analyzing the presentation of his consciousness, we need to study not just 
the passages of text that present his inner speech in the speech modes of 
direct thought, free indirect thought, and thought report; not just whether 
he is a flat or round character or which of the various intertextual stereo-
types readers will apply to him; not just his position as an actant or function 
within the structure of the story; and not just his role as a focalizer. All of 
those things are important and will contribute to an understanding of how 
Lydgate’s mind works. But, as Lydgate’s identity is, in part, socially distributed 
or situated among the minds of the other inhabitants of the town, much more 
is needed.
 Reading Lydgate’s narrative within the context of the whole text is an 
extremely “gappy” experience: he is referred to in a number of passages that, 
added together, amount to less than a third of the total novel. (I am talking 
here about the gaps in the narrative’s attention to the character, and not gaps 
in reader understanding.) To demonstrate how gappiness can be measured, 
I have set out below a schedule of all the passages in the text that relate to 
Lydgate. It includes not only the occasions when he is physically “on stage,” 
but also, and most importantly, those occasions when he is being talked 
about by other characters. Although the schedule is a little impressionistic 
and could be presented in slightly different ways, it nevertheless gives a fairly 
accurate picture of Lydgate’s presence in the novel. (The passage totals may 
not correspond exactly with the page references—in the first example, an 
eight-page passage within the nine pages 61 to 69—either because the pas-
sage begins toward the end of the first page or ends toward the beginning 
of the last page, or because I have rounded the totals up or down to whole 
numbers.)    
Passage 1 (61–69):  8 pages (then a 9-page gap)
Passage 2 (78–86):  8 pages (10-page gap)
Passage 3 (96–130):  34 pages (49-page gap)
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Passage 4 (179–88):  9 pages (8-page gap)
Passage 5 (196–209):  13 pages (27-page gap)
Passage 6 (236–45):  9 pages (46-page gap)
Passage 7 (291–93):  2 pages (27-page gap)
Passage 8 (299–316):  17 pages (4-page gap)
Passage 9 (320–23):  3 pages (17-page gap)
Passage 10 (340–44):  4 pages (57-page gap)
Passage 11 (401–15):  14 pages (26-page gap)
Passage 12 (441–73):  32 pages (9-page gap)
Passage 13 (482–531): 49 pages (8-page gap)
Passage 14 (539–40):  2 pages (5-page gap)
Passage 15 (545–52):  7 pages (23-page gap)
Passage 16 (575):  1 page
Total: 212 out of 578 pages  (a little over a third of the total)
 It is worth making a number of points about this schedule. First, 
the passages featuring Lydgate tend to be shorter in length than the gaps 
between those passages. Only three of the sixteen passages are above sev-
enteen pages in length. (These three compose half of Lydgate’s total narra-
tive.) Ten of the other passages are under ten pages in length. By contrast, 
seven of the gaps are over twenty pages long and three are over forty-five 
pages long. As I say, reading Lydgate’s narrative within the context of the 
whole text is an extremely gappy experience. During these gaps, the reader 
has to continue to apply the continuing-consciousness frame. That is, we 
have to be aware that Lydgate continues to exist within the reality of the 
storyworld and will have on his mind such important issues as the hospital 
chaplaincy affair, his relationship with Rosamond, his money troubles, and 
the receding prospects of further medical research. Following Clennam’s 
cognitive narrative in Little Dorrit is an equally gappy experience; Anne 
Elliot’s is less so because she is the main character-focalizer in Persuasion, 
but the rarely focalized Wentworth’s is more so. Lydgate’s gappiness is espe-
cially notable when one considers that, with Dorothea, he is the main char-
acter in the novel. Less important characters will obviously be even gappier 
in nature. I am not contrasting him with other important characters in 
similar texts of the same sort of size: for example, Rogozhin in The Idiot or 
Rhett Butler in Gone with the Wind. In fact, it seems to me quite likely that 
similarly significant characters are equally gappy. To find out whether this 
is the case would be an interesting exercise to undertake, but is beyond the 
scope of this study.
 Second, because the Lydgate storyworld is aspectual in that it views the 
whole Middlemarch storyworld only from Lydgate’s subjective point of view, 
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a good deal of the whole storyworld is missing from his own. It is plausible to 
speculate that Lydgate has no or limited knowledge of the following impor-
tant areas of the novel: Dorothea’s relationships with Casaubon, Ladislaw, her 
sister Celia, and Sir James Chettam; the relationships between Mary Garth, 
the Garth family, Fred Vincy, and Farebrother; Mr Featherstone; Raffles and 
the precise nature of Bulstrode’s secret; and the extent of the relationship 
between Rosamond and Ladislaw, and Dorothea’s discovery of them in a 
compromising situation. This general point emerges powerfully from the film 
of Little Dorrit that was made by Christine Edzard in 1987. Part one of the 
film presents the storyworld from Clennam’s limited point of view; part two 
from Little Dorrit’s. The effects can be surprising. For example, the financial 
crash occurs with no warning, without the buildup related to Merdle’s fragile 
state of mind and eventual suicide that is featured in the novel, because, of 
course, Clennam would have been unaware of all of that.
 Third, it is an artificial exercise to try to examine Lydgate’s mind in iso-
lation from the other minds in the storyworld. Lydgate’s narrative is deeply 
embedded within the whole novel. To say that it composes a third of the 
whole novel is misleading. This third consists not only of his narrative, but 
also of large portions of the narratives of Rosamond (obviously), Farebrother, 
Bulstrode, Dorothea, Casaubon, and Ladislaw. All of these characters have 
versions of his mind, or double cognitive narratives, contained within their 
own minds. A consequence of this exercise is that their narratives have been 
aspectually adjusted, and these characters are now seen mainly from his cog-
nitive and ethical viewpoint.
 Fourth, notwithstanding the third point, these passages, embedded 
though they are within the larger Middlemarch narrative, add up to a coherent 
and continuous narrative in their own right. They would require the addition 
of only a little explanatory material to make an excellent short novel (rather, 
I imagine, like the one that was originally planned by George Eliot).
 Finally, it is striking how Lydgate’s narrative is dominated both by con-
versations with others in which he takes part and also by discussions about 
him by others when he is not present. His mind is actively engaged with its 
social context. Within his narrative, there are only five passages of private 
thought, totaling fourteen pages. However, this label, “private,” is rather mis-
leading because these passages are also profoundly social and are informed 
by his mind’s dialogic relationships with other minds. Also, they frequently 
refer to his engagement with the social world in the form of action, both past 
(“He had quitted the party early” [63]) and future (“He had come to Middle-
march bent on doing many things” [64]). Many of these actions and plans for 
action relate to his assumptions about the workings of other minds. In the 
first and second passages of private thought (64) and (112–15), he is deciding 
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not to marry and is planning his future research. In the third (122–24), he is 
wondering how to vote on the chaplaincy question. In the fourth (404–8), he 
is trying to work out what to do about his growing money troubles and his 
inability to get Rosamond to understand them. In the final passage (509–11), 
he is thinking over past actions such as his marriage and his acceptance of a 
loan from Bulstrode, the joint actions of others (“The general black-balling 
had begun” [511]), and his own actions in response (“And yet how was he to 
set about vindicating himself?” [509]).
 The presentation of Lydgate’s mind in the discourse is dominated 
in these and other ways by the concept of action. His mind is generally 
described in terms of what he does. As Gilbert Ryle says, when we talk 
about the mind, we talk about the doing and undergoing of things in the 
ordinary world. The presentation of his actions is dominated by the nar-
rative’s purpose of creating a cognitive character frame for the reader that 
highlights the contrast between Lydgate’s lofty aims and his rather less 
elevated maneuverings. His actions and also his reasons for them can be 
interpreted within this framework. The story of his slide into mediocrity 
then has even greater impact.
 The reader is able to see Lydgate’s mind in action, among other ways, 
in his medical work and specifically in his diagnoses of illness. It is also vis-
ible during the various conversations in which he takes part. In our first 
encounter with him he is “listening gravely” (60) while nonsense is being 
talked to him. This is dramaturgical action: evoking in a public audience a 
certain image or impression. A good deal of thought report is what I refer 
to as contextual: the short unobtrusive clauses, phrases, or even single words 
describing a character’s thought processes that are often combined with 
descriptions of actions. Much of the contextual thought report that refers to 
Lydgate’s mind is used to explain the purpose of his actions. These actions 
are often the speech acts that occur during conversations. This combination 
of a description of an action and the reason for it in the form of contextual 
thought report is common: “Lydgate, not willing to let slip an opportunity 
of furthering a favourite purpose, ventured to say . . .” (302). Also: “Lydgate’s 
ear had caught eagerly her mention of the living, and as soon as he could, 
he reopened the subject, seeing here a possibility of making amends for the 
casting-vote he had once given with an ill-satisfied conscience” (342). Here 
is a more complex example: “He sat looking at her, and did not rise to pay 
her any compliments, leaving that to others, now that his admiration was 
deepened” (110). Here, an action (looking), a nonaction (not complimenting 
her), the decision that is the specific reason for the nonaction (leaving it to 
others), and the general state of mind that is the basic reason for all three of 
these (admiration) are combined in a sentence that causally links action and 
consciousness together. I say more about action in the next chapter.
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 As I said in chapter 1, the concept of fictional minds is intended to 
encompass the issue of characterization as well as that of the representation 
of consciousness. Consider this example: Rosamond’s refinement is “beyond 
what Lydgate had expected” (109). It would be reasonable to infer from this 
statement a single mental event: say, Lydgate realizes in a self-conscious flash 
of intuition that this is how he feels about Rosamond. It is also his settled 
belief that this is so, and his belief is a state of mind that will exist over time, 
and will be true of his mind whether or not he is thinking about Rosamond 
at any given moment. It is also a reflection of the dispositions that are char-
acteristic of his character or personality: his tendency to be arrogant, to be 
class-conscious, and to be attracted to women. These short-, medium-, and 
long-term elements of his mind relate to both consciousness and character-
ization and cannot be separated. Here is another, among countless exam-
ples in the novel: “Lydgate had often been satirical on this gratuitous pre-
diction, and he meant now to be guarded” (199). Again, there is a complex 
balance here between characterization and dispositions (the past), current 
mental events and states (the present), and the kind of functional, purposive, 
problem-solving mental functioning that is oriented toward the future.
Lydgate’s Relationship with Middlemarch
Lydgate’s relationship with Middlemarch is negotiated in terms of the double 
cognitive narratives they have of each other. His relationship with Rosamond 
fails to become an intermental unit because the double cognitive narratives 
they have of each other differ so widely from their own internal narratives. 
These are the most important relationships in his life, and I will now ana-
lyze them in turn. (Some of the quotes that have been used already will be 
repeated during this discussion because they will now be interpreted from 
Lydgate’s, rather than the town’s, perspective. There will also be a similarly 
small amount of repetition in the next chapter for the same sort of reason.)
 Lydgate is introduced within an intermental frame. His identity is socially 
situated before we meet him, and there are a number of discussions of him 
throughout the novel that continue the town’s exploration of his identity. It 
is striking that the early part of the novel contains far more information on 
the “Lydgates” that exist in the minds of other characters than it does on the 
“Lydgate” that emerges from direct access to his own mind. It is worth exam-
ining the beginning of this process in a little detail. The reader begins the 
initial, tentative, and hypothetical construction of Lydgate’s cognitive nar-
rative by making use of the double cognitive narratives of other characters. 
We first hear of him indirectly, while Lady Chettam and Mrs Cadwallader 
are discussing him. “Tell me about this new young surgeon, Mr Lydgate. I 
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am told he is wonderfully clever: he certainly looks it—a fine brow indeed” 
(61). Mrs Cadwallader replies that “He is a gentleman  .  .  .  He talks well” 
(61). Lady Chettam agrees that he is “really well connected . . . One does not 
expect it in a practitioner of that kind” (62). Mrs Cadwallader then notices 
that Dorothea Brooke “is talking cottages and hospitals with him . . . I believe 
he is a sort of philanthropist” (62). So, we find out before we actually meet 
him that he is apparently young, clever, good-looking, a well-connected gen-
tleman, someone who talks well, a sort of philanthropist, and innovative and 
successful. These few words on the page are now transformed by the reader 
into an already pre-existing imaginary individual with a past that is part of 
the Middlemarch storyworld. His cognitive narrative started twenty-five-odd 
years ago, and the reader is now engaged in reconstructing it.
 The conversation between Mrs Cadwallader and Lady Chettam is largely 
a consideration of Lydgate’s mind. Some features are obviously related to his 
mental life: being clever, philanthropic, and successfully innovative. Others 
are slightly more indirect: “talking well” is a description of behavior that 
implies a series of mental attributes such as cleverness, confidence, awareness 
of others, and so on. Being a gentleman is yet more indirect, but presumably 
has implications for the way the mind works. In addition, it is also part of 
the competence of the reader to construct, this time by indirect means, some 
aspects of Lydgate’s mental life that are implicit in what we have been told. Let 
us say, for example: having the above qualities makes it likely that he is not 
only self-confident and ambitious, but also altruistic, imaginative, and ide-
alistic. The reader is using material on Lydgate’s social and publicly available 
mind that has been refracted through the conflicting worldviews of Mrs Cad-
wallader and Lady Chettam. A version of his mind exists within their minds. 
Their minds are interacting with, conflicting with, and interrogating the con-
structions that others have formed of his mind. They disapprove of his being 
both a gentleman and a doctor and also of the fact that he is a doctor with 
ideas about the advancement of medicine. Although the characters do not 
openly speculate about the causal network behind Lydgate’s behavior, there 
is an implicit puzzlement over the motives that a gentleman would have for 
wanting to become a doctor. Lydgate’s own motivation becomes more explicit 
during the direct access to his mind later in the passage. Future events appear 
to show that the views of the two characters on his mind were fairly accurate. 
To use a familiar but revealing phrase, there are some respects in which he 
may not “know his own mind.” In the next chapter of the novel Lydgate is 
scornful about the possibility of losing his balance through thinking himself 
to be falling in love, and we find out later that this is precisely what he does do.
 Scenes recur throughout the novel in which various groups of towns-
people discuss Lydgate’s mind. An intermental consensus emerges from a 
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variety of intramental perspectives and a joint double cognitive narrative is 
constructed. These scenes result in an interesting dual perspective on the 
town mind. Seen from one perspective, although these conversations create 
a consensus, they also contain intramental dissent. People disagree over the 
precise extent of Lydgate’s guilt in the matter of the bribe. But seen from the 
point of view of Lydgate’s mind, the Middlemarch mind is fully shared, uni-
form, and monolithic. And in a sense he is not necessarily wrong. Once the 
consensus has emerged it becomes extremely powerful, and the reservations 
of some individuals around the edges do not count for much.
 The town’s views are sometimes related simply to the facts of the case and, 
interestingly, the speculation that Lydgate’s windfall is a loan from Bulstrode 
turns out to be factually correct. More often, though, Middlemarch is con-
cerned with the attribution of motives. “The inferences were closely linked 
enough: the town knew of the loan, believed it to be a bribe, and believed 
that he took it as a bribe” (504). The Middlemarch mind is always inclined 
to attribute unworthy reasons to Lydgate’s actions: “After this, it came to be 
held in various quarters that Lydgate played even with respectable constitu-
tions for his own purposes” (314). The cognitive operations involved in the 
attribution of motives can become quite complex: “Thus it happened that on 
this occasion, Bulstrode became identified with Lydgate and Lydgate with 
Tyke; and owing to this variety of interchangeable names for the chaplaincy 
question, diverse minds were enabled to form the same judgment concerning 
it” (126). A fully fledged narrative for Lydgate emerges from the network of 
attribution: “There was hardly ever so much unanimity among them as in the 
opinion that Lydgate was an arrogant young fellow and yet ready for the sake 
of ultimately predominating to show a crawling subservience to Bulstrode” 
(312). At other times the consensus consists simply of abuse: “they agreed 
that Lydgate was a jackanapes” (126).
 Throughout the novel, a dialogical relationship exists between the intra-
mental Lydgate and the intermental Middlemarch. He is concerned with 
anticipating, reconstructing, arguing against the common view of the work-
ings of his mind. His mind is in a conflicted dialogue with the minds of the 
various groups and individuals concerned with the question of the chap-
laincy of the hospital. Sometimes this relationship is expressed in general 
terms: “For the first time Lydgate was feeling the hampering threadlike pres-
sure of small social conditions, and their frustrating complexity” (124). This 
specific issue brings home to Lydgate the power of the intermental mind: 
“The affair of the chaplaincy remained a sore point in his memory as a case 
in which the petty medium of Middlemarch had been too strong for him” 
(129). Much of the conflict occurs within the context of his medical work: 
“He was impatient of the foolish expectations amidst which all work must be 
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carried on” (181). This “feud between him and the other medical men” (188) 
is regularly explained in terms of mind-reading difficulties. On occasions, 
Lydgate is unable to develop a double cognitive narrative that is sufficiently 
sophisticated to make his social relations easier. This can sometimes relate to 
the group mind: “Lydgate’s remark did not meet the sense of the company” 
(107); and: “But Lydgate had not been experienced enough to foresee that his 
new course would be even more offensive to the laity” (306). At other times, 
it is focused on an individual: “Lydgate had really lost sight of the fact that Mr 
Chichely was his Majesty’s coroner” (108).
 The novel contains a balanced picture of Lydgate’s double cognitive nar-
rative of Middlemarch. In some ways, he performs quite well. There is plenty 
of evidence to show that, despite his undoubted arrogance, he does at least 
make some effort to reconstruct other minds and is quite successful in doing 
so. For example: “But would the end really be his own convenience? Other 
people would say so, and would allege that he was currying favour with Bul-
strode” (124). Later, he hopes that Dorothea’s actions can “clear [him] in a 
few other minds” (530). He can also be quite sensitive in his constructions 
of individual double cognitive narratives: “For Lydgate was acute enough to 
indulge him with a little technical talk” (311); “That there might be an awk-
ward affair with Wrench, Lydgate saw at once” (180); and, “Lydgate was con-
scious of having shown himself something better than an everyday doctor, 
though here too it was an equivocal advantage” (311). He is being quite flex-
ible here and not overtly confrontational. When things become more serious 
during the Bulstrode loan crisis, he becomes extremely sensitive. He notices 
“a peculiar interchange of glances when he and Bulstrode took their seats” 
(502); and, while he helps Bulstrode out of the room after he is accused, “It 
seemed as if he were putting his sign-manual to that association of himself 
with Bulstrode, of which he now saw the full meaning as it must have pre-
sented itself to other minds” (504).
 On the other hand, he feels “some zest for the growing though half-
suppressed feud” (188). When he makes a successful diagnosis and another 
doctor does not, “Lydgate did not make the affair a ground for valuing him-
self or (very particularly) despising Minchin” (311). The parenthetical phrase 
reveals that he does despise Minchin to some degree. “We see that he was 
bearing enmity and silly misconception with much spirit, aware that they 
were partly created by his good share of success” (314). “Enmity and silly 
misconception,” on a free indirect discourse reading, are his terms, and he 
is obviously rather self-satisfied with his ability to bear them with “much 
spirit” in light of his success. The undertones in these quotes reveal that he 
underestimates the Middlemarch mind. His tendency to arrogance will have 
an important role in the narrative progression as a contributory factor in his 
eventual downfall.
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 Before going on to discuss Lydgate’s relationship with Rosamond it may 
be useful, as a contrast, to describe briefly Lydgate’s friendship with Fare-
brother, an inhabitant of the town who is not part of the Middlemarch mind. 
Lydgate has a fairly full and accurate double cognitive narrative of Fare-
brother. As their friendship develops, difficulties arise when Farebrother tries 
to help Lydgate. Initially, “Lydgate took Mr Farebrother’s hints very cordially, 
though he would hardly have borne them from another man” (315). (This 
sentence, by the way, is a good example of the inseparability of consciousness 
and characterization that I referred to earlier: it consists of mental events 
[cordial taking of hints], states of mind [feelings for Farebrother], and char-
acter [general unwillingness to take hints].) Later, Farebrother offers more 
specific help. First, this is how it appears to Lydgate: “He knew as distinctly as 
possible that this was an offer of help to himself from Mr Farebrother, and he 
could not bear it” (446). Next, this is how it appears to Farebrother: “Could 
this too be a proud rejection of sympathy and help? Never mind; the sym-
pathy and help should be offered” (492). What is significant here is that the 
empathy or mind reading between the two men is accurate. Lydgate knows 
that Farebrother knows that Lydgate knows et cetera that the offer of help 
is embarrassing but must be made. The mutual attribution of motives and 
states of mind is far more successful in this case than, as shown now, between 
Lydgate and his wife.
Lydgate’s Relationship with Rosamond
Both Lydgate and Rosamond have deeply developed double cognitive narra-
tives of each other that are very different indeed from their actual narratives, 
and so, as a result, there is no evidence at all of any genuinely intermental 
thinking. In contrast, in Evelyn Waugh’s Vile Bodies, the precise opposite is 
the case. Within a social group called the “Bright Young Things” who are 
active in London in the 1920s, there is a good deal of intermental thought, 
but no double cognitive narratives. They act together, but have no interest in 
each other’s inner lives. Lydgate and Rosamond are interested: it is just that 
they are completely wrong about each other.
 The narrator remarks that Lydgate and Rosamond “lived in a world of 
which the other knew nothing, it had not occurred to Lydgate that he had 
been a subject of eager meditation to Rosamond . . . In Rosamond’s romance, 
it was not necessary to imagine much about the inward life of the hero, or 
of his serious business in the world” (114). Reading the engagement scene 
(208) carefully, it is apparent that it comes about through a series of misun-
derstandings about what the other is thinking. Rosamond was “keenly hurt 
by Lydgate’s manner,” which was simply the result of embarrassment. The 
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long-term result is predictable: “Between him and her indeed there was that 
total missing of each other’s mental track, which is too evidently possible even 
between persons who are continually thinking of each other” (405). As his 
money troubles grow, Lydgate decides to try to make their relationship inter-
mental, to bring about a meeting of minds, and he fails. “Perhaps Lydgate 
and she had never felt so far off each other before” (409). He refers to the 
possibility of making the marriage an intermental unit, when he suggests that 
“there are things which husband and wife must think of together” (410). But 
this never happens. During the crisis, “He did not speak to her on the subject, 
and of course she could not speak to him” (522). The narrator concludes, “The 
beginning of mutual understanding and resolve seemed as far off as ever; nay 
it seemed blocked out by the sense of unsuccessful effort” (524).
 It does not help the accuracy of Lydgate’s double cognitive narrative of 
Rosamond that she is so adept at dramaturgical action. Even at an early stage 
in their relationship she calculates well what kind of behavior will attract 
him. “In two minutes he was in the room, and Rosamond went out, after 
waiting just long enough to show a pretty anxiety conflicting with her sense 
of what was becoming” (180). Later, she is still careful to control Lydgate’s 
image of her: “Rosamond, however, was on her side much occupied with 
conjectures, though her quick, imitative perception warned her against 
betraying them too crudely” (244). During the crisis, her private impression 
management becomes rather more perfunctory: “She received his kiss and 
returned it faintly, and in this way an appearance of accord was recovered for 
the time” (413). However, her public impression management is studied and 
elaborate. During a party, “Rosamond was perfectly graceful and calm, and 
only a subtle observation . . . would have perceived the total absence of that 
interest in her husband’s presence which a loving wife is sure to betray, even 
if etiquette keeps her aloof from him . . . In reality, however, she was intensely 
aware of Lydgate’s voice and movements; and her pretty good-tempered air 
of unconsciousness was a studied negation by which she satisfied her inward 
opposition to him without compromise of propriety” (443).
 Rosamond constructs a double cognitive narrative of Lydgate that owes 
far more to the emotional needs of her mind than to the actual workings of 
his. They meet and she is attracted: “Yet this result, which she took to be a 
mutual impression, called falling in love, was just what Rosamond had con-
templated beforehand” (80). “Rosamond, in fact, was entirely occupied not 
exactly with Tertius Lydgate as he was in himself, but with his relation to 
her” (115). Later, looking back, and making explicit the existence of different 
Lydgates, the narrator comments that “the Lydgate with whom she had been 
in love had been a group of airy conditions for her” (457). When the prob-
lems arise, her reaction is predictable: “The thought in her mind was that if 
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she had known how Lydgate would behave, she would never have married 
him” (412). “In her secret soul she was utterly aloof from him” (448). “Open-
minded as she was [about the bribe allegation], she nevertheless shrank from 
the words which would have expressed their mutual consciousness, as she 
would have shrunk from flakes of fire” (518). “Even this trouble, like the rest, 
she seemed to regard as if it were hers alone. He was always to her a being 
apart, doing what she objected to” (523). Her solipsism even extends to the 
class implications of having Lydgate as a husband: “She was so intensely con-
scious of having a cousin who was a baronet’s son staying in the house, that 
she imagined the knowledge of what was implied by his presence to be dif-
fused through all other minds” (401). To summarize, the narrator comments 
that “she had been little used to imagining other people’s states of mind 
except as a material cut into shape by her own wishes” (536). “It seemed that 
she had no more identified herself with him than if they had been creatures 
of different species and opposing interests” (412). 
 The narrator is kinder to Lydgate and acknowledges that he makes an 
effort to understand Rosamond’s mind. But there are difficulties: “Perhaps 
it was not possible for Lydgate, under the double stress of outward material 
difficulty and of his own proud resistance to humiliating consequences, to 
imagine fully what this sudden trial was to a young creature who had known 
nothing but indulgence” (411). Nevertheless, “he had made many efforts to 
draw her into sympathy with him about possible measures for narrowing 
their expenses” (448). He suggests that “We two can do with only one ser-
vant” (448). Lydgate then acknowledges the distance between their narra-
tives: “To many women the look Lydgate cast at her would have been more 
terrible than one of anger: it had in it a despairing acceptance of the distance 
she was placing between them” (412). Regarding the relationship between 
Dorothea and Ladislaw, “It was significant of the separateness between 
Lydgate’s mind and Rosamond’s that he had no impulse to speak to her on 
the subject; indeed, he did not quite trust her reticence toward Will. And he 
was right there; though he had no vision of the way in which her mind would 
act in urging her to speak” (414). The attribution is interesting here. He cor-
rectly assumes that she will speak to Ladislaw, but does not know about the 
thought processes that will lead her to do so.
 In the end, he renounces thoughts of an “ideal wife” and begins to plan 
the adjustments necessary for living with his real one. He has to ensure that 
his double cognitive narrative will correspond more closely in the future to 
her actual narrative. As if to compensate, he fantasizes about a virtual inter-
mental unit: “he was beginning now to imagine how two creatures who loved 
each other, and had a stock of thoughts in common, might laugh over their 
shabby furniture, and their calculations how far they could afford butter and 
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eggs” (484). It is a poignant and rather moving fact about the novel that the 
only references that I can find to Lydgate’s and Rosamond’s joint actions are 
these hypothetical or imaginary situations regarding making do with one 
servant, laughing over their furniture, and calculating what they could afford. 
This married couple shares no actual joint actions within the reality of their 
storyworld.
CONCLUSION
I would like to end with a reminder that I am not saying that the minds 
that compose a particular intermental unit necessarily fuse completely and 
become totally available to each other. Toward the end of the novel, Dorothea 
realizes that she and Rosamond “could never be together again with the same 
thrilling consciousness of yesterday within them both. She felt the relation 
between them to be peculiar enough to give her a peculiar influence, though 
she had no conception that the way in which her own feelings were involved 
was fully known to Mrs Lydgate” (549). There was an intermental moment 
between them, but it was not a complete fusion. They now have different 
understandings of the event. The three statesmen mentioned in the example 
from Vile Bodies that was used in the previous chapter are hiding together, 
but they may be doing so for different reasons, and may even have misun-
derstood the reasons of the others for wanting to hide. Intermental units are 
fuzzy.
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SOCIAL MINDS IN  L ITTLE DORRIT
I T IS COMMON, when reading discussions of the sustained inside views of characters’ private minds in the novels of, say, Henry James, to be told that, by contrast, characters in novels by Charles Dickens are really only 
ever seen from the outside. We only see their surface. They are flat when they 
should be round. The effect is often to sound rather patronizing about Dick-
ens’s achievement: “Brilliant novelist in his way, of course, but without the 
depth of James!” I would like to reverse that perspective. In cognitive terms, 
nearly all of your life is spent on the surface, on the outside, in the sense that 
all of the minds with which you are involved (with the admittedly rather 
important exception of your own!) are only ever experienced on the surface, 
and from the outside. From this point of view, it is not surprising that Oscar 
Wilde said, as quoted at the beginning of this book, that it is only shallow 
people who do not judge by appearances, and that the true mystery of the 
world is the visible, not the invisible. Dickens is the novelist of appearances, 
and of the visible, and his achievement can only be fully appreciated from 
the externalist perspective.
Little Dorrit
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Intramental Thought
There are few extended passages of inside views of private thought in Little 
Dorrit. One such is a long passage of Clennam’s inner speech regarding his 
love for Minnie Gowin (more usually referred to as “Pet”) and his concern 
about growing old: “And he had plenty of unsettled subjects to meditate 
upon  .  .  .  First, there was the subject seldom absent from his mind, the 
question, what he was to do henceforth in life” (231). However, in addi-
tion to these passages, there is a good deal of contextual thought report 
scattered around the rest of the text relating to private thinking. This intra-
mental thought benefits from an externalist perspective just as much as 
intermental thought does. To illustrate, I will draw attention to three of 
the features of intramental thought that are undervalued by the internalist 
perspective.
 First, it is worth questioning for a moment the apparent inaccessibility 
of private thought to others. How much mental functioning is there in the 
novel that at least one other character is not aware of, albeit in general terms? 
The answer that I would suggest is: not much. Regarding the passage quoted 
from just now, Little Dorrit for one is aware of Clennam’s feelings. She 
knows immediately that something is wrong with Clennam after he gives 
up thoughts of Pet, and she knows about his anxieties about growing old. 
“He never thought that she saw in him what no one else could see” (432). 
When asking this question of each character in turn (“Does another char-
acter know about how their mind works?”), I am struck by the public nature 
of the thought in the novel. Characters may have their secrets, such as Little 
Dorrit’s love for Clennam, but in most cases their thought is generally public. 
Miss Wade is obviously secretive by nature, but she reveals her mind to 
Clennam by showing him her life story. The minds of Frederick Dorrit and 
Mr F.’s Aunt are pretty inaccessible (and perhaps Casby’s and Flintwinch’s to 
some extent?), but there are few others, it seems to me.
 Second, intramental thought is intensely dialogic. In a splendidly 
Bakhtinian phrase that is used of Mrs Clennam, “It was curious how she 
seized the occasion to argue with some invisible opponent” (407). In a form 
of words that brings to mind Daniel Dennett’s notion of mind-ruts, Mrs 
General is described as having “a little circular set of mental grooves or rails 
on which she started little trains of other people’s opinions” (503). The point 
is that it is other people’s opinions that are running along her mind-grooves. 
The private thoughts of Mrs Clennam and Mrs General, in common with all 
of the other characters in the novel, are filled with the thoughts of others.
 Finally, the presence of intermental thought is often concealed within 
descriptions of intramental functioning. “From the days of their honey-
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moon, Minnie Gowan felt sensible of being usually regarded as the wife of 
a man who had made a descent in marrying her” (541). At first reading, 
this sounds like a simple example of intramental contextual thought report. 
However, her dialogic anticipation of the feelings of others contains an inter-
mental component which, using the technique that was noted in the dis-
cussion of the opening passage of Middlemarch, is disguised within a pas-
sive construction (“regarded as”). It may be decoded as follows: the group 
of people who know her regard her (Pet thinks) as that sort of wife. When 
Miss Wade is part of the quarantine party at the beginning of the novel, the 
narrator says of her: “And yet it would have been as difficult as ever to say, 
positively, whether she avoided the rest, or was avoided” (62). Although this 
is a statement about Miss Wade’s disposition to be unsociable, it is also about 
the shared functioning of “the rest”: their awareness of her disposition and 
their resulting behavior in avoiding her. Similarly, it is said of Little Dorrit 
that “She passed to and fro in it [the Marshalsea] shrinkingly now, with a 
womanly consciousness that she was pointed out to every one” (118). This is 
a description of her state of mind, but it also refers to the joint state of mind 
of the prison population in considering her the Child of the Marshalsea 
that results in the communal pointing behavior. The externalist perspective 
is required in order to tease out the intermental element in sentences that 
appear to be simply presentations of private thought. And, as in Middle-
march, these examples show that much of the purpose of the narrative is 
to question the accuracy and authority of the collective judgments on the 
individuals who are experiencing the intermental gaze. The issue of accuracy 
in particular brings us to unreadability, or, at the very least, the possibility of 
incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise defective reading of other minds.
 As I have said, some characters tend to be difficult to read. Much is 
made of Flintwinch’s impassivity and impenetrability. Despite being phys-
ically pushed about by Blandois, he “bought himself up with a face com-
pletely unchanged in its stolidity” (602). When Mr Casby is questioned by 
Clennam about Miss Wade, being determined to tell him nothing of what 
he knows about her, he “knew his strength lay in silence” (594). When Miss 
Wade herself is similarly intent on revealing nothing of her mind, she “stood 
by the table so perfectly composed and still after this acknowledgement of 
his remark that Mr Meagles stared at her under a sort of fascination, and 
could not even look to Clennam to make another move” (376). This is a 
vivid illustration of the importance of publicly available cues when reading 
other minds. When those cues are missing, as when Miss Wade deliberately 
eliminates them to order to keep her thoughts hidden and makes use of “her 
distant, proud, and self-secluded manner” (719), then Meagles is at a loss to 
know how to deal with it. Miss Wade herself thinks that she is able to read 
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other minds accurately: “From a very early age I have detected what those 
about me thought they hid from me” (725). However, it is apparent from 
the context that she was frequently wrong, and was simply misinterpreting 
genuine kindness. On a more amusing level, the workings of Mr F.’s Aunt’s 
mind are, mercifully perhaps, completely opaque: “Mr F.’s Aunt may have 
thrown in these observations on some system of her own, and it may have 
been ingenious, or even subtle: but the key to it was wanted” (199).
Visible Thought
More typical of the novel, though, are the copious examples of thought that 
is easily available to others. Even a solipsistic character such as Mr Dorrit 
is able to notice when Merdle is out of sorts (674). The fairly unobservant 
Young John Chivery knows that Little Dorrit is in love with Clennam, and 
can make a remark to Clennam such as “I see you recollect the room, Mr 
Clennam?” (791; my emphasis). Even reserved characters such as Miss Wade 
are not always able to conceal their thoughts. During a discussion with 
Clennam, “She heard him with evident surprise, and with more marks of 
suppressed interest than he had seen in her” (719; my emphasis). This is a 
novel in which the visibility of thought is frequently and pointedly empha-
sized. When Pancks gives a glass of wine to Blandois, it is “not without a 
visible conflict of feeling on the question of throwing it at his head” (814; my 
emphasis). The narrator mocks the efforts made by Merdle and Lord Dec-
imus to keep their thoughts secret. They move about at their dinner party, 
“each with an absurd pretence of not having the other on his mind, which 
could not have been more transparently ridiculous though his real mind had 
been chalked on his back” (624).
 This visibility is a characteristic not only of the specific mental events 
that occur in the minds of characters but also of the dispositions that per-
sist over time and that form part of their personality. Blandois’ selfishness is 
made visible by the way in which he moves around a room soiling the fur-
niture (402). In a particularly vivid image, when Clennam watches Gowan 
while he is unawares, “There was something in his way of spurning [stones] 
out of their places with his heel, and getting them into the required posi-
tion, that Clennam thought had an air of cruelty in it” (245). The externalist 
Dickens is particularly adept at observing the surface of the storyworld in 
order to create telling descriptions of small, inconsequential examples of 
behavior that appear to other characters and also to the reader to sum up the 
personality of the character performing the action.
 Characters pass judgments, often spiteful but accurate, that are based 
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on their ability to see other characters’ personalities in action. Fanny says of 
her loved one, Sparkler, “If it’s possible—and it generally is—to do a foolish 
thing, he is sure to do it” (664). Fanny is again perceptive, this time in judging 
Mrs General’s mind by her mannerisms: “I know her sly manner of feeling 
her way with those gloves of hers” (666). Flintwinch is another character 
whose disposition is to be unsparing about the failings of others. He says of 
Clennam’s father, “He was an undecided, irresolute chap, who had every-
thing but his orphan life scared out of him when he was young” (224). At the 
end of the novel, he shouts to Mrs Clennam, “But that’s the way you cheat 
yourself ” (851). In each case, dispositions link specific mental events and 
actions (doing foolish, sly, irresolute, or dishonest things) to those charac-
ters’ stable, long-lasting personalities (being a foolish, sly, irresolute, or dis-
honest person). Occasionally, the insight that one character has into another 
extends beyond their dispositions and encompasses their whole mind. Miss 
Wade feels that Gowan knows her completely, all about how her mind works. 
“He understood the state of things at a glance, and he understood me. He 
was the first person I had ever seen in my life who had understood me . . . He 
accompanied every movement of my mind” (732).
The Face
One of the obvious ways in which thought is made public is by means of the 
face. As we do in real life, characters pick up cues about the mental func-
tioning of others by reading facial expressions. Of course, this is only one 
means among many. At one point, Blandois does not need to see Clennam’s 
face; he knows what he is thinking simply by watching the back of his head: 
“Though Clennam’s back was turned while [Blandois] spoke . . . he kept those 
glittering eyes of his  .  .  . upon him, and evidently saw in the very carriage 
of the head . . . that he was saying nothing which Clennam did not already 
know” (819). Nevertheless, the face is a particularly important source of 
knowledge about the minds of others, and there is a continual stream of ref-
erences in the novel to this fact. Some relate to individual mental events. Mrs 
Clennam says to Little Dorrit,“You love Arthur. (I can see the blush upon 
your face.)” (859). Clennam “saw a shade of disappointment on [Mrs Plor-
nish’s] face, as she checked a sigh, and looked at the low fire” (178). “There 
was an expression in his face [Blandois] as he released his grip of his friend’s 
[Cavalletto’s] jaw, from which his friend inferred that . . . [et cetera]” (174). 
“‘My God!’ said Bar, starting back, and clapping his hand upon the other’s 
breast. ‘. . . I see it in your face’” (773). On other occasions, the face is seen 
as an indicator of long-term dispositions. When Clennam was a child, Mrs 
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Clennam could see him looking at her “with his mother’s face” (859) and 
therefore knows that he will, as she thinks, take after her. Little Dorrit is able 
to see that “there was neither happiness nor health in the face that turned 
to her” (857). The narrator comments of Mr Chivery that, “As to any key 
to his inner knowledge being to be found in his face, the Marshalsea key 
was as legible as an index to the individual characters and histories upon 
which it was turned” (346). Changes in the flow of events can be signaled by 
changes in characters’ faces. In the climax of the novel, Mrs Clennam’s face 
is, at first, as inscrutable as ever: “Her face neither acquiesced or demurred” 
(837), and “Her face was ever frowning, attentive, and settled” (839). How-
ever, as events unravel and get beyond her control, “Mrs Clennam’s face had 
changed. There was a remarkable darkness of colour on it, and the brow was 
more contracted” (841).
 Many of the most powerful moments in the novel involve descrip-
tions of facial expressions. In the scene in which Little Dorrit is meditating 
on London Bridge and is caught unawares by Young John Chivery, “She 
started and fell back from him, with an expression in her face of fright and 
something like dislike that caused him unutterable dismay . . . It was but a 
momentary look, inasmuch as she checked it  .  .  . But she felt what it had 
been, as he felt what it had been; and they stood looking at one another 
equally confused” (260). Here, her facial expression inadvertently reveals 
her true feelings and both she and Young John are shocked by the result. 
In marked contrast, facial expressions can also serve a dramaturgical func-
tion. Characters self-consciously use them to present to the world the sort 
of self that they want the world to see. “With these words, and with a face 
expressive of many uneasy doubts and much anxious guardianship, he [Mr 
Dorrit] turned his regards upon the assembled company in the Lodge; so 
plainly indicating that his brother was to be pitied for not being under lock 
and key” (269). However, these efforts can be unsuccessful: “Do what he 
could to compose his face, he could not convey so much of an ordinary 
expression into it, but that the moment she saw it, she dropped her work and 
cried, ‘Mr Clennam! What’s the matter?’” (465). Characters are continually 
attempting to read faces as cues to action. Clennam “suffered a few people 
to pass him in whose face there was no encouragement to make the inquiry” 
(118). This face-reading may be only partially successful. A character may 
find out something of what another is thinking, but not the whole story. 
“As she [Little Dorrit] looked at him [Clennam] silently, there was some-
thing in her affectionate face that he did not quite comprehend: something 
that could have broken into tears in a moment, and yet that was happy and 
proud” (885). This example brings out the differences between characters 
and readers as interpreters of facial expressions. Here, Dickens’s implied 
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reader comprehends more than Clennam does. This balance between the 
implied reader and other characters is always present: sometimes characters 
and readers are equal, at times characters comprehend more than readers (at 
least initially), and at other times, as here, they comprehend less.
 In addition, a facial expression can serve almost as the kind of nonverbal 
communication that is the subject of the next section. Clennam has difficulty 
following Mrs Plornish’s train of thought because she is rather inarticulate: 
“He was at a loss to understand what she meant; and by expressing as much 
in his looks, elicited her explanation” (178).
Nonverbal Communication
Another way in which social minds are made publicly available to each other 
is through nonverbal communication. This may be defined as the intentional 
use of the body to communicate information. There is a surprisingly large 
amount of it in the novel. It generally occurs between characters who know 
each other well and who therefore form an intermental unit. An example 
is the Dorrit family. Little Dorrit “looked in amazement at her sister and 
would have asked a question, but that Fanny with a warning frown pointed 
to a curtained doorway of communication with another room” (284). Tip 
“asked her the question with a sly glance of observation at Miss Fanny, and 
at his father too” (505). He also gives Fanny “a slight nod and a slight wink; 
in acknowledgement of which, Miss Fanny looked surprised, and laughed 
and reddened” (536). Within such a unit, nonverbal communication is an 
efficient supplement to speech. “In answer to Cavalletto’s look of inquiry, 
Clennam made him a sign to go; but he added aloud, ‘unless you are afraid 
of him.’ Cavalletto replied with a very emphatic finger-negative, ‘No, master’” 
(821). This is a cooperative, beneficial unit. Fanny and Mrs General form a 
conflicted, competitive unit but the signing is just as efficacious. When “Miss 
Fanny coughed, as much as to say, ‘You are right’” (661), Mrs General knows 
exactly what she means.
 The choreography of the nonverbal communication in this novel is 
beautifully judged and often extremely subtle. So much so that the absence 
of any sign can sometimes be sign enough. Within people of the same social 
class, who understand each other well, the significance of doing nothing 
can be well understood. “Ferdinand Barnacle looked knowingly at Bar as 
he strolled upstairs and gave him no answer at all. ‘Just so, just so,’ said Bar, 
nodding his head” (614). In addition, a refusal to admit to an understanding 
of nonverbal signs can be as significant. Plornish, “having intimated that he 
wished to speak to her [Little Dorrit] privately, in a series of coughs so very 
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noticeable” (326) that Mr Dorrit must be aware of their meaning, Mr Dorrit 
nevertheless refuses to admit that he understands Plornish. To do so would 
be an admission that he knows that Little Dorrit works to support him. At 
the end of the novel, Mrs Clennam is reduced to a cruel parody of commu-
nication. “Except that she could move her eyes and faintly express a negative 
and affirmative with her head, she lived and died a statue” (863).
 One example of the absence of a sign is worth dwelling on because 
it raises interesting issues relating to the concept of action. Meagles tact-
lessly praises Gowan’s connections with the Barnacles in Doyce’s presence. 
“Clennam looked at Doyce, but Doyce knew all about it beforehand, and 
looked at his plate, and made no sign, and said no word” (248). It is clear 
from the rhythm of the prose, the emphasis of each clause, that Doyce makes 
a conscious decision to do nothing. But this decision differs little, in cogni-
tive terms, from a decision to perform an actual physical action. In addition, 
it must be remembered that this is a social situation in which certain actions 
are expected, such as showing interest by nodding, smiling, and agreeing. 
Doyce’s refusal to do any of these things is a nonaction that has a drama-
turgical function. He is demonstrating that he is unhappy with Meagles’s 
remarks. But who is he demonstrating this disapproval for? I would suggest 
that it is primarily for Clennam, who may well be expecting disapproval-
action, but will also pick up on the significance of nonaction. To an extent, 
also, it is for Meagles too, who will perhaps insensitively be expecting 
approval-action, but may, perhaps Doyce is hoping, interpret the nonaction 
as approval. In effect, Doyce is doing nothing in order to manage these con-
flicting expectations. Again, characters’ interpretations and readers’ inter-
pretations will differ. The reader will know immediately what Doyce means; 
Clennam will pick up on it pretty quickly; Meagles is, Doyce will anticipate, 
likely to misunderstand the silence. 
 The pair formed by Clennam and Pancks may, at first sight, appear to 
be a distinctly unpromising illustration of the use of signs within an inter-
mental unit. I referred above to characters with inscrutable faces, and Pancks 
is one. “With his former doubt whether this dry hard personage were quite 
in earnest, Clennam again turned his eyes attentively upon his face. It was as 
scrubby and dingy as ever, and as eager and quick as ever, and he could see 
nothing lurking in it that was at all expressive of a latent mockery that had 
seemed to strike upon his ear in the voice” (322). When Pancks speaks highly 
of Casby, “Arthur for his life could not have said with confidence whether 
Pancks really thought so or not” (462). The difficulty that Clennam has in 
reading Pancks’s mind becomes particularly important when Clennam does 
not know whether Pancks’s interest in the history of the Dorrit family is 
well meant or not. His activities “caused Arthur Clennam much uneasiness 
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at this period” (367), and “awakened many wondering speculations in his 
mind” (323).
 However, over time, Clennam comes to know Pancks’s mind better. 
“Between this eccentric personage and Clennam, a tacit understanding and 
accord had been always improving  .  .  . Though he had never before made 
any profession or protestation to Clennam, and though what he had just said 
was little enough as to the words in which it was expressed, Clennam had 
long had a growing belief that Mr Pancks, in his own odd way, was becoming 
attached to him” (637). Note the emphasis on the fact that their relationship 
does not rely on words. During the conversation in which Pancks tempts 
Clennam to speculate (638–43), much is understood, or partly understood, 
between the two men, but little is actually said. It is not even explicitly stated 
that Pancks has been successful in persuading Clennam to invest in Merdle. 
Later, the understanding between Clennam and Pancks becomes sufficiently 
intermental for them to be able to communicate by signs. “Mr Pancks in 
shaking hands merely scratched his eyebrow with his left forefinger and 
snorted once, but Clennam, who understood him better now than of old, 
comprehended that he had almost done for the evening and wished to say a 
word to him outside” (594). When outside, “Arthur thought he received his 
cue to speak to him as one who knew pretty well what had just now passed” 
(595). However, the resulting conversation demonstrates that the efficiency 
of intermental thought should not be overestimated. Misreadings can occur. 
When Pancks says that he wants to take a razor to Casby (in fact, to cut his 
hair), Clennam thinks that he wants to cut his throat!
The Look
A subcategory of the emphasis on the importance of the face is the signifi-
cance of the look. For minds to be public and available, it is necessary for 
characters to look attentively at each other in order to pick up the sorts of 
cues that I have been describing. This may even require staring at the other 
person. In fact, there is a noticeable preponderance in the text of those three 
words, attentive, look, and stare. Table 4.1 sets out some comparative usages 
for these words and their variants in four novels: Persuasion, Little Dorrit, 
Middlemarch, and Henry James’s The Ambassadors. The numbers in paren-
theses are adjusted to take account of the total length of the text: that is, the 
figures for The Ambassadors are doubled because it is approximately half 
the length of Little Dorrit and Middlemarch; and the figures for Persuasion 
are quadrupled because it is approximately a quarter of their length. The 
information is taken from the invaluable Victorian Literary Studies Archive 
114 | Chapter 4
Web site (http://victorian.lang.nagoya-u.ac.jp/concordance.html). The dif-
ferences in usage are significant. Little Dorrit scores higher than the other 
three novels in every case but one, and usually by a substantial margin. (The 
only exception is the number of attention words in Persuasion.)
 In Little Dorrit, the act of looking fulfills a number of different func-
tions. The list that follows is a selection. Some of the quotations from the text 
that are used elsewhere in this chapter reveal other uses of the look. Some of 
the following examples could equally well have been used to illustrate other 
functions.
•	 Information-seeking: “Monsieur Rigaud’s eyes . . . were so drawn in that 
direction that [Cavalletto] more than once followed them to and back 
from the pavement in some surprise” (46).
•	 Information-giving: When Mrs Clennam talks to Clennam, “Her 
emphasis had been derived from her eyes quite as much as from the 
stress she laid on her words” (747). “Their looks met. Something 
thoughtfully apprehensive in [Pet’s] large, soft eyes, had checked Little 
TABLE 4.1
  LITTLE   
 PERSUASION DORRIT MIDDLEMARCH AMBASSADORS
Total 
word length 84,000 345,000 324,000 170,000
    
Attention 27 (108) 60 42 19 (38)
Attentive 6 (24) 21 4 4 (8)
Attentively 1 (4) 11 0 1 (2)
TOTALS 34 (136) 92 46 24 (48)
    
Look 56 (224) 331 242 105 (206)
Looks 14 (56) 35 31 7 (14)
Looked 42 (168) 367 230 137 (274)
Looking 45 (180) 281 265 42 (84)
TOTALS 157 (628) 1014 768 291 (578)
    
Stare 0 (0) 16 6 8 (16)
Stares 1 (4) 0 1 1 (2)
Stared 0 (0) 16 7 16 (32)
Staring 2 (8) 32 8 2 (4)
TOTALS 3 (12) 64 22 27 (54)
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Dorrit in an instant” (544).
•	 Warning: “To Arthur’s increased surprise, Mistress Affery, stretching 
her eyes wide at himself, as if in warning that this [Blandois] was not a 
gentleman for him to interfere with” (599).
•	 Thanking: “Mother, with a look which thanked Clennam in a manner 
agreeable to him” (581).
•	 Expressing curiosity: Blandois and Mrs Clennam “looked very closely at 
one another. That was but natural curiosity” (403).
•	 Bonding: “There was a silent understanding between them [Little Dorrit 
and Pet] . . . She looked at Mrs Gowan with keen and unabated interest” 
(544).
•	 Intimidating: Flintwinch says to Mrs Clennam, “Now, I know what you 
mean by opening your eyes so wide at me” (850).
•	 Controlling: “As Mrs Clennam never removed her eyes from Blan-
dois . . . so Jeremiah never removed his from Arthur” (602).
 The use of the look can be an important element in a character’s whole 
personality. Little Dorrit looks at Clennam “with all the earnestness of her 
soul looking steadily out of her eyes” (214). The look is often expressive of 
the attitude of the looker toward the “lookee.” “The visitor [Miss Wade] stood 
looking at her [Tattycoram] with a strange attentive smile. It was wonderful 
to see the fury of the contest in the girl, and the bodily struggle she made as 
if she were rent by the Demons of old” (65; my emphasis). “Mrs Clennam 
and Jeremiah had exchanged a look; and had then looked, and looked still, 
at Affery” (834). However, it can sometimes be that the accusation of staring 
is more informative about the uneasy state of mind of the “staree” than it is 
about the alleged starer. Miss Wade refers to someone in her past who “had a 
serious way with her eyes of watching me” (727). Fanny unfairly reproaches 
Little Dorrit for staring at her (665), and Mr Dorrit thinks that the Chief 
Butler looks at him “in a manner that Mr Dorrit considered questionable” 
(678). When Mr Dorrit’s mind is collapsing and “his daughter had been 
observant of him with something more than her usual interest,” he demands 
peevishly, “Amy, what are you looking at?” (701).
 The mechanics are interesting to observe. A look may be combined with 
the nonverbal communication discussed above: Clennam, “more with his 
eyes than by the slight impulsive motion of his hand, entreated her [Little 
Dorrit] to be reassured and to trust him” (121). Characters sometimes see 
significance in an exchange of looks by others. When Pancks comes to break 
the news of the Dorrit wealth, “The excitement of this strange creature was 
fast communicating itself to Clennam. Little Dorrit with amazement, saw 
this, and observed that they exchanged quick looks” (437). Characters are 
frequently uncomfortably aware of being the subject of a stare. When Mr 
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Dorrit goes to see Mrs Clennam, “he felt that the eyes of Mr Flintwinch and 
of Mrs Clennam were on him. He found, when he looked up, that this sensa-
tion was not a fanciful one” (686). Mrs Clennam (perhaps the major starer 
in the novel) “sat looking at her until she attracted her attention. Little Dorrit 
coloured under such a gaze, and looked down” (390). Flintwinch comments 
drily to Clennam, “You’ll be able to take my likeness, the next time you call, 
Arthur, I should think” (744). Clennam is comically uncomfortable with 
a look from Flora: “In his ridiculous distress, Clennam received another 
of the old glances without in the least knowing what to do with it” (194). 
Occasionally, a look can be so compelling that the lookee has to return it. 
“Throughout he [Blandois] looked at her [Little Dorrit]. Once attracted by 
his peculiar eyes, she could not remove her own, and they had looked at each 
other all the time” (546). Mr F.’s Aunt “looked at Clennam with an expression 
of such intense severity that he felt obliged to look at her in return, against 
his personal inclinations.” “None of your eyes at me,” she scolds him (590).
Physically Distributed Cognition
I explained in chapter 2 that the term physically distributed cognition refers, 
as Daniel Dennett says, to our habit of off-loading as much as possible of 
our cognitive tasks into our environment. Dickens, in keeping with his 
absorption in the surface, and therefore physical, nature of thought, was 
acutely aware of this phenomenon. Consider again the passage quoted in my 
opening chapter in which Meagles comes close to saying that the informa-
tion that Miss Wade lives in Park Lane is literally contained in the Meagles’s 
family house. Mrs Clennam’s house is another example of this sort of cog-
nition. Take this description of her room, which she has not left for many 
years: “Yet there was a nameless air of preparation in the room, as if it were 
strung up for an occasion. From what the room derived it . . . no one could 
have said without looking attentively at its mistress, and that, too, with a 
previous knowledge of her face” (832; my emphasis).
 Characters can suffer when taken out of their physically distributed net-
work or when their environment is disrupted. Affery is “sensible of the danger 
in which her identity stood” (405) partly because of the menacing noises that 
she hears in Mrs Clennam’s house (which are eventually explained by its col-
lapse). At the climax of the novel, when Mrs Clennam leaves her room, she 
is “made giddy by the turbulent irruption of this multitude of staring faces 
into her cell of years, by the confusing sensation of being in the air, and the 
yet more confusing sensation of being afoot, by the unexpected changes in 
half-remembered objects” (856). Disoriented by the sudden absence of her 
Little Dorrit  | 117
physically distributed cognitive network, Mrs Clennam behaves so strangely 
while she is stumbling to the Marshalsea to see Little Dorrit that people in the 
streets think she is mad. The most extreme example is Mr Dorrit, who, after 
his release from the Marshalsea prison, never loses the feelings of discomfort 
and unease that he experiences while trying to cope with the absence of that 
familiar environment. His mind eventually gives way under the pressure. 
During his breakdown, Mr Dorrit “looked about him, as if the association 
were so strong that he needed reassurance from his sense of sight that they 
were not in the old prison-room” (702). Afterwards, “from that hour his 
poor maimed spirit, only remembering the place where it had broken its 
wings, cancelled the dream through which it had since groped, and knew of 
nothing beyond the Marshalsea” (710). Interestingly, Little Dorrit also suf-
fers from the same syndrome, albeit, of course, in a much milder form. She 
is described as “quite displaced even from the last point of the old standing 
ground in life on which her feet had lingered” (517). Life in Rome for her 
“greatly resembled a superior sort of Marshalsea” (565). She has the insight 
to be aware of what is happening to her and writes to Clennam that “These 
new countries and wonderful sights . . . are very beautiful, and they astonish 
me, but I am not collected enough—not familiar enough with myself, if you 
can quite understand what I mean—to have all the pleasure in them that I 
might have” (522).
 In addition, I cannot resist adding (at the suggestion of Porter Abbott) 
an extraordinary example of physically distributed cognition from a dif-
ferent Dickens novel, Hard Times (1854): “‘I think there’s a pain somewhere 
in the room,’ said Mrs Gradgrind [on her deathbed], ‘but I couldn’t positively 
say that I have got it’” (193).
Large Intermental Units
The large units in Little Dorrit include the speculators, the Marshalsea, 
and “Society.” The speculators who invest in Merdle and are subsequently 
ruined by him are always referred to as an intermental unit, even though, 
like most large units, it is necessarily an ill-defined set composed of indi-
viduals who have bought into Merdle to varying extents. “All people knew 
(or thought they knew) that he had made himself immensely rich” (611). 
“Nobody  .  .  . knew what he had done; but everybody knew him to be the 
greatest that had appeared” (627). When explanations for Merdle’s death 
are sought, the entirely spurious physical condition of “pressure” is decided 
upon, and, in an interesting echo of the language that is used in Middle-
march, the narrator remarks that this is “entirely satisfactory to the public 
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mind” (775). In a chilling analysis of the working of this type of intermental 
thought, one that lies behind the exploitative functioning of the medium-
sized units of the Barnacle family and the Circumlocution Office, Ferdinand 
Barnacle remarks to Clennam when he visits him in the Marshalsea, “Pardon 
me, but I think you really have no idea how the human bees will swarm to 
the beating of any old tin kettle; in that fact lies the complete manual of gov-
erning them” (807).
 The intermental unit of the Marshalsea prison is referred to by the nar-
rator as the collegians, as in “the Collegians were not envious” of the Dorrit 
family’s newfound wealth (475). It has a common view on Mr Dorrit in par-
ticular: “It was generally understood that you must deduct a few [years] from 
his account [of how long he has been in the prison]; he was vain, the fleeting 
generations of debtors said” (105). Clennam is able to read this shared mind. 
He notices that “It was evident from the general tone of the whole party, that 
they had come to regard insolvency as the normal state of mankind, and the 
payment of debts as a disease that occasionally broke out” (128). Distinc-
tions can be made within units, and, when appropriate, subgroups may be 
delineated: “All the ladies in the prison had got hold of the news, and were 
in the yard . . . the gentleman prisoners, feeling themselves at a disadvantage, 
had for the most part retired” (101). Generally, the vision of intermental 
identity in Little Dorrit is rather different from that in Middlemarch, where 
the inhabitants of that town manage to retain their subjective individuality 
while being at the same time part of its group mind. But in the Dickens 
novel many of the descriptions of joint thought are relentlessly negative and 
despairing. This is a world in which individuals have a tendency to become 
“human bees” who lose their identity and gain nothing in return: “There 
was a string of people already straggling in, whom it was not difficult to 
identify as the nondescript messengers, go-betweens and errand bearers of 
the place . . . All of them wore the cast off clothes of other men and women, 
were made up of patches and pieces of other people’s individuality, and had 
no sartorial existence of their own proper” (131).
 Turning to the other end of the social scale, it is a noteworthy feature of 
Mrs Merdle’s conversational style that she constantly refers to the demands 
of “Society.” This is the shorthand used for a network of different, overlap-
ping subgroups such as the “Hampton Court Bohemians” (440) that Mrs 
Gowan belongs to, and “the Circumlocution Barnacles, who were the largest 
job-masters in the universe” (441). Gowan is well aware that he belongs to 
this network, remarking to Clennam that “I belong to a clan, or a clique, or 
a family, or a connection, or whatever you like to call it” (451). Mrs Merdle 
uses the mention of Society in order to enforce and reinforce ideological 
norms on others. However, it can be difficult for individuals to know how to 
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put these norms into practice in particular circumstances. When Mr Merdle 
complains that he does not enjoy Society events, she points out that he has 
to pretend: “Seeming would be quite enough” (448). Similarly intermental 
difficulties tend to arise during crises. “On the first crash of the eminent Mr 
Merdle’s decease, many important persons had been unable to determine 
whether they should cut Mrs Merdle, or comfort her” (873). Luckily for her, 
they choose the latter.
 I mentioned above, in the sections on the expressiveness of the face, 
the use of nonverbal communication, and the importance of the attentive 
look, that much can be left unsaid when a character knows fairly well what 
another is thinking. This is true of cooperative and constructive intermental 
units such as Clennam’s relationships with Pancks and Doyce, as well as 
more dysfunctional examples such as the relationship between Little Dorrit 
and her father. Here too, a good deal is often left unspoken. However, the 
unexpressed nature of much of the intermental functioning in the novel is 
even more apparent in the conflicted and destructive small units that exist 
within the norms established by the large unit of Society. These units are 
characterized by shared thought that is based on pretence and, in particular, 
on the pretence that intermental understanding is absent. On the contrary, 
though, these units rest on a network of shared assumptions that make their 
vicious verbal jousting possible.
 Two of an entertaining bunch of examples are the relationships between 
Fanny and Mrs Merdle and between Fanny and Mrs General. In the former 
case, Fanny and Mrs Merdle understand each other so perfectly that the 
real subjects of their conversations need never be made explicit. It is in this 
way that the two of them spend the second half of the novel (“Riches”) pre-
tending that they never met in the first (“Rags”). Indeed, “The skilful manner 
in which [Mrs Merdle] and Fanny fenced with one another on the occasion 
almost made her quiet sister [Little Dorrit] wink” (566). In a good example 
of the competitive nature of encounters fought under the rules of Society, the 
discussion between Mr Dorrit and Mrs Merdle over the engagement between 
their offspring becomes a zero-sum game, a “skilful seesaw . . . so that each of 
them sent the other up, and each of them sent the other down, and neither 
had the advantage” (657). The conversation between Mrs Merdle and Mrs 
Gowan over the engagement between Gowan and Pet is a more cooperative 
affair, but is still governed by the same rules: “Knowing, however, what was 
expected of her, and perceiving the exact nature of the fiction to be nursed, 
she [Mrs Merdle] took it delicately in her arms, and put her required contri-
bution of gloss upon it . . . And Mrs Gowan, who of course saw through her 
own threadbare blind perfectly, and who knew that Mrs Merdle saw through 
it perfectly, came out of this form, notwithstanding, as she had gone into it, 
120 | Chapter 4
with immense complacency and gravity” (444). What is happening here is 
that there is one apparent or surface intermental understanding that is based 
on a lie (the marriage is regrettable), while the real understanding (the mar-
riage is to be welcomed) must never be explicitly acknowledged.
The Dorrit Family
One of the ways in which a group of people can be identified as an inter-
mental unit is a strong sense among those people of being part of that 
group. Such a group often has a clearly defined self-image in the sense that 
it is important to its constituent individuals that they identify themselves 
as belonging to it. Some families are like this; others are not. The Dorrit 
family definitely has a strong self-image. During Frederick’s unforgettable 
outburst to William in which he complains about the family’s treatment of 
Little Dorrit, he refers to the “family credit” (538). Earlier, Mr Dorrit had 
“felt that the family dignity was struck at by an assassin’s hand” (511). The 
same words, “family dignity,” are used again several pages later (551). These 
phrases refer to the shared consciousness within the family of their alleged 
importance and social standing. They contain a strong sense of them and us, 
insiders and outsiders. The outsiders have to be made aware of the impor-
tance of the family name, and the insiders are uneasily aware of outsiders’ 
skepticism on this point.
 The following passage is a remarkable one. The word “family” is repeated 
four times in such quick succession that the phrases containing the word, 
and referring thereby to different aspects of the workings of the Dorrit inter-
mental mind, comprise eleven words out of a total of forty-four. The passage 
attempts to convey by means of this repetition a sense of the creation of what 
may be termed the family ideology: “It was the family custom to lay it down 
as family law, that she was a plain domestic little creature, without the great 
and sage experience of the rest. This family fiction was the family assertion 
of itself against her services” (280; my emphasis). The background to the 
phrase quoted earlier about Mr Dorrit feeling that the family dignity had 
been struck at by an assassin’s hand is that he is excessively self-conscious 
about the recent family history. Fanny knows well that it is “often running 
in his mind that other people are thinking about [the Marshalsea], while he 
is talking to them” (647). As with many intermental units, though, gener-
alizations should be employed with care. This sort of cognitive functioning 
is complex. To repeat, most groups have a core membership but are looser 
around the edges. Significantly, Wittgenstein used the notion of family 
resemblances in the Philosophical Investigations to illustrate the fuzziness of 
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concepts (1958, 32). The consciousness of the Dorrit family credit is shared 
by the core family of William, Fanny, and Tip. It is not characteristic of the 
other members who, for different reasons, are much more peripheral: Fred-
erick and Little Dorrit.
 The workings of the Dorrit mind in action are evident in characteristic 
shared patterns of behavior. These behavioral patterns can relate to individ-
uals who are either inside or outside of the unit. The passage quoted above 
that referred to the family four times in three lines is a good illustration of 
the former. From an intramental point of view, Little Dorrit is referred to as 
“retiring,” “unnoticed,” “overlooked and forgotten” (all in one paragraph on 
page 337), and is regarded in Venice as “the little figure of the English girl 
who was always alone” (520) and who always “asked leave to be left alone” 
(519). However, much of this intramental shyness arises from her treatment 
by William, Fanny, and Tip. Its origins are intermental. It is laid down as 
family law that Little Dorrit is to be treated in a certain way, and should have 
a certain function within the unit as a plain domestic creature who does not 
possess their wisdom. It is a central element in the shared consciousness 
of the core family. Little Dorrit is intramentally aware of the place allotted 
her. It is stated that she “submitted herself to the family want in its greatness 
as she had submitted herself to the family want in its littleness” (556–57). 
Intermental cognitive functioning is often revealed in the joint actions that 
arise from these family dispositions to behave in certain ways. In the John 
Chivery affair, “Little Dorrit herself was the last person considered” (257). 
Of the triumphant leaving of the Marshalsea, the narrator states that “This 
going away was perhaps the very first action of their joint lives that they had 
got though without her” (480). And they fail spectacularly by completely 
forgetting her and leaving her behind.
 Family customs can often reveal a lot about a family to outsiders. When 
Clennam hears Little Dorrit being praised by her uncle, Frederick Dorrit, 
he resents the family tone of voice: “Arthur fancied that he heard in these 
praises a certain tone of custom, which he had heard from the father last 
night with an inward protest and feeling of antagonism . . . He fancied that 
they viewed her, not as having risen away from the prison atmosphere, but 
as appertaining to it; as being vaguely what they had a right to expect, and 
nothing more” (134). It is quite common, I think, for outsiders being intro-
duced to a family to see at a glance what is revealed by joint patterns of 
behavior: say, which members of it are excessively over- or undervalued. The 
narrator comments of the family treatment of Little Dorrit that “She took 
the place of eldest of the three, in all things but precedence; was the head of 
the fallen family; and bore, in her own heart, its anxieties and shames” (112). 
The narrator also describes Little Dorrit in the act of sighing by referring to 
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“the whole family history in that sigh” (648). Both are moving descriptions 
of the ways in which individuals may acquire and internalize some of the 
characteristics of the intermental unit to which they belong, and how painful 
this internalization process can be.
 Intermental units can also function in similarly characteristic ways 
toward individuals who are outside of the unit. Such mechanisms as scape-
goating are powerful tools for defining group consciousness. William, Tip, 
and Fanny develop a common antagonism toward Clennam, based mainly 
on his skepticism toward their core value, the family credit. Fanny says 
of him that “He obtruded himself upon us in the first instance. We never 
wanted him” (507). Clennam is well aware of their shared hostility because 
of their unsubtle joint behavior and comes “to a clearer and keener percep-
tion of the place assigned him by the family” (573). Again, though, it should 
be stressed that the peripheral members do not share these communal atti-
tudes. Little Dorrit is in love with him and it is doubtful whether Frederick 
has any view at all on the matter.
 It is often rewarding to investigate the subunits that develop within an 
intermental unit because they tend both to illuminate and be illuminated 
by the social dynamics of the larger group. Within the relationship between 
Little Dorrit and her father, much is often left unspoken. They understand 
each other but do not make this knowledge of the other apparent: he because 
he is emotionally dishonest; she for reasons of delicacy and a reluctance to 
confront that dishonesty. “For a little while there was a dead silence and 
stillness” (271) between them, “They did not, as yet, look at one another” 
(272). In that silence, it is apparent that she knows that he has encouraged 
young John Chivery to court her for his own selfish purposes, he knows that 
she knows, she knows that he knows that she knows, and so on. Much of 
the relationship between father and daughter is expressed in terms of ges-
ture: “To see her hand upon his arm in mute entreaty half-repressed, and 
her timid little shrinking figure turning away, was to see a sad, sad sight” 
(123). Like Fanny, Little Dorrit knows about how her father’s mind works, 
in particular on the question of the family credit: “She felt that, in what he 
had just now said to her and in his whole bearing towards her, there was the 
well-known shadow of the Marshalsea wall” (530). As is to be expected over 
the course of a long narrative, their relationship changes: “From that time 
the protection that her wondering eyes had expressed towards him, became 
embodied in action, and the Child of the Marshalsea took upon herself a 
new relation towards the Father” (111). The shared cognitive functioning 
within this intermental pair is flawed, however, by his dishonesty. He pre-
tends that there has been no change.
 Fanny and Little Dorrit also form an intermental pair within the larger 
unit of the whole family. The latter is quick to pick up on behavioral cues 
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from her sister: she “became aware that Fanny was more showy in manner 
than the occasion appeared to require” (549). As a consequence of their inti-
macy, Fanny shares secrets with her. She tells Little Dorrit how she always 
knows when a man is interested in her (558). She also explains in great detail 
the reasons why she and Mrs Merdle will pretend that they have not met 
before (551). When Fanny cries after telling her that she is engaged, “It was 
the last time Fanny ever showed that there was any hidden, suppressed, or 
conquered feeling in her on the matter” (654). From that time onward, her 
feelings will be hidden from others, but Amy will know of them, having been 
shown them once.
 As shown in the discussion of large cognitive units, Fanny and Mrs 
Merdle understand each other so perfectly that the real subjects of their con-
versations need never be openly referred to. The relationship between Fanny 
and Mrs Merdle’s son, Sparkler, is much less well balanced. Fanny toys with 
Sparkler, and her knowledge of his mind, such as it is, enables her to calibrate 
the torture perfectly. Her control over him, while enjoyable in itself, causes 
problems in terms of Fanny’s acute awareness of the perceptions of others. 
“Miss Fanny was now in the difficult situation of being universally known 
[to be the object of Mr Sparkler’s affections], and of not having dismissed 
Mr Sparkler . . . Hence she was sufficiently identified with the gentleman to 
feel compromised by his being more than usually ridiculous” (645). She is 
aware of the intermental consensus, presented in the passive voice, that iden-
tifies her relationship with Sparkler as a serious one. She knows that such 
a consensus can solidify quickly and cannot thereafter be easily changed. 
Fanny therefore jumps quickly to Sparkler’s defense whenever Gowan ridi-
cules him. The enslavement has consequences for Little Dorrit too, as she 
realizes how their two minds are working: “Thenceforward, Little Dorrit 
observed Mr Sparkler’s treatment by his enslaver, with new reasons for 
attaching importance to all that passed between them” (651). “Little Dorrit 
began to think she detected some new understanding between Mr Sparkler 
and Fanny” (651). She notices that “Mr Sparkler’s demeanor towards herself 
changed. It became fraternal” (652).
 The bulk of this section has analyzed intermental units that are char-
acterized by conflict, competition, exploitation, dishonesty, solipsism, and 
selfishness. The ideology of the Dorrit family credit, despite the complete 
absence of evidence for it, is imposed on others in order to devalue them. 
Their joint exploitation of, and dishonesty toward, Little Dorrit is morally 
reprehensible, as is their attempted scapegoating of Clennam. In addition, 
Fanny in particular forms conflicted and competitive pairings with others 
such as Mrs Merdle and Mrs General. This bleak picture is in stark contrast 
to the nature of the intermental unit formed by the relationship between 
Little Dorrit and Clennam, which is examined now.
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Clennam and Little Dorrit
Intermental units can be approached in a number of different ways. One is 
simply to trace the development of the relationship as a whole over time. 
Another is to examine it in terms of the variation in focalization: in this case, 
the relationship is mostly focalized through Clennam. A third is to examine 
the degree of intermental thought: individuals may understand each other 
perfectly, imperfectly, or even (as with non-units such as Lydgate and Rosa-
mond) not at all. It may be that different units will be illuminated by different 
sorts of approaches. In the case of Clennam and Little Dorrit, I will evaluate 
a few general aspects of their relationship before concentrating first on Clen-
nam’s knowledge of Little Dorrit’s mind and then on her knowledge of his.
 As the reader would expect of the central romance of the novel, Clennam 
and Little Dorrit share a good deal of their thinking: not all, but a good deal. 
The following excerpt from her letter to him gives a flavor of the complexity 
of the self-conscious theory of mind that is involved in their relationship: 
“It looked at first as if I was taking on myself to understand and explain 
so much  .  .  .  But  .  .  .  I felt more hopeful for your knowing at once that I 
had only been watchful for you, and had only noticed what I think I have 
noticed, because I was quickened by your interest in it” (608). This is written 
by someone who is well aware of the workings of her own mind and the 
mind of the one she loves, and how the two minds can function together. 
As is often the case, though, their mind reading is not perfect. A common 
characteristic of theory of mind involving two people who know each other 
well is that one will often know that something is wrong with the other, but 
not know precisely what: “She feared that he was blaming her in his mind 
for so devising to contrive for them, think for them, and watch over them, 
without their knowledge or gratitude; perhaps even with their reproaches for 
supposed neglect. But what was really in his mind, was the weak figure with 
its strong purpose” (211–12). In this case she knows that something is on his 
mind, but she is wrong about what it is. (As we will see, something similar 
happens with Anne Elliot and Wentworth.) Near the end of the novel, after 
they have been apart for some time, he sees something in her face although 
he does not know exactly what it is: “As she looked at him silently, there was 
something in her affectionate face that he did not quite comprehend: some-
thing that could have broken into tears in a moment, and yet that was happy 
and proud” (885).
 There is a paradox that commonly arises in narratives with a comic 
structure. On the one hand, the central couple in a comedy often exhibits 
a high degree of intermentality. This is what one would expect when people 
are attracted to each other and are on the same wavelength. On the other 
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hand, there is often a huge gap or blind spot in their joint mind reading that 
relates to the most important matter of all—their feelings for each other. In 
the case of this novel, Clennam does not know that Little Dorrit is in love 
with him; she does not know that Clennam is in love with her. “She was 
quicker to perceive the slightest matter here, than in any other case—but 
one” (544). There are interesting parallels here with the development of the 
relationships between Anne and Wentworth and Dorothea and Ladislaw. 
There is a certain logic to such intermental breakdowns in the relationships 
of lovers. It may be that they will have a tendency to put the other on a ped-
estal and think something along the lines of “he/she is so wonderful that he/
she will not be interested in me.”
 Mind reading involves reading one’s own mind as well as reading the 
minds of others, and both can be unreliable. Little Dorrit’s first-person 
attribution is accurate because she knows that she is in love with Clennam. 
However, for the majority of the novel, Clennam is not aware of the most 
important fact about the working of his own mind: that he is in love with 
Little Dorrit. Efficient first-person attribution is as necessary as the third-
person sort for successful participation in an intermental unit. For any unit 
of this sort to function properly, with a fair degree of accuracy and concern 
for the feelings of the other, the individuals within it have to try to come to a 
reasonable working knowledge of their own feelings as well as the feelings of 
the other in order to make informed and sensitive ethical judgments about 
how to behave. Clennam becomes aware that his feelings for Little Dorrit are 
complex, and this awareness leads him to exercise the sort of care in dealing 
with her feelings that I will be describing. Nevertheless, he sometimes hurts 
her because he does not yet know that he is in love with her or that she is 
in love with him. Toward the end of the novel, Clennam finds his private 
thoughts “remarkable” to him (787), suggesting that he is aware of the fal-
libility of introspection.
 The issue of control often arises even within beneficial intermental units. 
There is evidence from the beginning of the novel that Clennam attempts to 
influence Little Dorrit’s mind: “He wished to leave her with a reliance upon 
him, and to have something like a promise from her that she would cherish 
it” (140). He is concerned, though, that the Little Dorrit who exists in his 
mind may not be the one who exists in her own. “To make a domesticated 
fairy of her . . . would be but a weakness of his own fancy” (305). The feeling 
will not go away. “Something had made her keenly and additionally sensitive 
just now. Now, was there someone in the hopeless unattainable distance? 
Or had the suspicion been brought into his mind, by his own associations?” 
(309). Clennam is showing a sensitive awareness of his and her aspectuality. 
He is acutely conscious of the possibility that his Little Dorrit could become 
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a “domesticated fairy” and thereby lose contact with what he thinks might 
be her own conception of herself. He knows that he is using her for his own 
emotional needs by creating an image of her in his mind that may not fit 
her own self-image. Importantly, he does not wish to do so. Unfortunately, 
though, he then overcompensates by talking about himself as much older 
than he is, and thus inadvertently hurts Little Dorrit’s feelings. The narrator 
comments that he would not talk of himself as though he was old “If he had 
known the sharpness of the pain he caused the patient heart, in speaking 
thus!” (432). To make matters worse, Clennam does not realize that rein-
forcing the age gap by calling her a child is equally hurtful. “A slight shade 
of distress fell upon her, at his so often calling her a child. She was surprised 
that he should see it, or think such a slight thing” (208). Again, this may be 
a familiar sensation. Many of us have inadvertently hurt someone close to us 
by unsuccessfully trying to second-guess their feelings. As is said of Oedipa 
and Mucho, the married couple in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 
(1966), “Like all their inabilities to communicate, this too had a virtuous 
motive” (30).
 In any event, despite these difficulties, Clennam’s theory of mind is, in 
ethical terms, far superior to that of the Dorrit family. In a number of pas-
sages early in the novel, we see Clennam fully understanding Little Dorrit’s 
love for her father. “Evidently in observance of their nightly custom, she put 
some bread before herself, and touched his glass with her lips; but Arthur 
saw she was troubled and took nothing” (122). “He understood the emotion 
with which she said it, to arise in her father’s behalf; and he respected it, 
and was silent” (126). “He gathered from a tremor on her lip, and a passing 
shadow of great agitation on her face, that her mind was with her father” 
(306). He is considerate about her poverty. “He was going to say so lightly 
clad, but stopped himself in what would have been a reference to her pov-
erty” (208). Little Dorrit becomes aware that he knows her mind well. “‘Can 
you guess,’ said Little Dorrit  .  .  .  looking at him with all the earnestness of 
her soul looking steadily out of her eyes, ‘what I am going to ask you not to 
do?’” (214). He guesses correctly that her request is to stop giving money to 
her father and brother. She tells him that “I know you will understand me 
if anybody can” (523). And she is right. “He saw the bright delight of her 
face, and the flush that kindled in it, with a feeling of shame . . . The same 
deep, timid earnestness that he had always seen in her, and never without 
emotion, he saw still” (826). Their nonverbal communication is noticeably 
efficient. “She started, coloured deeply, and turned white. The visitor, more 
with his eyes than by the slight impulsive motion of his hand, entreated her 
to be reassured and to trust him” (121). He can read her emotional behavior 
(starting and turning white); she can read the intention behind his gesture. 
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The following small detail beautifully encapsulates the closeness of their 
mind reading: “‘Little Dorrit,’ said Clennam; and the phrase had already 
begun, between these two, to stand for a hundred gentle phrases, according 
to the varying tone and connection in which it was used” (213). I think many 
readers of this book will have had personal experience of the use of a private 
language within a close relationship.
 However, in a troubling and difficult scene, there is a breakdown in 
the communication between them. Little Dorrit confides that she does not 
understand why, after spending so long in the debtors prison, her father still 
has to pay off his debt before he is released. Clennam cannot understand why 
she does not understand that it is the honorable thing to do. The narrator 
remarks that “It was the first speck Clennam had ever seen, it was the last 
speck Clennam ever saw, of the prison atmosphere upon her” (472). I refer 
to this passage as troubling and difficult because it is possible that the ethical 
judgments made by most readers today would not necessarily be in line with 
Clennam’s or the implied author’s on this issue. My interpretation of this 
sentence, guided by its beautiful cadence, is that the implied reader is being 
invited by the implied author to identify with Clennam’s disapproval. It may 
well be that the actual readers of Dickens’s period would have been readier 
to accept that invitation than the actual readers of today, who may, I think, 
be more likely to regard Little Dorrit’s question as, at the least, a reason-
able one to ask. How is it, they might ask themselves, that people who steal 
money are penalized only once by the prison sentence and do not have to 
pay back the money, while people who owe money have to suffer both pen-
alties? Because the actual reader may be at some distance from the implied 
reader in this case, the effect could be to make Clennam look heavy-handed 
and judgmental. In terms of readers’ responses to Little Dorrit, the effect is 
rather paradoxical. A familiar criticism of Dickens is that he makes his hero-
ines into saints. These days, we would like more imperfections. However, the 
“flaw” that he gives Little Dorrit in an attempt to humanize her is unlikely to 
be seen as such by modern readers.
 As the bulk of the text is focalized through Clennam, there is less evi-
dence of Little Dorrit’s mind reading. Nevertheless, for large stretches of 
the novel, she is obviously well aware of Clennam’s feelings. In addition to 
some of the examples given above, she knows immediately that something 
is wrong with Clennam after he gives up thoughts of Pet. She asks if he has 
been ill (431), and she knows about his anxieties about growing old. “He 
never thought that she saw in him what no one else could see” (432). There 
is a noticeable emphasis on the face in her mind-reading of Clennam. She 
can read his facial expressions with ease. “As she made the confession, tim-
idly hesitating, she raised her eyes to the face, and read its expression so 
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plainly that she answered it” (211). “Do what he could to compose his face, 
he could not convey so much of an ordinary expression into it, but that the 
moment she saw it, she dropped her work and cried, ‘Mr Clennam! What’s 
the matter?’” (465). Intermental units are not sealed off from the rest of the 
storyworld, and Little Dorrit is perceptive when she sees Clennam inter-
acting with others. When Pancks comes to break the news of the Dorrit 
wealth, “The excitement of this strange creature was fast communicating 
itself to Clennam. Little Dorrit with amazement, saw this, and observed that 
they exchanged quick looks” (437). Knowledge of others can be contextual 
as well as relying on external indicators such as facial clues and signs. She 
understands his awareness of her feelings about her father because she knows 
the sort of person that he is. “Little Dorrit had a misgiving that he might 
blame her father” (208). I said earlier that William Dorrit is too frightened 
to recognize and acknowledge change in his relationship with Little Dorrit. 
This one is different. At the end of the novel, she realizes immediately that 
Clennam knows that it has altered. As a consequence, “He hesitated what to 
call her. She perceived it in an instant” (825), and reassures him that she still 
wishes to be known as “Little Dorrit.”
Clennam and Mrs Clennam
This is a dysfunctional relationship in which there is evidence only of the 
most basic kind of intermental thinking. What they know about each other 
is the sort of person that the other is, their character or personality, their 
dispositions to behave in certain ways. He knows her to be cold, arrogant, 
and unbending. She knows him well enough to identify what she regards as 
weakness in him. But it is precisely this knowledge that fuels her hostility 
toward him and drives them further apart. Clennam knows that his mother 
has a secretive disposition and he guesses that she has a secret that might 
be connected in some way to Little Dorrit. But these are circumstantial or 
contextual guesses based on his knowledge of her character. They do not 
arise from any knowledge of her detailed thought processes as they occur in 
everyday contexts. Clennam is well aware that Mrs Clennam does not have 
any sort of intermental bond with him. “He touched the worsted muffling 
of her hand—that was nothing; if his mother had been sheathed in brass 
there would have been no new barrier between them” (76). As a sensitive 
man, he feels the lack of any connection deeply. In consequence he has little 
desire for her company: “He had no intention of presenting himself in his 
mother’s dismal room that night, and could not have felt more depressed 
and cast away if he had been in a wilderness” (203). Clennam is watchful 
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in her presence, forever unsuccessfully seeking clues to her state of mind. 
“Mrs Clennam glanced at her son, leaning against one of the windows. He 
observed the look” (92).
 Clennam is a character who believes in social minds. For him, it is an 
ethical decision to be as open as possible in his cognitive functioning. He 
thinks that people should be capable of empathy and he tries to empathize 
with his mother: “A swift thought shot into his mind. In that long imprison-
ment here, and in her own long confinement to her room, did his mother 
find a balance to be struck” (129). What little knowledge he has of his moth-
er’s thought processes leads him to try to achieve a reconciliation with her. 
She rejects the offer. Indeed, the conflicted conversations that result reveal 
fresh complexities. “‘You knew I would. You knew me’ she interrupted. Her 
son paused for a moment. He had struck fire out of her, and was surprised” 
(87). Although she is acknowledging that he knows what sort of person 
she is, the key point is that he is surprised. He still does not know her well 
enough to be able to predict her emotional reactions. There is a lack of bal-
ance in that Clennam is trying to find a meeting of minds and his mother is 
not. His mother’s rejection of an open relationship is echoed in the behavior 
of Gowan, which I will examine later. However, to put this relationship in 
context, it is worth noting that Mrs Clennam can be surprisingly sensitive to 
the thought processes of others. This seems particularly true of Little Dorrit. 
She tells her, “You love Arthur. (I can see the blush upon your face.)” (859). 
When Little Dorrit later recoils from her, she seems to care, responding, 
“Even now, I see you shrink from me, as if I had been cruel” (860).
Clennam and Flora
Clennam usually displays a sensitive awareness of the aspectuality of indi-
viduals and of the fact that identities are situated. I have mentioned that he 
is aware that he may be using Little Dorrit by creating an image of her in 
his mind that might not fit her own self-image in order to supply his own 
emotional needs. However, he is noticeably less aware of a similar sort of 
problem that arises in his relationship with Flora. For about twenty years, 
the image of Flora that is present in Clennam’s mind is of the young Flora. 
This image takes no account of the passing of time. He neglects to make any 
adjustments to anticipate what an older Flora might be like. The inevitable 
happens. Clennam’s previous, young Flora dies instantly as soon as he meets 
the older one. “Clennam’s eyes no sooner fell upon the subject of his old 
passion than it shivered and broke to pieces” (191). Interestingly, Flora real-
izes what has happened. “‘I know I am not what you expected, I know that 
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very well.’ In the midst of her rapidity, she had found that out with the quick 
perception of a cleverer woman” (195). However, what is so amusing about 
Flora’s character is that she keeps forgetting what she has so perceptively 
noticed. She keeps morphing into young Flora, thereby attempting to trans-
form Clennam correspondingly into young Clennam. This, of course, causes 
the older Clennam great discomfort. “In his ridiculous distress, Clennam 
received another of the old glances without in the least knowing what to do 
with it” (194). However, Flora’s sympathy for Little Dorrit and her whole-
hearted interest in Clennam’s happiness eventually press her to stay in older-
Flora character.
 Flora’s mental functioning is locked into a dialogical relationship with 
Clennam’s. To use Gregory Bateson’s formula as described in chapter 2, for 
increased explanatory power, the way to delineate Flora’s cognitive system 
is to draw the limiting line so that you do not cut out anything that leaves 
things inexplicable. That means not leaving out of account either young 
Flora or older Flora, either Clennam’s Flora or her own Flora. Together, these 
different Floras comprise her situated identity.
Mrs Clennam, Flintwinch, and Affery
The business partnership of Flintwinch and Mrs Clennam, frequently 
referred to by Affery as “the clever ones,” is a fiercely conflicted and com-
petitive relationship. Their conversations are games of chess that anyone 
overhearing would find difficult to follow (a sure sign of a high-functioning 
intermental unit). The closeness of their joint thinking is frequently empha-
sized by Flintwinch’s recriminations during their regular arguments: “It 
doesn’t matter whether you answer or not, because I know you are, and you 
know you are” (224). Flintwinch knows what she is thinking, she knows that 
he knows, he knows that she knows, and so on. Their minds are transparent 
to each other. He remarks to her, “Now, I know what you mean by opening 
your eyes so wide at me” (850). He even shouts at Mrs Clennam, “But that’s 
the way you cheat yourself ” (851). He is saying that his third-person attribu-
tions of her states of mind are more accurate and reliable than her own first-
person ones. Nevertheless, despite these very real tensions, they form an alli-
ance, knowing that they are stronger together than they are alone. “Perhaps 
this had originally been the mainspring of the understanding between them. 
Descrying thus much force of character in Mr Flintwinch, perhaps Mrs 
Clennam had deemed alliance with him worth her while” (225). Each uses 
his or her knowledge of the other’s mind to further his or her own interests.
 Both try to exercise control over others by their watchfulness, their use 
of the look. When Mr Dorrit goes to see Mrs Clennam, “he felt that the eyes 
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of Mr Flintwinch and of Mrs Clennam were on him. He found, when he 
looked up, that this sensation was not a fanciful one” (686). “As Mrs Clennam 
never removed her eyes from Blandois  .  .  .  so Jeremiah never removed his 
from Arthur” (602). The power of the look is an outward manifestation of 
their control. This look is employed with regularity on Affery in order to 
subjugate her to their joint will: “Mrs Clennam and Jeremiah had exchanged 
a look; and had then looked, and looked still, at Affery” (834).
 Both recognize that the other is a strong character. In a telling phrase, 
strongly reminiscent of Middlemarch’s desire to swallow Lydgate whole, Flin-
twinch tells Mrs Clennam that “The peculiarity of my temper is, ma’am, that I 
won’t be swallowed up alive” (224). When two people are in such a close rela-
tionship, to the point where it can be said that an intermental mind has been 
formed (even in the case of a conflicted unit such as this), the fear of being 
swallowed up, of losing one’s individuality, can be a pressing one. This is, in 
fact, what happens to Affery. At a conference that I attended once, I noticed 
that one of my hosts was becoming uncomfortable with my talk of social 
minds and intermental units. When I pressed her she admitted as much, 
explaining that she found repugnant the idea of having her freedom as an 
independent individual curtailed by being in such a unit. By contrast, others 
will welcome the intimacy and love that can arise within them.
 Intermental units are fluid. This one is sometimes a pair but, at other 
times, it becomes a trio, when “the clever ones” exercise their large degree 
of control over Affery’s mind. Despite her sluggish intramental functioning, 
Affery, by her repeated use of this phrase, recognizes the strength of the 
intermental pair formed by Flintwinch and Mrs Clennam. She asks herself, 
“What’s the use of considering? If them two clever ones have made up their 
minds to it, what’s left for me to do? Nothing” (78). “But as ‘them two clever 
ones’—Mrs Affery’s perpetual reference, in whom her personality was swal-
lowed up—were agreed to accept Little Dorrit as a matter of course, she had 
nothing for it but to follow suit” (94). Note the recurrence of the phrase “swal-
lowed up” that was used by Flintwinch earlier. The difference is that Affery 
really is being swallowed up. The unit is so strongly defined that the narrator 
often drops the quotation marks: Affery is “held in very low account by the 
two clever ones, as a person, never of strong intellect, who was becoming 
foolish” (389). She is an example of a character who loses her intramental 
identity by being subsumed into an intermental unit that contains much 
stronger characters than her. She becomes as mysterious to herself as she is 
to others. “In the vagueness and indistinctness of all her new experiences and 
perceptions, as everything about her was mysterious to herself she began to 
be mysterious to others: and became as difficult to be made out to anyone’s 
satisfaction as she found the house and everything in it difficult to make out 
to her own” (229). Because her personality really is being swallowed up, it 
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is no surprise to be told that Affery is “sensible of the danger in which her 
identity stood” (405).
Clennam and Gowan
The relationship between Clennam and Gowan is a particularly interesting 
one. Although the two men form a conflicted unit, it differs from the equally 
conflicted “clever ones” because it is also unbalanced and asymmetrical. That 
is to say, it is Gowan who wishes it to be conflicted; Clennam does not and 
he tries hard to understand the workings of Gowan’s mind in order to make 
it cooperative. Clennam can see, while watching the unaware Gowan, that 
“There was something in his way of spurning [stones] out of their places with 
his heel, and getting them into the required position, that Clennam thought 
had an air of cruelty in it” (245). At other times, though, despite Clennam’s 
best attempts, his theory of mind lets him down. He cannot understand 
Gowan’s dilettante attitude toward the arts and his casual attitudes toward 
Pet and others. Gowan enjoys Clennam’s struggles to understand him and 
his resulting discomfiture: “Mr Henry Gowan seemed to have a malicious 
pleasure in playing off the three talkers against each other, and in seeing 
Clennam startled by what they said . . . His healthy state of mind appeared 
even to derive a gratification from Clennam’s position of embarrassment and 
isolation among the good company” (362). Clennam keeps trying and “tried 
to convey by all quiet and unpretending means, that he was frankly and dis-
interestedly desirous of tendering him any friendship he would accept. Mr 
Gowan treated him in return with his usual ease, and with his usual show of 
confidence, which was no confidence at all” (451).
 To use Anne Elliot’s damning condemnation of Mr Elliot that I discuss 
in the following chapter, Gowan, despite appearances to the contrary, is not 
“open.” To adapt the words of the narrator of this novel, it is the usual show 
of openness, which is no openness at all. Gowan is using his theory of mind 
dishonestly: he knows that Clennam wants openness; he pretends to be open; 
he knows that he is not really being open; he enjoys Clennam’s disappoint-
ment that he is not. Gowan uses his knowledge of Clennam’s mind precisely 
to repel the possibility of mutual thought, making this an asymmetrical rela-
tionship. Clennam’s disappointment in Gowan leads him into a familiar phe-
nomenon related to first-person attribution: “It would have been so cruel if 
he had meant it, that Clennam firmly resolved to believe he did not mean it” 
(453). In the modern phrase, Clennam is in denial. However, it does him no 
good because Gowan knows well how minds of this sort work and is ruthless 
in exploiting such weakness. During a later encounter, Clennam is described 
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as “smarting under these cool-handed thrusts, of which he deeply felt the 
force already” (721). Such cruelty requires a refined theory of mind.
 Gowan uses this refined mind reading on his wife for equally cruel 
purposes. In encouraging Blandois to become a friend, Gowan does so 
for the sole reason that he knows that Pet would much rather that he did 
not. He “opposed the first separate wish he observed in his wife” (541). The 
Jamesian tone of that sentence is a reminder that the relationship between 
Gowan and Pet, set as it is in Italy, has marked similarities to the marriage 
between Osmond and Isobel Archer in The Portrait of a Lady. To use the term 
employed as the title of a book by the philosopher Colin McGinn, Gowan, 
like Osmond, likes Mindfucking (2008).
Little Dorrit and Pet
During Pet’s growing realization that her marriage will not be the genu-
inely intermental unit that she had hoped for, she has a consolation in the 
strong relationship that she forms with Little Dorrit. The narrator points out 
that “There was a sympathetic understanding already established between 
the two” (563); and also that “There was a silent understanding between 
them . . . She [Little Dorrit] looked at Mrs Gowan with keen and unabated 
interest; the sound of her voice was thrilling to her; nothing that was near 
her, or about her, escaped Little Dorrit” (544). Little Dorrit tells Clennam 
that “I loved her almost as soon as I spoke to her” (521). Her love for Pet 
enables her to read her mind well. During their first meeting, “There was 
a sorrowfully affectionate and regretful sound in [Pet’s] voice, which made 
[Little Dorrit] refrain from looking at her for the moment” (496). In addition 
to such vocal cues, Little Dorrit’s face-reading works well too. “Little Dorrit 
stopped. For there was neither happiness nor health in the face that turned to 
her” (857). Little Dorrit is aware of the consensus, referred to above, that Pet 
and her family had set out to catch Gowan as a good social connection. How-
ever, “Little Dorrit’s interest in the fair subject of this easily accepted belief 
was too earnest and watchful to fail in accurate observation . . . She even had 
an instinctive knowledge that there was not the least truth in it” (563).
 Part of the reason for Little Dorrit’s skepticism is her perceptive aware-
ness of the dynamics within the Gowan marriage. Although, oddly, she 
becomes a favorite of Gowan (544), this does not prevent her from being 
unsparing in her judgments of his mental functioning: “Little Dorrit fan-
cied it was revealed to her that Mr Gowan treated his wife, even in his 
very fondness, too much like a beautiful child. He seemed so unsuspicious 
of the depths of feeling which she knew must lie below that surface, that 
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she doubted if there could be any such depths in himself ” (548). She is 
also penetrating in her judgments of Gowan’s behavior generally. When the 
Dorrit family is being insufferably munificent in its patronage of Gowan 
as a painter, “Little Dorrit was not without doubts how Mr Henry Gowan 
might take their patronage” (554). And her doubts are justified when he 
takes it badly. Little Dorrit is also aware of the fact that Pet (like Clennam) 
is in denial about the quality of Gowan’s mind: she writes, “I believe she 
conceals [all his faults], and always will conceal them, even from herself ” 
(607).
 A rather surprising intermental unit that develops in the second half of 
the novel is that formed by Little Dorrit, Pet, and Blandois. To both Little 
Dorrit and Pet, “Blandois behaved in exactly the same manner; and to both 
of them his manner had uniformly something in it, which they both knew to 
be different from his bearing towards others” (563). Little Dorrit’s aversion 
to Blandois is visible and therefore public: “She went down, not easily hiding 
how much she was inclined to shrink and tremble; for the appearance of this 
traveller was particularly disagreeable to her” (497). She becomes fascinated 
by his stare: “Throughout he [Blandois] looked at her [Little Dorrit]. Once 
attracted by his peculiar eyes, she could not remove her own, and they had 
looked at each other all the time” (546). Pet is equally repelled by him and 
knows that he killed her dog. The two women are reduced to a conspiracy 
and they use secrecy and silence in their communications whenever he is 
near. “Their looks met. Something thoughtfully apprehensive in [Pet’s] large, 
soft eyes, had checked Little Dorrit in an instant” (544).
ACTION IN LITTLE DORRIT
When the firm Doyce and Clennam is ruined by the collapse of Merdle’s 
financial empire, Clennam knows that it is his fault because, under the influ-
ence of Pancks, he speculated in Merdle’s schemes without Doyce’s knowl-
edge. He decides to do all he can to spare Doyce. He tells his solicitor, Mr 
Rugg, that he will publicly accept all the responsibility for the bankruptcy.
(1) Clennam then proceeded to state to Mr Rugg his fixed resolution. (2) He 
told Mr Rugg that his partner was a man of great simplicity and integrity, 
and that in all he meant to do, he was guided above all things by a knowledge 
of his partner’s character, and a respect for his feelings. (3) He explained 
that his partner was then absent on an enterprise of importance, and that 
it particularly behoved himself publicly to accept the blame of what he had 
rashly done, and publicly to exonerate his partner from all participation in 
the responsibility of it . . .
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(4) The disclosure was made, and the storm raged fearfully. (5) Thousands of 
people were wildly staring about for somebody alive to heap reproaches on; 
and this notable case, courting publicity, set the living somebody so much 
wanted, on a scaffold. (6) When people who had nothing to do with the case 
were so sensible of its flagrancy, people who lost money by it could scarcely 
be expected to deal mildly with it. (7) Letters of reproach and invective show-
ered in from the creditors; and Mr Rugg, who sat upon the high stool every 
day and read them all, informed his client within a week that he feared that 
there were writs out.
(8) “I must take the consequences of what I have done,” said Clennam. (9) 
“The writs will find me here.” (781–83)
For the remainder of this chapter I aim to show how the presentations of 
actions contained in this passage are extremely informative about mental 
functioning. In particular, I will evaluate the discursive purposes that are 
served by these presentations. The concept of action is an important one in 
structuralist narratology. Propp’s morphology is basically a classification of 
different types of actions. The French structuralists of the 1960s onwards 
based their whole conception of narrative on actions, events, moves, and so 
on. In this way, the notion of action became the cornerstone of narrative 
theory, and a good deal of illuminating and insightful work was done on this 
concept. However, it seems to me that this work was undertaken within the 
story side of the story/discourse distinction and that there is much more to 
say about how action is presented or described in the discourse. The ques-
tion then becomes not so much “What actions are performed?” as “How are 
those actions described?” I will investigate the latter question in relation to 
the above passage within the following four conceptual frameworks:
•	 philosophy of action;
•	 sociocultural action;
•	 intermental action; and
•	 discursive action.
Philosophy of Action
The theoretical study of narrative fiction is based on the assumption that 
there is a distinction between those parts of the discourse that present char-
acters’ actions and those that present their consciousnesses. The former are 
regarded as statements that describe the surface events of the storyworld 
such as physical movements; it is thought, by contrast, that the latter convey 
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interiority, subjectivity, and private flows of thought. This discussion will 
dispute that dichotomy and will argue that what appear to be simple action 
descriptions in novels frequently contain a good deal of explicit information 
about characters’ minds. In fact, it can often be difficult to establish whether 
a statement refers to an action or to a state of consciousness. In the Philosoph-
ical Investigations, Wittgenstein quotes the sentence “I noticed that he was 
out of humour,” and asks, “Is this a report about his behaviour or his state of 
mind?” (1958, 179). (I refer to this in Fictional Minds as Wittgenstein’s ques-
tion [2004, 120–21]). He is drawing attention to the fact that the mental and 
physical sides of action and behavior coexist and interpenetrate to the point 
where they are difficult to disentangle. The mental network that lies behind 
all actions contains intentions, reasons, motives, purposes, and causes, and 
elements of this network are often present in the discourse that is used to 
describe an action.
 For that reason, there is a continuum rather than a simple dichotomy 
between action descriptions and descriptions of consciousness. I call it the 
thought–action continuum (2004, 212–14). Here again is the simple example 
from Vile Bodies that was used in chapter 2 in the context of intermental 
thought: “The three statesmen hid themselves.” A statement such as “they hid 
behind the curtain” looks at first glance like an action description, pure and 
simple. This sentence would certainly not be considered as a presentation of 
consciousness within traditional narratological approaches. But compare it 
with another, similar-sounding sentence: “They stood behind the curtain.” 
In the context of the second sentence, the first description, hiding, starts to 
look rather different. Although it may appear to be merely a description of an 
action, it contains important information about the mental functioning of the 
people standing behind the curtain because it explains the reason why they 
are doing so, their motive for doing so, their intention in doing so. Saying that 
they are standing there leaves open any number of reasons why they would 
be standing there. It leaves more work for the reader to do. From this angle, 
the more you look at the word hid, the more like a consciousness verb it 
becomes. The sentence can be decoded in consciousness terms as follows: the 
three agreed that it was in their interest to conceal themselves from someone, 
realized that it was possible for them to do so, and decided together to take 
the action of hiding. Put another way, the word stood is at the action end of 
the thought–action continuum while the word hid is nearer the middle; it 
describes the action but also contains a reference to the mental functioning 
behind the action. Applying Wittgenstein’s question to “stood,” the answer is 
that it is a report of their behavior. Applying it to “hid,” the answer is that it 
is a report both of their behavior and their state of mind. Of course, although 
the word “hide” explains the reason for the action in a way that “stand” does 
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not, it still leaves open the reason for wanting to hide. Other, fuller descrip-
tions could reveal yet more detail on the motivation.
 The phrase “wildly staring about for somebody alive to heap reproaches 
on” (sentence 5) is a description of two actions: wildly staring and heaping 
reproaches. However, both phrases are also descriptions of states of mind: 
feeling wild and feeling reproachful. They can therefore be placed in the 
middle of the continuum. “Wildly staring” may also be termed indicative 
description (2004, 172): it is an action description that, through the use of the 
adverb “wildly,” indicates the frame of mind behind the action. In making 
these attributions, readers also rely on what I call cue-reason words (2004, 
216–17). These are words that signal that the causal network behind an 
action is about to be made explicit. “Because,” “so that,” “in order to,” and 
“for” are common cue-reason words, the last of which occurred twice in the 
discussion of disposition statements in The Portrait of a Lady in chapter 1. 
In sentence (5), the description of the action of wildly staring is followed, 
after the cue-reason word “for,” by the reason why people were doing so. Or 
take this statement: “Clennam watched her face for some explanation of what 
she did mean” (365). The first four words describe the action; the words fol-
lowing the cue-reason word “for” explain the reason for the action. As with 
Clennam’s action of watching, the accompanying mental event is often made 
part of the description, rather than left implicit. Novels tend to contain few 
action descriptions that simply describe only the surface of physical behavior.
 Part of the work of decoding action statements involves readers following 
the attempts of characters to read other characters’ minds. The characters in 
this passage are doing a good deal of mind reading. In order to convey the 
complexity of this cognitive work, I have set out below a summary of it:
(1)  Clennam explains his view of the workings of Doyce’s mind: he 
is simple and has integrity.
(2)  Clennam also explains his view of the workings of his own 
mind: he has been rash.
(3)  Clennam wants to make sure that the public mind will under-
stand his intention to accept responsibility.
(4)  Clennam knows that Rugg, as a lawyer, is unhappy about his 
intention.
(5)  So, to achieve his purpose, Clennam has to make sure that Rugg 
understands his “fixed resolution” to make the disclosure.
(6)  Rugg conveys to Clennam that he understands his intention 
(because he arranges for the disclosure).
(7)  Rugg deduces from the letters of reproach and invective that 
writs will follow.
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(8)  The public forms a view on Clennam’s intentions: that he is 
wantonly seeking publicity.
(9)  Rugg and Clennam become aware of the public’s view.
In fact, though, this list, detailed as it is, is an oversimplification. For example, 
item 1 can be broken down into much more detail as follows:
•	 Clennam thinks that
•	 Doyce will think that
•	 the public will think that
•	 Doyce will think that
•	 the public will acquiesce in
•	 Doyce trying to get away with not paying his debts.
As with previous lists of this sort, the thinking here is both intermental and 
intramental.
 The reader of this passage has to undertake this complex theory of 
mind processing without being able to rely on any explicit representations 
of consciousness by the narrator because the passage does not contain 
any, as traditionally defined; instead, it is a presentation of several actions, 
some of which are speech acts. In the first paragraph, Clennam tells Rugg 
about the action that he intends to take in the future. The second para-
graph is a description of the actions of other people. The third paragraph 
contains another speech act. However, these descriptions allow the reader 
to attribute various states of mind to Clennam. He feels the emotions of 
guilt, remorse, shame, and embarrassment. He knows that the bankruptcy 
is his fault. Further, he has decided that the right thing to do is to accept 
the blame. Any analysis of action in the discourse has to take account of 
the questions of personal responsibility that are at the heart of readers’ 
responses to novels. (This is the issue that was raised so thought-provok-
ingly by Paris Hilton in chapter 1: “In the future, I plan on taking more of 
an active role in the decisions I make.”) In the case of a death by shooting, 
do you describe the action of the killer as the twitching of the finger, the 
pulling of the trigger, the firing of the gun, the killing of a person, or the 
murdering of a person? These descriptions differ to the extent to which 
they ascribe consciousness to the agent, take account of the consequences 
of the physical movement, and assign responsibility to the agent for those 
consequences. Clennam is right to accept responsibility for the outcome of 
his action (bankrupting Doyce), even though that was an unintended con-
sequence of his intended action of investing the money. This question of 
responsibility is pursued further in the discussion below on the discursive 
approach to action descriptions.
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Sociocultural Action
The following typology of sociocultural action (following James Wertsch, 
but in part derived from Jürgen Habermas) was first introduced in Fictional 
Minds (2004, 166–67). There, I illustrated it with examples from Aphra Behn’s 
Orinokoo (1688). Here, I relate it to the passage under discussion. Wertsch 
refers to the five categories as alternative types of action, but they can also be 
regarded as different perspectives on, or descriptions of, the same action. The 
choice of which perspective or description to use depends on the context and 
the point being made about that action. Again, this issue is pursued further 
in the discussion on discursive action.
(a)  Teleological action. A person attains a goal or brings about the occurrence 
of a desired state by choosing the means that have the promise of being 
successful in a given situation and applying them in a suitable manner. 
The central concept is that of a decision among alternative courses of 
action, based on an interpretation of the situation, in order to realize an 
end (Wertsch 1991, 9–10). Clennam wishes to bring about the desired 
state of minimizing the effect of the catastrophe on Doyce. The means 
that he chooses involve making a public disclosure of his responsibility. 
He has made a decision that this course of action is the best means of 
achieving his end. The concept of teleological action dovetails neatly 
with the emphasis within the philosophy of action on the concepts of 
intentions, reasons, motives, and purposes.
(b)  Dramaturgical action. People evoke in their public audience a certain 
image or impression of themselves by purposefully disclosing their own 
subjectivity. Each agent can monitor public access to the system of his 
own intentions, thoughts, attitudes, desires, and feelings. Thus, the pre-
sentation of the self does not signify spontaneous, expressive behavior: 
it stylizes the expression of experience with a view to the audience. A 
person typically carries out this impression management with strategic 
goals, type (a), in mind (Wertsch 1991, 10). I have already referred to 
this type of action in this chapter and the previous one. You may recall 
that Rosamond Vincy is adept at dramaturgical action. This perspective 
on action as impression management fits the first and third paragraphs 
of the passage extremely well. In Clennam’s presentation of his proposed 
action there is a stylized feel to the language that he uses (sentence 3 
in particular). His directly quoted language in (8) also has the air of a 
public declaration. His course of action is referred to pejoratively by the 
public in (5) as “courting publicity.”
(c)  Normatively regulated action. This refers, not as (a) and (b) do, to the 
behavior of solitary individuals, but to members of a social group who 
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orient their action to common values, or the norms that obtain within 
a social group. The individual may comply with, or may violate, a par-
ticular norm or generalized expectation of behavior (Wertsch 1991, 
11). This is a reference to the social situatedness of action, and it is also 
a precise statement of the plots of a large number of novels in which 
protagonists initially comply with, and then violate, the social norms of 
their storyworld. Clennam’s motives as explained in sentences (2) and 
(3) are social norms that regulate his action. The use of a word such as 
“behoved” (3) is also an indication of how deeply Clennam has internal-
ized these norms.
(d)  Communicative action. This is the interaction of at least two persons. 
The actors seek to reach an understanding about the present situation 
and future plans in order to coordinate their actions by way of agree-
ment (Wertsch 1991, 11, following Habermas 1984, 86). This is a restate-
ment, within a different context, of the notion of intermentality. Given 
the close links between thought and action, it follows that action as well 
as thinking can be joint, group, shared, or collective. It is significant 
that there is often little difference, in practice, between the two terms 
intermental action and intermental thought. I say more on this in the fol-
lowing section on intermental action.
(e)  Mediated action. This type can be seen as a more sophisticated restate-
ment of type (a). Like type (a), it is goal-directed, but it does not assume 
that the appropriate focus of analysis is the solitary individual, or that 
there is a neat separation between means and ends. It takes account of 
the fact that human action typically employs mediational means such as 
tools and language that shape the action in essential ways (Wertsch 1991, 
12). The passage is obviously about Clennam’s choice of the best means 
or tools for achieving his ends.
Intermental Action
Intermental or communicative action is described by the discourse analyst 
Teun van Dijk as interactions between several agents that include all forms 
of cooperative social behavior such as the use of language (1976, 296). The 
simplest examples are those cases where two agents together accomplish the 
same action, while having the same intention. More complex are the cases 
where the intended actions are the same, but where the purpose is different, 
and so the joint action is done for different reasons. Alternatively, the pur-
poses may coincide, but the actions may be different (for example, preparing 
dinner with each agent fulfilling different tasks within the overall action). 
Some actions can be carried out by either one or more agents, while others, 
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such as marrying or fighting, must have at least two agents (van Dijk 1976, 
298). Although, with regard to the example of fighting, possible exceptions 
might include such British football club managers as Sir Alex Ferguson and 
Roy Keane who, as the cliché has it, could start a fight in an empty room.
 In my view, it is possible to make use of a looser notion of intermental or 
communicative action than is employed by van Dijk. You may have noticed 
that I have been using the term the public when discussing the reaction to 
Clennam’s declaration. This term designates the intermental unit responsible 
for the communicative actions that are described in the second half of sen-
tence (4), all of (5) and (6), and the first half of (7). This passage makes no 
sense if the existence of the public as an intermental agent is not recognized. 
Sentence (5) in particular is an example of the group focalization that is such 
a noticeable feature of the intermental activity in Middlemarch. Clennam is 
being judged by a large group in much the same way as Lydgate is by the town 
of Middlemarch. Much of the public’s intermental construction of Clennam’s 
actions, first in investing the money in Merdle’s empire and then in accepting 
responsibility for the loss of the money, is left implicit. If the reader does 
not try to reconstruct this group cognitive functioning, the public’s behavior 
will be inexplicable. So, although (4) is quite oblique, the phrase “the storm 
raged fearfully” can only be understood as a metaphorical presentation of 
intermental action. This is the case despite the fact that, as many people are 
involved, there is not the explicit joint understanding and coordination that 
Wertsch, Habermas, and van Dijk have in mind (although van Dijk concedes 
the possibility that people may take part in a communicative action for dif-
ferent reasons and purposes).
 The group behavior being described in this passage is different from 
individual action. We recognize this difference in phrases such as “mob rule,” 
“mass hysteria,” and “groupthink.” As Nietzsche put it in Beyond Good and 
Evil (part four, aphorism 156), “madness is something rare in individuals—
but in groups, parties, peoples, ages it is the rule” (1990, 103). In a sense, 
these are individual actions—it is individuals who are heaping reproaches 
and sending letters—but in another sense they are also collective. The indi-
vidual actions make more sense, in this case, when they are regarded as part 
of a joint action because people have become caught up in a group mind 
made up of wildness, reproach, and invective. They are behaving differently 
from the way in which they would behave as individuals because they have 
become part of this shared mind.
Discursive Action
The subdiscipline within psychology known as discursive psychology provides 
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an important perspective on action theory. Discursive psychologists such as 
Derek Edwards, Grant Gillett, Rom Harré, and Jonathan Potter argue that 
attributions of mental states to individuals are discursive in the sense that the 
descriptions arising from these attributions are performative speech acts that 
occur within complex language games and are always embedded in specific 
social contexts. Attributions tend to be discursively constructed as appar-
ently factual and objective, but often contain self-interested attributions of 
motives. “Pure” mental descriptions are rare. A mental state or an action will 
be described in a certain way and not in other ways for particular purposes, 
and these alternatives can vary greatly as to how they ascribe agency, impose 
responsibility, justify behavior, explain motivations, assign praise, deflect 
criticism and blame, and so on. This approach has obvious relevance to the 
novel, where mental functioning can only exist within the words of a fic-
tional discourse. Readers have to undertake a continual stream of attribu-
tion of mental functioning to characters in order to understand novels, but 
the descriptions of actions, dispositions, and emotions on which readers rely 
for these attributive purposes are not neutral. Many different choices can be 
made by narrators and characters regarding the wording of such descriptions 
and by readers regarding their interpretations of such wording. These choices 
have a profound effect, not only on the cognitive attribution of a wide range 
of mental states, but also on the ethical attribution of responsibility, criticism, 
praise, or blame.
 These psychologists see the mind “as dynamic and essentially embedded 
in historical, political, cultural, social, and interpersonal contexts” (Harré 
and Gillett 1994, 25). The fundamental premise of discursive psychology is 
that “no description of anything is the only one that is reasonable or possible” 
(Edwards 1997, 8). It is difficult to disentangle pure action description from 
attribution because descriptions will usually contain hidden attributional 
cues. Specifically, “descriptions constitute events as understandable sorts of 
human actions” (Edwards 1997, 6). “Accounts of actions are invariably, and 
at the same time, accounts for actions” (Edwards 1997, 8). “Versions of mind, 
of thought and error, inference and reason, are constructed and implied in 
order to bolster or undermine versions of events, to accuse or criticize, blame 
or excuse and so on” (Edwards and Potter 1992, 16). These “causal inferences 
and implications are often handled indirectly via ostensibly descriptive or 
factual accounts” (Edwards and Potter 1992, 78). Put simply, “attributional 
work is accomplished by descriptions” (Edwards and Potter 1992, 91).
 A similar perspective may be derived from the philosophy of action. The 
philosopher Donald Davidson states that “Explaining an action by giving an 
intention with which it was done provides new descriptions of the action” 
(1980, 110). Davidson lists various descriptions of the action of writing a 
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check to clear a gambling debt. “I am writing my name. I am writing my 
name on a piece of paper. I am writing my name on a piece of paper with the 
intention of writing a check. I am writing a check. I am paying my gambling 
debts” (1980, 110). He also states that “Redescription may supply the motive 
(‘I was getting my revenge’), place the action in the context of a rule (‘I am 
castling’), give the outcome (‘I killed him’), or provide evaluation (‘I did 
the right thing’)” (1980, 110). Different discursive purposes, often relating 
to issues of personal responsibility, may be served by the different contexts 
within which actions can be placed.
 So, what discursive purposes are served by the attributions that have 
been described so far? The passage is marked by a deliberate and self-con-
scious use of discourse in order to achieve certain goals. Clennam’s actions 
are revealed to be situated, public, and social. The narrator shows him to be 
choosing his words carefully in order to give credit to Doyce’s character (“sim-
plicity” and “integrity”), to emphasize his need to be guided by “respect” for 
his feelings, to acknowledge the pressure of social and moral norms (feeling 
“behoved”), and “to accept the blame for what he had rashly done.” In the lan-
guage of discursive psychologists, he is positioning himself (Bamberg 2005) 
as the person responsible for the calamity. Also, Clennam’s language in the 
third paragraph is principled and direct in that he does not portray himself 
as a passive, hapless, or reluctant recipient of the writs. It is easy to imagine 
the different ways in which Clennam could have talked to Rugg if, say, his 
purpose had been to avoid responsibility. Much of the theory on discursive 
psychology assumes that people generally try to avoid responsibility for 
bad things, acquire responsibility for good things, avoid blame, and acquire 
praise. However, while this may be true in general terms, characters in novels 
tend to be more complex than that. In this case, the whole purpose of Clen-
nam’s discursive construction of his actions is to accept responsibility for a 
bad thing and to acquire blame.
 That the same action can be described in different ways is vividly dem-
onstrated in the second paragraph, where Clennam’s action of disclosure is 
pejoratively referred to as “courting publicity.” This presentation by the nar-
rator of the viewpoint of the public is completely different from Clennam’s 
own positioning. It is also worth noting how cleverly the narrator frames 
the discourse in the second paragraph in order to encourage the reader to 
come to a negative judgment on the behavior of the public. There is a delib-
erately exaggerated style to the descriptions of the public’s actions: “storm 
raged fearfully,” “wildly staring,” “scaffold,” and “reproach and invective.” This 
exaggeration makes it clear that the apparent justification in sentence (6) (the 
“flagrancy” of Clennam’s actions, the appeal to disinterested parties, people 
who had lost money “could scarcely be expected to deal mildly with it”) is 
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ironic. The reader is made aware that the narrator is indicating that the sup-
posed justifications for the collective actions are insufficient to excuse them. 
This appeal to an apparently objective moral standard is typical of the kind 
of positioning that is analyzed by discursive psychologists. An important 
element in this process is the construction of consensus: “everybody knows 
that  .  .  .”; “it is understood that  .  .  .”; “we always do that,” and so on. Many 
other descriptions were available to the narrator to describe the actions of 
the public. The one chosen leaves little doubt as to how the implied reader is 
being asked to judge them.
CONCLUSION
Both perspectives on fictional minds, the internalist and the externalist, are 
required. Little Dorrit recognizes this truth. Employing the internalist per-
spective on those aspects of the mind that are inner, introspective, solitary, 
private, individual, psychological, mysterious, and detached, it is said of Mr 
Dorrit that “Only the wisdom that holds the clue to all hearts and all mys-
teries, can surely know to what extent a man, especially a man brought down 
as this man had been, can impose upon himself ” (275). In order to maintain 
a balance, the narrator employs the externalist perspective that stresses those 
aspects of the mind that are outer, active, public, social, behavioral, evident, 
embodied, and engaged, when commenting of Mr Chivery that, “As to any 
key to his inner knowledge being to be found in his face, the Marshalsea key 
was as legible as an index to the individual characters and histories upon 
which it was turned” (346).
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T HIS CHAPTER is rather different in structure from the previous two. Those were in-depth analyses of single novels; this one is more wide-ranging. It focuses first on Anne Elliot in Persuasion and considers 
how she functions within the intermental network of the novel’s storyworld. 
This analysis of a single character differs from the treatment of Lydgate in 
chapter 3 because there I analyzed the construction of his character at a very 
basic level (by examining, for example, its “gappiness”). Here, I take the anal-
ysis a stage further and look at how the intermental nature of Anne’s social 
mind is central to our understanding of the whole novel. The second section 
of this chapter looks at the topic of characters’ emotions in Persuasion. The 
subject of emotions is a huge one that would require another book to do it 
justice. I will therefore limit myself to a few brief words in order to give an 
indication of what such a full study might look like. The third section will 
make a few general points about a wide range of nineteenth-century novels. 
The intention here is to demonstrate that the intense interest in social minds 
shown by my three main example texts is entirely typical of the century as a 
whole. I use the fourth and final section to summarize some of the similari-
ties and differences to be found in the novels under discussion.
SOCIAL MINDS IN PERSUASION
Persuasion, like Middlemarch and Little Dorrit, is preoccupied with the bal-
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ance between public and private thought, intermental and intramental func-
tioning, social and individual minds. Like the other two, it contains frequent 
references to attributions of mental states, theory of mind, and intermental 
thought. These include general statements about the functioning of minds 
such as the narrator perceptively commenting that “Husbands and wives 
generally understand when opposition [to the wishes of their spouse] will 
be vain” (81). There are also many more specific instances. The Musgrove 
daughters are able to see their mother’s thought: “mamma is thinking of 
poor Richard” (91). Anne Elliot, who is generally, as we shall see, a good 
mind reader, “is ready to do good by entering into [Henrietta’s] feelings” 
(124).
 The character of Anne Elliot cannot be seen in isolation. Her mind is 
public, social, and engaged. In Bakhtinian terms, it is dialogic, frequently 
anticipating the views of others, successfully or not, and often judged by 
others, again favorably or not. This inescapability of the social has a profound 
effect on the value judgments that are made about her mind by others and 
also about others by her. When she is deciding whether she likes Mr Elliot or 
not, she arrives at this damning judgment: “Mr Elliot was rational, discreet, 
polished,—but he was not open” (173). This word “open” is an important 
one within the debate on social minds and requires further analysis. On the 
one hand, for people such as Anne and Clennam, whose default assumption 
about others is that their minds should work together to share the benefits 
of their mental functioning, honesty, goodwill, and openness are of great 
significance. She likes people whose minds are responsive, spontaneous, and 
generous. This coincides with the prevailing cultural preference in Austen’s 
novels, in which secrecy is disliked and characters such as Darcy in Pride 
and Prejudice and Jane Fairfax in Emma are criticized for being “cold” or 
“reserved.”
 On the other hand, when it comes to the most important elements of 
Anne’s mind, her feelings for Wentworth, she does not share them with any-
body else until the indirect indication in chapter 23 that she gives in her 
speech to Harville that finally gives Wentworth the spur he needs to propose 
to her. And she never tells Lady Russell her conclusions about taking her 
advice. Nor is she open with Mary about her thoughts on Mary’s behavior. 
So it is certainly not a simple matter of being open at all times. The fact that 
Anne is closed on these points is a result of moral choices, and they are 
moral choices that the implied author appears to approve of. It is legitimate 
to be closed in certain circumstances: for example, for reasons of politeness 
and courtesy, or when openness would cause unnecessary hurt to others or 
to oneself. The open/closed binary is an important one, in my view, but, like 
so many others, it does not work in a simplistic right/wrong way. Difficult 
Persuasion and Other Novels | 147
moral choices are required on the right level of openness to be adopted in 
specific circumstances.
 The emphasis in the text of Persuasion on the social nature of cognitive 
functioning is relentless. In a discussion between Anne and Mr Elliot on 
what constitutes “good company,” this phrase is used seven times in ten lines 
(162). There are also references on the following page to “society,” “the con-
nexion,” “your family,” “related,” “acquaintance,” “the relationship,” “acquain-
tance” (again), and “society” (again). All of these terms convey a sense of the 
context of the large-scale group frame of society within which Anne as an 
individual and also her smaller-scale relationships function. Anne’s behavior 
is inexplicable without an awareness of the pressures brought to bear by the 
group norms that are imposed on her. The following two passages explicitly 
acknowledge the importance of the role played by social minds in the novel. 
Furthermore, they show that Anne is self-consciously aware of this fact:
Anne had not wanted this visit to Uppercross, to learn that a removal from 
one set of people to another, though at a distance of only three miles, will 
often include a total change of conversation, opinion, and idea. . . . Yet, with 
all this experience, she believed she must now submit to feel that another 
lesson, in the art of knowing our own nothingness beyond our own circle, 
was become necessary for her. (69)
She acknowledged it to be very fitting, that every little social commonwealth 
should dictate its own matters of discourse; and hoped, ere long, to become a 
not unworthy member of the one she was now transplanted into.—With the 
prospect of spending at least two more months at Uppercross, it was highly 
incumbent on her to clothe her imagination, her memory, and all her ideas 
in as much of Uppercross as possible. (70)
These quotes, in demonstrating beyond doubt the narrator’s awareness 
of the externalist perspective, may surprise you (as they surprised me) in 
spelling out so clearly the practical implications of the theoretical framework 
described in chapter 2. To me, they sound like George Eliot. Reading them, 
it is easy to see how Middlemarch will come to be written. The language is 
not as obviously cognitive as that of the later novel, but the sensibility, the 
sensitivity to the workings of social minds, is the same.
The Party
Anne is sometimes alone. At the end of chapter 3, she “left the room, to seek 
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the comfort of cool air for her cheeks,” thinking to herself, “a few months 
more and he, perhaps, may be walking here” (54). The passage in chapter 
4 that gives the backstory specifies that Anne is alone while reviewing that 
story herself: “With all these circumstances, recollections, and feelings, she 
could not hear that Captain Wentworth’s sister was likely to live at Kellynch, 
without a revival of former pain; and many a stroll and many a sigh were 
necessary to dispel the agitation of the idea” (58). Also, she must be alone for 
lengthy periods in order to do all that reading that she talks with Benwick 
about. However, despite her frequent longing for solitude, few of the scenes 
presented in the novel show her to be alone. When she is not with her father 
and Elizabeth, she is usually part of a shifting, ever-changing group of people 
that I am calling the party. The composition of the party changes from day to 
day but its core consists of Charles and Mary, Mr and Mrs Musgrove, Hen-
rietta and Louisa, Admiral and Mrs Croft, Captain Wentworth, Captain and 
Mrs Harville, Captain Benwick, and Charles Hayter. As with all groups, the 
dynamics of the party raises interesting questions related to individuality, 
the self, and situated identity. Some of the members of the party such as 
Mrs Musgrove are difficult to imagine alone, as being an individual or a self 
apart from it. Others, though, remain distinct characters despite having part 
of their identity defined in terms of it. Wentworth is one such. He becomes 
the centre of its attention. There is “but one opinion of Captain Wentworth, 
among the Musgroves and their dependencies” (97). Unsurprisingly, when 
he is thinking of leaving the party to visit his brother, “the attractions of 
Uppercross induced him to put this off. There was so much of friendliness, 
and of flattery, and of everything most bewitching in his reception there; the 
old were so hospitable, the young so agreeable” (97).
 Intermental units sometimes engage in joint decision making. For 
example, joint decisions have to be taken by the party during the period after 
Louisa’s accident. In the moments immediately following her fall, under the 
impact of the trauma, the party fractures into individuals. Then, an initial 
decision, what to do with the injured Louisa, is required. It is an easy one for 
the group to make: “That Louisa must remain where she was, however dis-
tressing to her friends to be involving the Harvilles in such trouble, did not 
admit a doubt” (132). Later, more long-term plans are required. This time, 
the precise membership of the core decision-making subgroup of the party 
is specified. “Charles, Henrietta and Captain Wentworth were the three in 
consultation, and for a little while it was only an interchange of perplexity 
and terror  .  .  . At first, they were capable of nothing more to the purpose 
than such exclamations .  .  . The plan had reached this point .  .  . The other 
two warmly agreed . . . One thing more and all seemed arranged” (133–34). 
Notice that, at first, they are capable only of sharing their emotions. However, 
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they gradually find themselves able to take on the more cognitively oriented 
functions of short- and medium-term planning. The group then has second 
thoughts: “A much better scheme followed and was acted upon” (137). “It 
was soon determined that they would go” (138). This decision-making inter-
mental unit is functioning well. It is decisive but, when flexibility is required, 
it is able to change its mind and adopt a better plan. It is noticeable that Anne 
is not a part of the decision-making process but is indispensible to it, as she 
is the chief means by which its decisions can be implemented.
 Anne thinks constantly about her relationship with the party. She 
“admired again the sort of necessity which the family-habits seemed to pro-
duce, of every thing being to be communicated, and every thing being to 
be done together, however undesired and inconvenient” (106). “The two 
families were so continually meeting, so much in the habit of running in 
and out of each other’s house at all hours, that it was rather a surprise to 
her to find Mary alone” (64). The word “Uppercross” is frequently used as 
a metonymy for the party (in the same way as the names of large houses in 
Middlemarch are used). “Scenes had passed in Uppercross, which made it 
precious” (139); “Anne could not but feel that Uppercross was already quite 
alive again” (148); and Anne “looked back, with fond regret, to the bustles of 
Uppercross” (149). Her warm feelings about the group are clearly apparent.
 However, Anne is also ambivalent about what she calls the “domestic 
hurricane” (149). Sometimes she enjoys it as a welcome contrast to the ste-
rility and coldness of her own family; Anne envies the Musgrove sisters 
“nothing but that seemingly perfect good understanding and agreement 
together, that good-humored mutual affection, of which she had known so 
little herself with either of her sisters” (67–68). But at other times, she wishes 
to be alone. During the crisis in Bath, when what she really wants is some 
space, “she gave herself up to the demands of the party, to the needful civili-
ties of the moment” (194), but with some reluctance. At the end of novel, the 
value to Anne of being part of this intermental unit is heavily underscored. 
Although she is delightfully happy to be engaged again to Wentworth, she 
has “the consciousness of having no relations to bestow on him which a man 
of sense could value . . . nothing of respectability, of harmony, of good-will to 
offer in return for all the worth and all the prompt welcome which met her 
in his brothers and sisters” (252–53). Anne is uncomfortably aware that her 
own immediate family is of little value compared with the shared humanity 
and warmth of the party. As I said in chapter 2, our real-world knowledge 
tends to entail the default assumption that our theory of mind works better 
with spouses, friends, and immediate family than it does with total strangers. 
Sometimes, these default slots are filled; sometimes, when our assumptions 
are wrong, they are not. In the case of Anne’s relationship with her father 
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and older sister, where her word has “no weight,” major reconstruction is 
required. By the end of the novel, Anne almost abandons her family in her 
eagerness to embrace a new one.
Anne and Smaller Intermental Units
Anne is constantly engaged with other minds, and her knowledge of them is 
generally pretty good. “With a great deal of quiet observation, and a knowl-
edge, which she often wished less, of her father’s character” (62), Anne gen-
erally knows how Sir Walter’s mind is going to work. When he and Elizabeth 
talk to Anne in exaggerated terms about their renewed acquaintance with Mr 
Elliot, “allowances, large allowances, she knew, must be made for the ideas 
of those who spoke” (153). Anne’s perceptive “quiet observation” is often of 
the body language of others, in particular of their looks and glances. That 
Elizabeth and Mrs Clay agree on the merits of Mr Elliot “seemed apparent 
[to Anne] by a glance or two between them” (154). When Mr Elliot talks to 
Anne about his supposed suspicions of Mrs Clay, but without mentioning 
her name, “he looked, as he spoke, to the seat which Mrs Clay had been 
late occupying, a sufficient explanation of what he particularly meant” (163). 
And Anne does know immediately what he means.
 Nevertheless, the novel frequently demonstrates that care should be 
taken with the interpretation of evidence of the apparent mental functioning 
of others. When Anne confronts Mrs Clay with the fact that she, Anne, saw 
her talking to Mr Elliot, “It seemed to her [Anne] that there was guilt in 
Mrs Clay’s face as she listened” (232). Anne is right about Mrs Clay’s feel-
ings of guilt, but wrong about their cause. Anne thinks that Mrs Clay feels 
guilty because she has been confronted by Mr Elliot about her designs on 
Sir Walter, whereas, in reality, it is because she thinks that her affair with Mr 
Elliot has been discovered. In another example of half-successful, half-mis-
taken theory of mind, Mrs Smith says to Anne, “Your countenance perfectly 
informs me that you were in company last night with the person, whom you 
think the most agreeable in the world” (210). She is right, but wrong about 
the identity of the “most agreeable” person. It is not Mr Elliot, as Mrs Smith 
thinks, but Captain Wentworth. This confusion throws Mrs Smith so com-
pletely that she later says, “Now, how I do wish I understood you! How I do 
wish I knew what you were at!” (203).
 One of the major reasons for theory of mind breakdown is the solip-
sistic tendency that we all have to forget that other people have minds too 
and that they work differently from ours. Anne is conscious of this possi-
bility in herself. She has to remind herself that not everyone knows or even 
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cares about her feelings. Most of the time, her reminders to herself work. 
She is usually acutely conscious of other minds and knows that it is some-
times not possible to predict the reactions of others: “She had spoken it; 
but she trembled when it was done, conscious that her words were listened 
to, and daring not even to try to observe their effect” (229). But at other 
times, as Anne herself knows, her tendency to solipsism can get the better of 
her. On one occasion, Anne thinks that Mrs Croft is talking about Captain 
Frederick Wentworth when she is actually referring to her other brother, 
Edward Wentworth. Anne “immediately felt how reasonable it was, that Mrs 
Croft should be thinking and speaking of Edward, and not of Frederick; and 
with shame at her own forgetfulness, applied herself to the knowledge of 
[Edward’s] present state, with proper interest” (75). Anne has noticed that 
her “forgetfulness” is of the fact that Mrs Croft has a mind that will neces-
sarily work differently from hers. The important point is that she realizes that 
her misreading of Mrs Croft’s mind is caused by her understandable absorp-
tion in Wentworth’s arrival. Another example of Anne’s (admittedly fairly 
mild) solipsistic tendency is an elaborate set piece that takes up a whole page 
of text. When Anne is walking with Lady Russell in Bath she sees Captain 
Wentworth approaching on the other side of the road. During the course of 
a long paragraph Anne attributes a variety of states of mind to Lady Russell 
on the assumption that she has seen him and still disapproves of him. She 
anticipates a meeting between the two with growing dread. Finally, however, 
Lady Russell bathetically reveals that all she has been thinking about are 
curtains! On hearing this, “Anne sighed and blushed and smiled, in pity and 
disdain, either at her friend or herself ” (189).
 The last-mentioned misunderstanding is indicative of the complexity 
of the friendship between Anne and Lady Russell. Although Lady Russell 
is referred to as Anne’s “one very intimate friend” (36), it is also mentioned 
that, after her refusal of Wentworth, Anne and Lady Russell “knew not each 
other’s opinion, either its constancy or its change” (57). The point is made 
again: “It was now some years since Anne had begun to learn that she and 
her excellent friend could sometimes think differently” (160). And repeated: 
“They did not always think alike” (160). The relationship then strengthens 
again. When Anne discovers Mr Elliot’s true nature, one of her first thoughts 
is that “She must talk to Lady Russell, tell her, consult with her” (218). And, 
when matters are resolved, “Anne knew that Lady Russell must be suffering 
some pain in understanding and relinquishing Mr Elliot, and be making 
some struggles to become truly acquainted with, and do justice to Captain 
Wentworth” (251). But, although the friendship is restored, they are never 
really a strong intermental unit. Anne has turned out to be a much better 
judge of character with regard to both Wentworth and Mr. Elliot, and, as a 
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result, she is not open with her about the differences in their views on other 
people generally. It is hardly a friendship of equals.
 The Croft marriage is an interesting attributional case study. On the 
one hand, the strongly intermental nature of the relationship between the 
Admiral and Mrs Croft is frequently emphasized. In Uppercross, “The 
Admiral and Mrs Croft were generally out of doors together . . . dawdling 
about in a way not endurable to a third person” (97). In Bath, they “brought 
with them their country habit of being almost always together . . . [Anne] 
delighted to fancy she understood what they might be talking of ” (179). 
Anne responds to them as a couple, not as individuals: The Crofts “were 
people whom her heart turned to very naturally” (174). While thinking 
about her earlier engagement to Wentworth, she pays them this heartfelt 
tribute: “With the exception, perhaps, of Admiral and Mrs Croft, who 
seemed particularly attached and happy, (Anne could allow no other excep-
tion even among the married couples) there could have been no two hearts 
so open, no tastes so similar, no feelings so in unison, no countenances so 
beloved” (88). In addition to her emotional response to them, Anne is also 
aware that they function as a cognitive unit. She watches the Crofts “with 
some amusement at their style of driving,” which involves their taking joint 
decisions on the steering, and “which she imagined no bad representation 
of the general guidance of their affairs” (114). There is only one occasion 
on which they are of different minds. When the Admiral warmly praises 
the Musgrove girls as possible objects of Wentworth’s affection, Mrs Croft 
refers to them “in a tone of calmer praise, such as made Anne suspect that 
her keener powers might not consider either of them as quite worthy of her 
brother” (114).
 On the other hand, much is also made of the Crofts’ regular attributional 
breakdowns involving others. At one point, Admiral Croft talks to Went-
worth “without taking any observation of what he might be interrupting, 
thinking only of his own thoughts” (92–93). When Anne wishes to be reas-
sured by the Admiral that Wentworth is not grieving over losing Louisa to 
Captain Benwick, he is not sensitive enough to pick up on her emotional 
needs and “Anne did not receive the perfect conviction which the Admiral 
meant to convey” (183). To do him credit, he is sensitive enough to wish to 
convey the reassurance, but not sufficiently attuned to the workings of other 
minds to do so successfully. In addition, there is an enjoyably comic example 
of Mrs Croft’s solipsism. When she is insistent to Mrs Musgrove about not 
referring to Bermuda or the Bahamas as “the West Indies,” “Mrs Musgrove 
had not a word to say in dissent; she could not accuse herself of having ever 
called them any thing in the whole course of her life” (94). It is an inter-
esting question whether it is a coincidence that the two individuals in the 
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tightest intermental unit in the novel are also the ones who are among the 
most solipsistic in their relations with others. It is also worth comparing the 
centripetal nature of this unit with Anne’s and Wentworth’s centrifugal rela-
tionship as described at the end of the novel in the long quote (see page 156 
below) with which this discussion of social minds in Persuasion concludes. 
The older couple are, in their cognitive relations with others, rather sealed off 
from them by their absorption with each other, while the love between the 
younger pair includes a heightened awareness of other minds.
Anne and Wentworth
The key to the novel is the construction of Wentworth’s mind by Anne and 
by the reader. The central question posed by the text is: What does he now 
think of her? He appears at first to have no feelings for her and it then slowly 
becomes apparent that he does still love her. Anne experiences intense feel-
ings of anguish toward the end of the novel when she is not sure what Wen-
tworth is thinking. Her record in this respect is patchy. Sometimes she does 
know: “When he talked, she heard the same voice, and discerned the same 
mind” (88–89). And when he talks lightly of being ready to make a foolish 
match: “He said it, she knew, to be contradicted” (86). At other times she 
does not know. It is odd that this is a unit that does not function particu-
larly well. As I said, though, when discussing Little Dorrit, this is consistent 
with the default assumptions contained in the cognitive frame for lovers, by 
which we assume that the course of true love never runs smooth and misun-
derstandings can often arise.
 Anne’s knowledge of Wentworth’s views on others is generally accurate, 
but it is much less so when he is thinking about her. When he is listening 
to Mrs Musgrave becoming sentimental about her useless son, “there was 
a momentary expression in Captain Wentworth’s face at this speech, a cer-
tain glance of his bright eye, and curl of his handsome mouth, which con-
vinced Anne” that she knew what he was thinking, “but it was too transient 
an indulgence of self-amusement to be detected by any who understood him 
less than herself ” (92). Anne can always discern his views on her family. 
When Mary makes an excessively snobbish remark to him about the Hay-
ters, she “received no other answer, than an artificial, assenting smile, fol-
lowed by a contemptuous glance, as he turned away, which Anne perfectly 
knew the meaning of ” (19). When Sir Walter and Elizabeth ostentatiously 
offer him a visiting card because they know that he will “look well” in their 
drawing room, Anne “knew him; she saw disdain in his eye” (231). And 
when Anne sees Elizabeth snub Wentworth in the shop in Bath: “It did not 
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surprise, but it grieved Anne to observe that Elizabeth would not know him. 
She saw that he saw Elizabeth, that Elizabeth saw him, that there was com-
plete internal recognition on each side; she was convinced that he was ready 
to be acknowledged as an acquaintance, expecting it, and she had the pain of 
seeing her sister turn away with unalterable coldness” (186). (For a treatment 
of this scene as an example of “deep intersubjectivity,” see Butte 2004, 3.)
 In contrast, Anne’s knowledge of his feelings about her is much more 
intermittent. It is fascinating to follow the fluctuations in their relation-
ship in terms of the successes and the failures in their theory of mind. At 
the beginning, Anne lacks any knowledge of his state of mind. Before they 
meet again, “She would have liked to know how he felt as to such a meeting. 
Perhaps indifferent, if indifference could exist under such circumstances. 
He must be either indifferent or unwilling” (83). When it appears that the 
latter possibility is the correct one, “Anne understood it. He wished to avoid 
seeing her” (84); “Anne felt the utter impossibility, from her knowledge of his 
mind, that he could be unvisited by remembrance any more than herself ” 
(88); and “She understood him. He could not forgive her,—but he could not 
be unfeeling” (113). Anne is wrong, though; she does not understand him 
because she is unaware of his growing renewed love for her. Nevertheless, 
she slowly begins to understand him better and to interpret his behavioral 
clues correctly. As is so often the case, there is a gap between characters’ 
interpretations of others’ minds and readers’ interpretations of those minds. 
The reader will be ahead of Anne here in picking up on those clues about 
Wentworth’s renewed love. Anne, who is such a good reader of others, does 
not understand him yet because she is afraid to let herself believe in his love. 
It makes her too vulnerable to the kind of pain that she experienced eight 
years before and that she is living with still.
 In the scene in Lyme in which Anne, Wentworth, and Mr Elliot meet 
briefly, it seems to Anne that Wentworth sees that Mr Elliot is attracted to 
her: “It was evident that the gentleman . . . admired her exceedingly. Captain 
Wentworth looked round at her instantly in a way which shewed his noticing 
of it. He gave her a momentary glance,—a glance of brightness, which 
seemed to say, ‘That man is struck with you,—and even I, at this moment, 
see something like Anne Elliot again’” (125). But, even in Bath, her success 
rate is mixed: “He was more obviously struck and confused by the sight of 
her, than she had ever observed before; he looked quite red . . . The character 
of his manner was embarrassment. She could not have called it either cold 
or friendly, or any thing so certainly as embarrassed” (185). This is another 
instance of partially successful theory of mind. She knows his mind well 
enough to know that he is embarrassed, but not well enough to know why. 
However, typically, she knows that she does not know what is troubling him: 
“She could not understand his present feelings, whether he was really suf-
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fering much from disappointment or not; and till that point was settled, she 
could not be quite herself ” (187). Similarly, “Either from the consciousness, 
however, that his friend had recovered, or from other consciousness, he went 
no farther” (192). Anne does not know which.
 Finally, Anne realizes that Wentworth does love her. The point at which 
she finally realizes this reads like an attribution manual in its analysis of the 
behavioral clues on which theory of mind rests. For this reason, the passage 
is worth quoting in full:
His choice of subjects, his expressions, and still more his manner and look, 
had been such as she could see in only one light. His opinion of Louisa Mus-
grave’s inferiority, an opinion which he seemed solicitous to give, his wonder 
at Captain Benwick, his feelings as to a first, strong attachment,—sentences 
begun which he could not finish—his half averted eyes, and more than half 
expressive glance,—all, all declared that he had a heart returning to her at 
least; that anger, resentment, avoidance, were no more; and that they were 
succeeded, not merely by friendship and regard, but by the tenderness of 
the past. She could not contemplate the change as implying less.—He must 
love her. (195)
 But a problem remains—his jealousy of Mr Elliot. Anne does not realize 
this at first: “Anne knew not how to understand him” (239). As previously, 
she knows that something is the matter but does not know for sure what it 
is: “She saw him not far off. He saw her too; yet he looked grave, and seemed 
irresolute, and only by very slow degrees came at last near enough to speak 
to her. She felt that something must be the matter. The change was indubi-
table” (198). She correctly guesses the reason why: “Jealousy of Mr Elliot! It 
was the only intelligible motive” (199). Later, her guess is confirmed: “She 
had not mistaken him. Jealousy of Mr Elliot had been the retarding weight, 
the doubt, the torment” (243). In the meantime, the reader is given the only 
direct access in the novel to Wentworth’s side of the relationship and, signifi-
cantly, it is put in theory of mind terms. In his letter to her, he cries out in 
evident exasperation and suffering, “For you alone I think and plan.—Have 
you not seen this? Can you fail to have understood my wishes?” (240).
 As I began this discussion with some large-scale group cognitive frames 
before going on to talk about medium- and then small-scale frames, I would 
like to conclude with a passage that brings us full circle by combining all 
three. The novel ends with Anne and Wentworth together. She is adjusting 
to her new life, and getting used to how her mind will be working together 
with other minds, and particularly Wentworth’s, in the future. This passage 
beautifully encapsulates the functioning of Anne’s social mind in action by 
showing her at the center of an intermental network:
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Mr Elliot was there; she avoided, but she could pity him . . . Lady Dalrymple 
and Miss Carteret; they would soon be innoxious cousins to her. She cared 
not for Mrs Clay, and had nothing to blush for in the public manners of her 
father and sister. With the Musgroves, there was the happy chat of perfect 
ease; with Captain Harville the kind-hearted intercourse of brother and 
sister; with Lady Russell, attempts at conversation, which a delicious con-
sciousness cut short; with Admiral and Mrs Croft, every thing of pecu-
liar cordiality and fervent interest, which the same consciousness sought to 
conceal;—and with Captain Wentworth, some moments of communication 
continually occurring, and always the hope of more, and always the knowl-
edge of his being there. (247–48)
EMOTIONS IN PERSUASION
Much of the mental functioning that we attribute to fictional characters con-
sists of strong emotions and feelings. Emotions drive narratives. They are 
the teleological motors of narratives. A novel with all of the emotions and 
feelings taken out would not make much sense. This crucially important ele-
ment in the whole fictional mind was neglected by traditional, structuralist-
derived, Genettian narratology for three reasons, I think. One is that it is 
difficult to find room for the messiness and complexity of emotions within a 
character paradigm limited to actants with carefully defined roles within the 
text. The second is that structuralist narratologists historically thought of the 
representation of consciousness in the novel in terms of linguistic catego-
ries such as stream of consciousness, interior monologue, and free indirect 
discourse, and these categories do not lend themselves easily to analysis in 
terms of the concept of emotion. (See Fictional Minds, chapter 3, for the 
theoretical background to this problem.) The final, more general reason is 
that emotions are difficult—in particular, they are difficult to talk about sys-
tematically and analytically. Whenever I discuss with other narrative theo-
rists my interest in fictional emotions, I often sense a blank in their minds, 
a moment of panic arising from an inability to see how such a theoretical 
study could be undertaken. This is so despite the fact that so much of their 
actual, practical criticism involves talking about specific emotions. I recog-
nize this panic because I so often feel it myself. Of all of the various elements 
of fictional minds that I have tried to explore, I have found emotions to be 
much the most difficult. It is with a feeling of relief, if I am honest, that I can 
say that, within the confines of this study, it is only possible to hint at the 
complexity of the subject.
 However, it should be said that the current position on theoretical 
Persuasion and Other Novels | 157
interest in emotions and fiction is now much healthier than before. Quite a 
bit of attention has been paid to this topic recently within other, nonstruc-
turalist traditions. Of particular importance is the rhetorical criticism of the 
Chicago School, exemplified by the work done by James Phelan (1989) and 
Peter Rabinowitz (1987), who take account of characters’ emotions while 
investigating readers’ emotions. Much of their work is concerned with rea-
soning back from the emotional effects of a work on the reader to the causes 
of those effects in the interaction of authorial choices and readerly knowledge 
of narrative conventions. Philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum link emo-
tions with ethics, and, in particular, turn to the novel to investigate ethics in 
ways that supplement analytic philosophy, because the novel recognizes the 
cognitive value of the emotions (for example, Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge 
[1992]). In Having a Good Cry (2002), Robyn Warhol foregrounds the emo-
tional dimensions and cultural consequences of readers’ engagement with 
popular-culture narratives. Finally, postclassical narrative theorists such as 
David Herman (2007a) and Patrick Colm Hogan (2003) have also made 
important advances in the theorizing of characters’ emotion. As a small con-
tribution to this process, I will briefly discuss the presentation of emotions 
in chapter 23 of Persuasion.
 In order to reinforce the point made just now about the centrality of 
emotion to narrative, I want to present here a set of short quotes from Per-
suasion. Taken together, they compose a kind of condensed abstract of some 
of the emotions to be found in this novel. It is only a selection. A list of 
all of the references to emotions in the novel would be far longer than this 
one. I have focused on the most extreme and deeply felt emotions only for 
maximum impact.
“The pride, the folly, the madness of resentment” (244). “Her heart revelled in 
angry pleasure, in pleased contempt” (140). “You must allow for an injured, 
angry woman” (206). “The inevitable sufferings of her situation had been 
such as could not be related without anguish of spirit” (215). “She had used 
him ill; deserted and disappointed him” (86). “He is totally beyond the reach 
of any sentiment of justice or compassion. Oh! He is black at heart, hollow 
and black” (206). “Anger, resentment, avoidance were no more” (195). “[It] 
made her shudder at the idea of the misery which must have followed” (216). 
“[She] fully submitted, in silent, deep mortification” (85).
“Treading back with feelings unutterable” (131), “He exclaimed in the bitter-
est agony” (130). “[Her] shudderings were to her herself alone” (90). “As if 
overpowered by the various feelings of the soul” (132), “they were sick with 
horror” (132). “The horror of that moment to all who stood around . . . in an 
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agony of silence” (129). “The horror and distress you were involved in—the 
stretch of mind, the wear of spirits” (193), “How could I look on without 
agony?” (246). “What wild imaginations one forms, where dear self is con-
cerned.” (199).
“All the overpowering, blinding, bewildering, first effects of strong surprise 
were over with her. Still, however, she had enough to feel! It was agitation, 
pain, pleasure, a something between delight and misery” (185). “She was 
deep in the happiness of such misery, or the misery of such happiness, 
instantly” (233). “As if wholly overcome” (135), he said: “You pierce my soul. 
I am half agony, half hope” (240).
“She could not command herself enough to receive that look” (242). “Her 
sensations on the discovery made her perfectly speechless . . . She could only 
hang over [him] with most disordered feelings . . . Such a confusion of vary-
ing, but very painful agitation, as she could not recover from” (103). “Her 
own emotions still kept her fixed. She had much to recover from, before she 
could move” (111). “For a few minutes she saw nothing before her. It was all 
confusion. She was lost” (185). “She gave herself up to the demands of the 
party . . . with exquisite, though agitated senses” (194). “She heard nothing 
distinctly; it was only a buzz of words in her ear, her mind was in confusion” 
(235). “She could not immediately have uttered another sentence; her heart 
was too full, her breath too much oppressed” (238). “Full of astonishment 
and emotion, she quitted [the place]” (135).
“She had some feelings that she was ashamed to investigate. They were too 
much like joy, senseless joy!” (178). “Every moment rather brought fresh agi-
tation. It was an overpowering happiness” (240). “[Her] spirits were dancing 
in private rapture” (242).
 Chapter 23 of Persuasion is the one in which Wentworth overhears 
Anne’s discussion with Harville about love and gender differences. Went-
worth writes his letter to Anne, who then has great difficulty in finding an 
opportunity to be alone with him once she has read it. However, they do 
eventually manage to meet and are finally reunited. This chapter contains a 
passage of three and a half pages in which, in effect, the plot of the novel is 
retold from Wentworth’s point of view. What follows is a list of the emotions 
and feelings that are explicitly referred to in this passage.
Jealousy, torment, pouring out his feelings, love, indifference, anger, suffer-
ing, fortitude and gentleness, angry pride, pride (again), the “madness of 
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resentment,” horror, remorse, being “startled and shocked,” not caring, feel-
ings, happiness, pleasure, warm attachment, pride (yet again), astonishment, 
happiness (again), feelings (again), love (again), “exquisite moments,” hope, 
despondence, feelings (yet again), reluctance, indifference (again), agony, 
indifference (yet again), feelings of being “overwhelmed, buried, lost” that 
he had “smarted under,” and a “year of misery.”
And all this in less than four pages.
 You may need to remind yourself at this point that the novel in question 
is by Jane Austen, and not, say, a Gothic novelist of the period, or even an 
overwrought Russian novelist such as Dostoevsky. There has long been a tra-
dition of unthinkingly assuming that what emotions there are to be found in 
Jane Austen are of a rather thin, attenuated, and bland variety. For example, 
in Charlotte Brontë’s view, “the Passions are perfectly unknown” to Jane 
Austen (Letter to W. S. Williams, 12 April 1850). This view persists to the 
present day. In her introduction to the Penguin edition of Anne Brontë’s The 
Tenant of Wildfell Hall (1848), Stevie Davies states of the Brontë novel that 
“Social comedy after the manner of Jane Austen characterizes Markham’s 
letters but they also incorporate glimpses of another, emotionally and intel-
lectually ampler world” (1996, xiv; my emphasis). The assumption behind 
her unfavorable comparison is that the world of Jane Austen novels is emo-
tionally impoverished. Anyone who has shared this view will probably join 
with me in the sense of surprise that I felt when I completed the two lists and 
discovered the sheer amount, density, and extremity of the emotions to be 
found in a Jane Austen novel.
 A potential drawback to cognitive approaches to literature is the pos-
sibility that they will focus only or mainly on the more obviously cognitive 
aspects of the mind such as what philosophers call practical reasoning: deci-
sions on alternative courses of action. In studying the whole mind, we need 
to consider other, less obviously cognitive areas such as emotions and feel-
ings. The need to recognize the importance of emotion is especially pressing 
because cognitions cause emotions; emotions cause cognitions. Emotions 
are therefore woven so deeply into the fabric of fictional discourse that it is 
difficult to separate them out from the other elements of a narrative. In the 
words of the psychologists Jerome Singer and John Kolligian, “Our ways of 
knowing the world are intrinsically bound up with our ways of feeling” (1987, 
548), and, in the view of Antonio Damasio, “consciousness and emotion are 
not separable” (2000, 16). Psychologists and philosophers stress repeatedly 
that cognition and emotion are inextricably linked (Damasio 2000, Elster 
1999, Le Doux 1999). In addition, the psychologist Keith Oatley maintains 
that “emotions are not on the periphery but at the center of human cogni-
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tion” (1992, 3) and that, as a result, “most philosophical work on emotions 
has been cognitive” (1999, 274). In the context of fictional minds, Lubomír 
Doležel feels that emotions have “regained their status as powerful moti-
vational factors but continue to elude theoretical grasp” (1998, 65). While 
discussing real minds, Damasio refers to “the scientific neglect of emotion” 
(2000, 39) but reassures us that, in recent years, “both neuroscience and cog-
nitive neuroscience have finally endorsed emotion” (2000, 40). It is good that 
narrative theory is now following suit.
 It seems to me that there are two broad and general tendencies in theo-
retical approaches to emotions. One is to emphasize their irrational, uncon-
trollable quality. This is the view of the emotions as passions. The other broad 
tendency is the stress, as in the previous paragraph, on the cognitive role of 
the emotions, especially in relation to the achievement of goals and plans. 
Oatley (1992) argues that emotions consist of four elements. Two of them—
(a) private, subjective experiences such as conscious preoccupation and 
phenomenological tone; and (b) public bodily disturbances, facial expres-
sions, and gestures—belong to the former tendency. The other two—(c) 
judgments, reactions relating to goals and plans, appraisal significance, and 
evaluation; and (d) action readiness—belong to the latter. With regard to the 
second, more cognitive tendency, I said just now that emotions function as 
the teleological motors of narrative. I want to pursue this point a little fur-
ther. Fictional emotion has to be evaluated in the context of the interrelated 
issues of attribution, motivation, and teleology. Readers comprehend narra-
tives primarily by means of their attributions of characters’ states of minds as 
stated or implied in the text. Much of this attribution process concerns moti-
vation—attributing motives, intentions, plans, goals, reasons for, or causes 
of, actions. And a good deal of the motivation for characters’ actions arises 
from their emotional reactions to what happens to them. Once characters’ 
motivations, and especially those related to their emotions, are apparent to 
the reader, the plot will unfold. It is in this way that attributions of motiva-
tion arising from emotions are the basis of teleology.
 As I say, Oatley works within a teleological perspective on the emo-
tions that focuses on their role in relation to the achievement of goals and 
plans. His central argument is that “Emotions are a human solution to prob-
lems of our simultaneous multiple goals, of our limitations and uncertain 
knowledge, and of our interactions with others” (1992, 411). Specifically, 
“emotions can communicate the need for cognitive change” (1992, 412) and 
the “normal function of an emotion is to change goal priorities and to load 
into readiness a small suite of plans for action” (1992, 89). (Notice how far 
we have come from uncontrollable passions.) Emotions communicate both 
to ourselves and to others that goals are being met or that they are not, and 
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what action is appropriate. Obviously, positive emotions relate to the ful-
fillment of plans and goals, and negative emotions to the various disjunc-
tions that occur between our expectations or hopes and the actual situa-
tion. With regard to fictional minds, readers and characters are sometimes 
fairly sure about the teleological implications of a particular emotion. “She 
had not mistaken him. Jealousy of Mr Elliot had been the retarding weight, 
the doubt, the torment” (243). This is a free indirect representation of what 
may be called historical motivation. It is Anne’s third-person attribution of 
the emotion of jealousy to Wentworth in order to explain his past conduct. 
She knows now that she was right to think that the motivation behind his 
behavior was the emotion of jealousy. In addition, though, the use of the 
word “retarding” has a teleological implication. His jealousy has, in effect, 
retarded for a short while the story of their reignited romance. Now that she 
is sure of this, she can try to bring about their eventual reconciliation. She 
can, to adopt Oatley’s language, load into readiness a small suite of plans 
for action. Her long-term goal is this reconciliation but shorter-term ones 
include, ideally, being alone with him or, at the least, if they are in public, 
trying to adopt the best course of dramaturgical action that will reassure him 
that he has no reason to feel any jealousy.
 Anne’s third-person attribution of an emotional state to Wentworth is 
then supplemented by Wentworth’s own first-person attribution of emo-
tional states to himself to explain his conduct: “He had imagined himself 
indifferent, when he had only been angry” (244). So Wentworth was for 
some time mistaken about his own emotional states. This is yet another 
example of the unreliability of first-person attribution that, although I said in 
chapter 2 would not be systematically pursued in this study, has cropped up 
with some regularity during my discussions of the reliability of third-person 
attribution.
 The two broad tendencies in the approaches to emotions are reflected in 
Oatley’s important distinction between the semantic messages and the control 
messages that are sent by emotions. Semantic messages are those that have a 
specific cognitive content. They are intentional. (I am again using this word 
in the sense that I referred to in chapter 2, not with the normal, everyday 
meaning relating to motivation but in its technical, philosophical sense of 
a mental state that is about something, that is directed out into the world.) 
Emotions and feelings often contain cognitive judgments on states of affairs 
in the world. Decisions to act in certain ways are made up, on the one hand, 
of desires, emotions, and feelings, and, on the other hand, of beliefs and cog-
nitions. And these two elements are difficult to disentangle. I desire some-
thing because I believe that it is good; I believe that it is good because I find 
that I desire it. Many of the cognitive judgments of characters in Persuasion 
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are presented in terms of their feelings. Characters are happy or sad that 
something, in their view, is the case. Presenting characters’ cognitive judg-
ments in terms of their feelings allows the narrator to register their approval 
or disapproval of these states of affairs. In many of these cases, the causation 
may be said to be forward. A character feels an emotion that is based on a 
cognitive judgment about an aspect of the storyworld and so takes action in 
order to change the current situation. The emotion causes a future action. 
Anne’s feelings of relief and happiness that she now knows what was causing 
Wentworth’s behavior and also her belief that she is able to do something 
about it will, together, result in future action—specifically, her attempts to be 
alone with him.
 By contrast, the control messages that are sent by emotions are non-
semantic. They function as a kind of alarm system. They arise out of the 
emotions as uncontrollable passions. These are the occasions when Anne 
is overcome by emotion to the point where she does not know what is hap-
pening around her. “Anne heard nothing distinctly; it was only a buzz of 
words in her ear, her mind was in confusion” (235). “She could not imme-
diately have uttered another sentence; her heart was too full, her breath too 
much oppressed” (238). There is often a correlation between control mes-
sages and the physical manifestations of emotions: starting, blushing, stam-
mering, crying, and so on. In these cases, the causation is typically backward. 
Anne feels an emotion because of what has just happened: the event causes 
the emotion; the emotion is a reaction to the event. In practice, of course, 
emotions will often form part of a causal chain, and specific examples of 
emotions will have both backward and forward elements. In any event, 
though, as is so often the case, the distinction between the semantic mes-
sages and the control messages that are sent by emotions is more of a spec-
trum than a dichotomy. Take this example: “She was deep in the happiness 
of such misery, or the misery of such happiness” (233). Although this is a 
reaction to past events that is similar in some respects to the examples of 
Anne being overwhelmed by emotions cited earlier in this paragraph, it has 
a more cognitive element than they have, I think. This sentence involves a 
judgment that Anne is a long way from fulfilling her objective. However, it 
does not contain any semantic messages and does not involve any element 
of planning for future action. So I would put this example roughly in the 
middle of the semantic/control spectrum.
 Moving back to the semantic end of the spectrum, attributions of emo-
tions can contain local (or short-term) motivation or extended (or teleolog-
ical) motivation, and often both. Take these two examples: “In desperation, 
she said that she would go home” (241). “Anxious to omit no possible pre-
caution, Anne struggled and said . . .” (241). In these cases, the motivation 
is both local (or short-term)—the examples explain Anne’s specific actions 
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at that point in the story—and also teleological (or long-term)—they are 
geared to Anne’s long-range plan of being reunited with Wentworth. To take 
another illustration, Anne overhears a conversation between Mrs Musgrove 
and Mrs Croft on the desirability of short engagements. “Anne found an 
unexpected interest here. She felt its application to herself, felt it in a ner-
vous thrill all over her, and at the same moment  .  .  . her eyes instinctively 
glanced towards [Wentworth]” (235). Anne’s nervous thrill results from her 
cognitive judgment on the applicability of the conversation to her situation. 
She appraises it in terms of her long-term goal of a rekindled relationship 
with Wentworth. It is also the motivation for her short-term response—the 
glance toward Wentworth.
 Oatley’s use of the term control is significant. Much of the teleological 
value of the emotions is related to the expression of emotions. Sometimes 
emotions are involuntarily expressed, for example by blushing, crying, and 
facial expressions. At other times, it is possible to control the expression of 
emotions in order to conceal them. In those cases, decisions can be made 
about how much emotion to express. One consequence of the concealment 
of strong emotion is that misunderstandings will arise. Initially, Wentworth 
and Anne do not express their emotions either to each other or to other 
people. This makes it more difficult for them to know what the other is feeling 
and thinking. Later, they do see signs of emotions in each other—one sees 
that the other is moved or disturbed—but they do not know what is causing 
the emotion. Doubt can arise because much of the action resulting from the 
feeling of an emotion is related to the concealment of that emotion. There is 
a need for her to control her “overpowering happiness” (240). “Anne could 
command herself enough to receive that look” (242); and “Smiles reined in 
and spirits dancing in private rapture” (242).
 The reasons for the need for concealment are complex. One is the general 
issue of social constraint. Anne has great concern for feelings of others: when 
her brother-in-law insists for the kindest of reasons in interfering with her 
desire to see Wentworth at the climax of the novel, thereby infuriating her 
almost beyond endurance, “She set off with him, with no feeling but grati-
tude apparent” (242). As she has been conditioned by the duty to be polite, 
her dramaturgical action is faultless. A second reason for concealment is the 
unreliability of first-person attribution. Characters are often not sure them-
selves precisely what their feelings mean or what their causes are, and so 
are apprehensive about expressing them. Wentworth thought he was feeling 
indifference when, as he eventually discovers about himself, he was experi-
encing anger. A third, related reason for concealment is the knowledge that 
emotions may cause actions that can be misinterpreted. Wentworth’s rekin-
dled love for Anne causes him to undertake kind actions toward her. He takes 
the boisterous nephew off her back when she is obviously bothered by him, 
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and he lifts her into the carriage at the end of a long walk when she is notice-
ably exhausted. Anne, however, mistakenly attributes these acts to his general 
thoughtfulness, rather than to any remaining feelings of love for her.
SOME OTHER NOVELS
I thought it would be a good idea at this point in the book to supplement 
detailed consideration of the three main texts with some remarks on other 
nineteenth-century novels. In this way, I can demonstrate some breadth as 
well as depth. In particular, I want to show that the explicit and self-con-
scious debate on the balance between public and private thought, inter-
mental and intramental functioning, social and individual minds that is 
such a striking feature of my main example texts is also characteristic of the 
fiction of the period as a whole. Within this balance, authors will use dif-
fering emphases to display the balance. Jane Austen, Wilkie Collins, Charles 
Dickens, Maria Edgeworth, George Eliot, Elizabeth Gaskell, and Anthony 
Trollope tend toward the social end of the spectrum. Their novels are char-
acterized by an assumption that characters’ thought processes are frequently 
transparent and public. It is for this reason that secrets (the device around 
which so many of their plots revolve) are so difficult to keep. In fact, several 
of the novels discussed below, and especially Maria Edgeworth’s Helen, Eliza-
beth Gaskell’s Wives and Daughters, Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley, and Wilkie 
Collins’s No Name (1862), would certainly benefit from the kind of in-depth 
analysis given earlier to Middlemarch and Little Dorrit. In contrast, other 
writers such as Walter Scott and Henry James are rather more ambivalent 
about social minds and are often more comfortable with the assumption that 
minds are usually inaccessible and private.
 The Warden is one of the many novels of the nineteenth century in which 
characters read the minds of others: “Mr Harding knew that the attorney-
general regarded him as little better than a fool, but that he did not mind; he 
and the attorney-general had not much in common between them; he knew 
also that others, whom he did care about, would think so too; but Eleanor, 
he was sure, would exult in what he had done, and the bishop, he trusted, 
would sympathize with him” (155). This passage vividly indicates the neces-
sity for seeing the character of Mr Harding as situated within a distributed 
cognitive network. As part of this network, he and the bishop form a small 
intermental unit of long standing. “The bishop and Mr Harding loved each 
other warmly” (24), and, for this reason, “Mr Harding determined to open 
his mind and confess his doubts” (25). He feels able, in this telling phrase, to 
“open his mind” to the mind of another, and, as in the passage from Helen 
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that was quoted at the beginning of this book, there is often no need for 
words. As with the characters of Dickens, gestures can be enough: when the 
bishop puts his hand on his knee as a gesture of comfort, “Mr Harding well 
knew what that pressure meant” (26).
 Shirley is another text that debates the epistemological and ethical 
implications of mind reading: “Men rarely like such of their fellows as read 
their inward nature too clearly and truly” (215). This novel is extraordinary 
in combining a large amount of staginess, awkwardness, and clunkiness in 
the presentation of the internalist perspective on characters’ minds (by such 
means as elaborate spoken soliloquies, highly unlikely diary entries, and the 
like) with great sensitivity, fluidity, and insight in the externalist perspective. 
One of the many examples of the latter is a beautiful and moving passage in 
which, following a period of estrangement, the minds of Shirley and Louis 
Moore start to work together again in perfect unison. They renew them-
selves as an intermental unit by slipping into their previous, familiar roles of 
tutor and pupil (378–89).
 The externalist perspective is, as I have said, an opportunity to widen 
and deepen our conception of such apparently internalist notions as char-
acter, interiority, subjectivity, and identity. Individuals do not exist in a 
vacuum. As the passage quoted above shows, Mr Harding can only be fully 
understood in terms of his functioning within intermental units. Similarly, 
other characters such as Lydgate in Middlemarch can be seen in relation to 
the units that they are not part of (for example, when they are identified as 
outsiders, scapegoats, and so on). There are many other ways in which a 
social-minds approach can be used to identify patterns in relationships that 
may not be apparent from the use of more orthodox tools. In The Tenant of 
Wildfell Hall, there are few examples of characters knowing what other char-
acters are thinking. The one exception is the relationship between Helen, the 
eponymous heroine, and Hargrave, the sexual predator who tries unsuccess-
fully to seduce her. During their brief passages of dialogue, there are at least 
seven explicit references to one of them being able to read the mind of the 
other. To put this in context, I have discovered only six other examples in the 
rest of the book. On the face of it, this finding seems surprising. Helen says 
that she finds Hargrave’s attentions abhorrent. However, the evidence of the 
closeness of their joint mental functioning suggests that her feelings for him 
may be deeper and more complex than her own narration, as contained in 
her diary, is willing to admit.
 Wilkie Collins is similar to Charles Dickens in his emphasis on the sur-
face: the looks, facial expressions, bodily movements, and sign language by 
which characters communicate with others. This is unsurprising, given the 
close working relationship between the two men. “Surface” is a word that 
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recurs throughout No Name. There is hardly any direct report of internal 
thought in this novel, but there is a good deal of highly visible thinking. 
“When [Magdalen] withdrew [her hands from her face], all the four per-
sons in the room noticed a change in her. Something in her expression had 
altered, subtly and silently; something which made the familiar features sud-
denly look strange, even to her sister and Miss Garth; something, through all 
after years, never to be forgotten in connection with that day—and never to 
be described” (124). Magdalen’s sister, governess, solicitor, and family friend 
can see the change in her mental functioning. It is so marked that they find 
it unforgettable. But there is an internalist side too. Although others can see 
the alteration in Magdalen’s face, it is strange to them. They do not know its 
precise nature. The change in her appearance arises from a decision that she 
had just made: her intention to avenge the wrong done to her and her sister. 
The others do not know this because she has also made another decision: to 
keep her desire for revenge a secret.
 Magdalen now has a secret. Edgeworth’s Helen also has a secret. Its 
beginnings are apparent in the passage with which this book began. The gen-
eral comes to believe that the dead man was Helen’s lover, not Cecilia’s. Out 
of loyalty to Cecilia, Helen cannot tell him that he is wrong. The plot of Helen 
hinges on this secret. Shirley and Wives and Daughters are similarly preoccu-
pied with secrets: How much can be concealed from others? For how long? 
And for what purpose? In Wives and Daughters, Mrs Gibson has a secretive 
disposition; Osborne is secretly married; Roger and then Molly discover the 
marriage and are forced to keep Osborne’s secret too; Cynthia conceals her 
relationship with Preston; Molly, again, finds it out and has another secret 
to keep. There are several passages in this novel, often involving Cynthia, in 
which characters either think about or discuss the difficulty of hiding aspects 
of their minds. And it is this difficulty of concealment that is precisely the 
point. On the face of it, the combination of secrets with social minds might 
seem paradoxical. But the juxtaposition of these apparently disparate ele-
ments highlights the epistemological and ethical dilemmas that characters 
face while trying to keep secrets from other minds within a community in 
which people tend to be open and cognitively available to each other. The 
characters who are attempting to hide something are forever fearful that 
their actions, facial expressions, looks, blushes, and silences will give them 
away, especially to other characters who know them well. (For an analysis of 
secrets in Wilkie Collins, see Bachman 2010.) 
 The strong sense of social entanglement (especially through the medium 
of gossip) that is characteristic of the nineteenth-century novel is reinforced 
by the visibility of thought. People will gossip when they notice that someone 
blushes when a particular person comes into the room. Once the object of 
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the gossip becomes aware that they are talked about, they will blush all the 
more. In Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility, Marianne in particular suffers 
from the extremely public ways in which what she regards as her innermost 
feelings are openly discussed by such prying gossips as Mrs Jennings. Mari-
anne in turn can cause suffering to others by her own behavior, specifically 
her displays of emotion. Brandon, on entering the room on one occasion, 
sees Marianne rush past him because she cannot contain her intense disap-
pointment that he is not Willoughby. This pains him deeply. It is against 
this background of intensely public thought that I will now discuss some 
of the different types of intermental units to be found in my selection of 
nineteenth-century novels. After starting with a few large and medium-sized 
units, I will focus on small ones that comprise parents and daughters, and 
then sisters or near-sisters.
 I mentioned in chapter 1 that Mr Harding quotes an old proverb in The 
Warden: “Every one knows where his own shoe pinches!” (114). I said that 
this is an internalist motto that vividly expresses the apparent truth that only 
we know what we are experiencing and no one else can. Oddly, this contri-
bution to the internalist/externalist debate in the nineteenth-century novel 
is totally at odds with the whole tenor of this profoundly externalist novel. 
Mr Harding feels that “all the world knew” (23) about his circumstances. “All 
Barchester was by the ears about it” (59). Susan Sniader Lanser (1992) has 
shown that the town of Cranford in Elizabeth Gaskell’s novel of that name 
works in much the same sort of way as Barchester does. The village of Rav-
eloe in George Eliot’s Silas Marner is another example. The role of the local 
community, in the form of “gossip,” “rumour,” and “scandal” (all words used 
in The Warden), is as important in these places as it is in Middlemarch, and 
so the sense of oppression that, for example, Mr Harding feels is similar to 
that felt by Dorothea, Lydgate, and Ladislaw. In Wives and Daughters, the 
collective mind of the town of Hollingford exerts perceptible pressure on Mr 
Gibson to marry again (he asks himself, “Why did people think” that he had 
to remarry? [104]), and its speculations about Mr Gibson’s past are similar to 
those about Lydgate’s. (In fact, there are curious parallels between the char-
acters of Gibson and Lydgate: though at different stages in their lives, both 
are cultivated country-town doctors who are interested in scientific research, 
but who blunder into unfortunate marriages to similarly shallow women.)
 It could be argued that the main character of Joseph Conrad’s The Nigger 
of the ‘Narcissus’ (1897) is the medium-sized intermental unit formed by the 
crew of the ship. At one point, the men of the crew attempt to rescue the 
black man of the title, James Wait:
A rage to fling things overboard possessed us. We worked fiercely, cutting 
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our hands and speaking brutally to one another  .  .  . The agony of his fear 
wrung our hearts so terribly that we longed to abandon him, to get out of 
that place . . . to get out of his hearing, back on the poop where we could wait 
passively for death in incomparable repose. (54)
This is extremely complex intermental thought. It starts with an emotion 
(rage) that is presented causally, that is, as an intention to perform an action 
(flinging things overboard) and therefore as a cause of that action. The inten-
tion is presumably unfulfilled and so the action remains hypothetical. The 
passage then presents realized joint action: intense labor and the unintended 
consequence of hands being cut, then speech. Both actions are expressed 
in ways that vividly convey shared states of mind: working fiercely and 
speaking brutally. Next a complex of strong emotions (hearts being wrung) 
are described as a response to an individual’s emotion (Wait’s agony of fear). 
This is followed by another causal emotion (longing), presented as an unful-
filled intention that relates to two decisions that are not made (wanting to 
abandon him and to get out of his hearing). This short passage concludes 
with a hypothetical desire (to wait passively for death). In addition, some 
emotions are implied, but not openly stated: compassion, fear, desperation, 
and so on. The thought processes are initially focused on an individual, 
Wait, but then become almost mystical or metaphysical (“waiting passively 
for death in incomparable repose”) in a way that is characteristic of this nar-
rative, but is completely alien to all of the other novels under discussion in 
this section.
 This passage is an example of a “we” narrative (as explained in chapter 
2, these are written predominantly in the first-person plural). As such, it is 
an indication of the presence of what might be called, in parallel, “we” cog-
nition: that is, intermental thought. As this book’s focus on heterodiegetic 
narratives will have demonstrated, “we” narration is only one such indicator. 
“Narcissus” oscillates weirdly between this sort of narration and what might 
be called “they” narration, and both indicate the presence of intermental 
thought. Analysts of “we” narration often express concern about what they 
regard as “illicit” access to individual mental functioning in texts of this sort. 
“How can the homodiegetic narrator know what is going on in the minds of 
his shipmates?” It seems to me that an important consequence of situating 
“we” narration within the much wider context of “we” cognition is that con-
cerns of this sort can, to a certain extent, be allayed. Within the externalist 
perspective, at least some knowledge of the mental states of others is the 
expected norm, not a mysterious aberration. This is a good example of a nar-
rative that can be illuminated by a discussion of its social minds. Within the 
tradition of the action novel, this is a novel of collective action; within the 
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tradition of the novel of consciousness, this is a novel of collective conscious-
ness.
 Close cognitive relationships between parents and daughters are a 
notable feature of several novels of the nineteenth century. In Shirley, while 
Caroline is being nursed by her mother, Mrs Pryor, the two “coalesced in 
wondrous union” (331). “Mrs Pryor could not complete her broken sen-
tences .  .  . but Caroline comprehended” (296). Shirley does not need to be 
told that Caroline and Mrs Pryor are mother and daughter—she sees it by 
watching them together. However, she conceals from them the fact that she 
knows it: “I may be communicative, yet know where to stop” (354). When 
the mother and daughter discuss love and marriage, they contribute to the 
social-minds debate by disagreeing over the degree of intermentality to 
be expected within a marriage. Caroline suggests that, “Where affection is 
reciprocal and sincere, and minds are harmonious, marriage must be happy.” 
Her mother disagrees, arguing that “It is never wholly happy. Two people can 
never literally be as one” (300). There is an equally close relationship between 
Mr Gibson and his daughter Molly in Wives and Daughters, and there are 
frequent references to their ability to know what the other is thinking. “We 
understand each other” (76). Molly feels great pain at her father’s decision 
to suspend the openly acknowledged working of the unit following his mar-
riage. He does this because he quickly realizes that his mind and that of the 
new Mrs Gibson will never be “harmonious.” By continuing to be as obvi-
ously close to his daughter in the future as he was in the past, he would, he 
thinks, appear to be disloyal to his new wife. Molly is sad that they now no 
longer share their minds. They enter into an unspoken pact that the inter-
mental quality of their relationship should from now on be implicit. Of 
course, by doing so, the father and daughter reinforce the intermental ele-
ment in their relationship, albeit by different means.
 Mr Harding is another father who forms a close unit with his daughter. 
He notices quickly that Eleanor loves John Bold. She knows that he is upset 
by the affair of the hospital. However, even this relationship contains mis-
understandings and concealments. He wrongly thinks at one point that she 
is more worried about herself than she is about him. Initially, Mr Harding 
suffers in silence, and for a long time he cannot tell anyone, even Eleanor, 
what he is thinking and feeling. On the other hand, he cannot “prevent her 
from seeing that he was disturbed” (83). “Eleanor saw well how it was” (83). 
His isolation hurts her: her desire is “to be allowed to share his sorrows” (84). 
Tellingly, she exclaims, “Oh! papa, your face tells so much; though you won’t 
speak to me with your voice, I know how it is with you every time I look at 
you” (88). She knows some of what he is thinking, but not all. She knows 
that he is suffering, but not that it is bad enough to make him want to resign 
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as warden. When he eventually tells her everything, “he laid bare the inmost 
corners of his heart to her” (89). Their mind reading also works well when 
they undertake joint actions. Mr Harding gives Eleanor a letter to his son-in-
law that explains that he is going to London to speak to the attorney general 
“with the perfect, though not expressed, understanding that its delivery was 
to be delayed” (138). Eleanor knows that Mr Harding wants the letter to 
arrive only after it is too late for his son-in-law to stop him going.
 Another interesting pattern to emerge from novels of this period is 
the high degree of intermentality between sisters or near-sisters. Examples 
include Elinor and Marianne in Sense and Sensibility (real sisters), Molly and 
Cynthia in Wives and Daughters (stepsisters), Shirley and Caroline in Shirley 
(close friends who become sisters-in-law), and Helen and Cecilia in Helen 
(almost-foster sisters). Shirley and Caroline have a fascinating conversation 
in which they debate the visibility of thought, and emotion in particular. 
Caroline: “I saw you disturbed.” Shirley: “You saw nothing, Caroline. I can 
cover my feelings.” But then, Shirley: “You can never tell how your look, 
mien, carriage, shook me . .  . I soon saw you were diffident” (340). Shirley 
then “took Caroline in her arms, gave her one look, one kiss, then said—
‘You are better’” (353). However, the familiar theme of the patchiness and 
unreliability of intermental thought recurs. Caroline remarks to Shirley: 
“I thought I knew you quite well: I begin to find myself mistaken” (357). 
In another similarly complex scene, Caroline tells Robert Moore about an 
intimate conversation between her and Shirley that probes the mechanics 
of intermentalism (474–75). In summary, Caroline explains to Robert that 
Shirley tells her some things but not others; Caroline can guess and infer 
some aspects of Shirley’s mind but not all of them. What neither finds out 
about the other is the identity of the person they love. In Wives and Daugh-
ters, there are frequent occasions on which Molly and Cynthia know what 
the other is thinking and they are able to communicate this knowledge by 
means of looks and gestures (for example, their shared disapproval of Mrs 
Gibson’s behavior). The picture is mixed again, though; Cynthia does not 
know about the most important aspect of Molly’s mind, because she does not 
suspect Molly’s feelings for Roger.
 Any survey of internalist and externalist perspectives in the nineteenth-
century novel would be incomplete without a brief discussion of Henry 
James. I will, therefore, comment at this point on a curious feature of one 
of his unjustly neglected books, The Tragic Muse (1890). Misunderstand-
ings between characters can occur when, during a conversation, one will 
not quite follow what the other has said and will ask them to explain what 
they meant to say. In The Tragic Muse there are, extraordinarily, at least 175 
examples of this phenomenon. (That is not a typing error—it does indeed 
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happen at least one hundred seventy-five times.) You may be thinking that 
this is Henry James, after all, and his characters are prone to employ mas-
terly indirection in order to avoid being understood or to pretend misun-
derstanding. However, this novel is different from other James novels in that 
it has few Machiavellian schemers and plotters. Characters here are trying 
to be straightforward with each other, and so the vast majority of their non-
understandings are genuine. It is just that the minds in this novel are private, 
solitary, and mysterious. As a result, characters’ conversations are too gnomic 
for easy communication. The tone is typically cagy—people circle each other 
watchfully, never saying precisely what they mean, not through deceit, but 
through self-absorption. Only rarely does a reader get a clear sense of a char-
acter knowing another’s mind. Specifically, they do not put themselves in 
somebody else’s place and ask themselves: What does that person already 
know, and what do I need to tell them in order to make myself intelligible? 
In almost every conversation in the novel, statements have to be made more 
explicit because the original formulation is unclear to the interlocutor. As a 
result, communication is a laborious effort. The predominant feeling is one of 
apartness. There is never any sense of a meeting of minds, of two characters 
being on the same wavelength. Revealingly, the narrator describes two par-
ticipants in one conversation as “speaking a different language” (346).
 Consider the contrast between the storyworld of this novel and those 
of the novels of Austen, Edgeworth, Gaskell, and Eliot. In cognitive terms, it 
is a huge distance to travel from The Tragic Muse—where characters do not 
know what others are thinking, despite their endlessly trying to explain—to 
the many earlier novels in which characters often know perfectly well what 
others are thinking without the need for speech. Within the externalist para-
digm, the emphasis is on ease of communication; within the internalist one, 
it is on its difficulty. However, it is important not to exaggerate the differences 
between Henry James and these other novelists. It is certainly not black and 
white—we are talking about shades of grey. In the James novel, characters do 
occasionally know what others are thinking. Equally, as I have shown, there 
are many secrets and frequent misunderstandings and mind-misreadings in 
the other novels. There are more secrets, in fact, in the externalist novels than 
in The Tragic Muse. Nevertheless, the general tendency is unmistakably dif-
ferent. The few examples of intermentality in the James novel have to be set 
against the 175-odd occasions when it is conspicuously absent.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE NOVELS
At this point in the book I will return to the three main example texts in 
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order to comment on some of the similarities and differences between them. 
I will also refer occasionally to some of the novels discussed in the previous 
section.
•
 The default setting for the sharing of thought is speech. When we want 
to let someone know what we are thinking, the obvious way to do so is to 
tell them in words. This is why communication by such nonverbal means 
as the look, the face, and body language presupposes more intermentality 
than speech. These communicative mechanisms are particularly salient in 
both Little Dorrit and No Name. Because there is a good deal of emphasis in 
both these novels on the visibility of thought, much is often deliberately left 
unsaid. Dickens in particular had an extraordinarily visual sense of cognitive 
functioning that accounts, I think, for much of the distinctively vivid and 
dramatic quality of his writing. In other novelists there is a little more stress 
on characters unconsciously betraying themselves, rather than consciously 
communicating by signs. In addition, George Eliot had a characteristic 
interest in the complex, intricate development of large, medium, and small 
units over time. It should be stressed, however, that these are all differences 
of emphasis only.
•
 Most nineteenth-century novels contain intermental minds (that is, high-
functioning units). The town of Middlemarch is well defined enough to be 
thought of as a group mind. Indeed, it is a major character in that novel. The 
village of Santa Dulcina delle Rocce is another good example. Other towns 
such as Barchester, Cranford, and Hollingford function in similar ways. The 
candidates for group-mind status in Persuasion and Little Dorrit tend to be 
small units. I am thinking here of such pairings as the Crofts, the clever ones 
(Flintwinch and Mrs Clennam), and the Meagles. The parent-daughter and 
sister pairings that were referred to in the previous section, together with the 
crew of the “Narcissus,” also qualify, in my view.
•
 All intermental units contain a balance between long-term dispositions 
to behave in certain ways and short-term, immediate, individual mental 
events. In some cases a knowledge of the former does not assist very much 
with the latter. Clennam knows that his mother has a secretive disposition, 
but he does not know the precise nature of her biggest secret, the one that 
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forms the plot of the novel. In other cases, knowledge of dispositions does 
help with day-to-day awareness of the mind of the other.
•
 Characters try to read other minds from a variety of motives—selfish-
ness, altruism, curiosity, ambition, and so on. Like intramental thought, 
intermental thought is morally neutral in itself. It is not necessarily good or 
bad, although, of course, specific examples will be. All of the novels inter-
preted in this study show evidence of beneficial, ethical, and rewarding and 
also of stupid, selfish, and destructive intermental thought. The range in 
terms of quality and ethics is similar to that for intramental thought.
•
 Arthur Clennam, Anne Elliot, Dorothea Brooke, Mr Harding, Helen, 
and others are open characters who believe in social minds, favor open-
ness in others, and are disposed to form intermental relationships. This does 
not preclude the possibility of secrecy for good reasons. Other characters 
are devious, secretive, and self-absorbed by nature. They are inclined to use 
mind reading for selfish and exploitative reasons and they manipulate the 
theory of mind of others. They do not take part in intermental units at all 
or else they form dysfunctional and unbalanced ones. Examples of closed 
characters are Mr Elliot, Mrs Clennam, Gowan, Miss Wade, Mr Casby, and 
Casaubon. Some of these like mindfucking for the pleasure of it; other minds 
are closed out of weakness.
•
 Open or closed minds can often be linked to the issue of control. In 
Wives and Daughters, Mrs Gibson vents her ill humor on Molly, “from whom 
she feared neither complaint nor repartee” (439). In other words, she selfishly 
makes use of her awareness of Molly’s mind, safe in the knowledge that she 
is able to manipulate and control her. Characters with closed minds tend to 
try to control others: Sir Walter and Elizabeth try to control Anne; the clever 
ones control Affery and try to control Clennam; Casaubon tries to control 
Dorothea; Rosamond tries to control Lydgate.
•
 All of the novels contain examples of small intermental units that func-
tion well. Middle-aged and elderly couples such as the Crofts, the Meagles, 
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and the Vincys seem to be the template in this respect. In these cases, the 
degree of intermentality, cognitive or emotional, is balanced or symmetrical; 
other units function differently. All of the novels that I have studied for this 
book portray small intermental units such as friendships, lovers, and mar-
riages that are both balanced and unbalanced. In their different ways, the 
destructive relationship between Flintwinch and Mrs Clennam and the ben-
eficial one between Little Dorrit and Pet are well balanced and symmetrical. 
The relationships between the clever ones and Affery, and between Clennam 
and Gowan, are not. There are also imbalances between Casaubon and Doro-
thea, and between Lydgate and Rosamond. 
•
 Imbalances are frequently related to the link between emotions and 
cognition. Little Dorrit and Pet often know what the other is thinking on 
an obviously cognitive level because they instantly developed a strong and 
immediate emotional bond and therefore know what the other is feeling too. 
But there are relationships in which this is not the case. The clever ones are a 
good example. Casaubon and Rosamond do not acknowledge Dorothea’s or 
Lydgate’s feelings.
•
 It is interesting to note that dysfunctionality arises in the context of small 
units and, also, to an extent, with medium-sized units, but not in the case of 
large units. It is difficult to imagine what it would mean to say that a whole 
town such as Middlemarch is dysfunctional. It might be too sweeping to say 
that it would be impossible, rather that it would be much less likely than, say, 
a dysfunctional marriage.
•
 Anne and Clennam are major characters whose theory of mind is fairly 
good. This would also tend to be true of the major characters featured in 
the novels briefly referred to in the previous section (for example, Molly 
and Helen). Dorothea and Lydgate, however, are rather too self-absorbed 
and focused on their high ambitions to be keen observers of other people. 
As a result, they make big mistakes and end up in unhappy marriages with 
manipulative spouses. Both Anne and Clennam self-consciously confront 
the dangers of solipsism, while Dorothea and Lydgate do not.
•
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 There is a good deal of emphasis in Little Dorrit, Persuasion, and the 
other novels on the workings of families; perhaps surprisingly, there is much 
less in Middlemarch. The nearest that this novel comes to the sustained pre-
sentation of the workings of a family unit is the Vincy family, but they do not 
have the central place in the novel that the Dorrits or the Elliots have. The 
three main characters, Lydgate, Dorothea, and Ladislaw, are not shown as 
having relationships with parents. (The roles that Mr Brooke and Casaubon 
play as the guardians of Dorothea and Ladislaw, respectively, hardly count in 
this context.)
•
 I mentioned in chapter 4 that some families have a strong self-image. The 
Dorrits (minus Little Dorrit and Frederick) are one example, and the Elliots 
(minus Anne) are another. The common factor is social insecurity. The Dor-
rits would like to be regarded as members of the middle class despite being 
in the debtors prison. Sir Walter and Elizabeth would like to be regarded 
as members of the upper class despite having to leave their family home. 
Pride and vanity have important roles to play in this social insecurity. Little 
Dorrit and Anne have a similar position (skepticism) on the question of the 
family honor. Oddly, as I say, there is no comparable family in Middlemarch. 
The question of class insecurity is much less of an issue in this novel than 
one might expect. The Chettams have a concern about Dorothea aligning 
the family with a man such as Ladislaw, who is “not quite out of the top 
drawer” (an obnoxious British phrase that used to be employed in these cir-
cumstances), but this concern is hardly of the same scale as the paranoia that 
grips both the Elliots and the Dorrits.
•
 Dickens was acutely aware of the phenomenon of physically distributed 
cognition and, in keeping with his absorption in the surface, and therefore 
physical, nature of thought, showed a greater interest in it than other nine-
teenth-century novelists (with the possible exception of Wilkie Collins).
•
 There are several examples of collective action and joint decision making 
in The Nigger of the “Narcissus” in particular, but also in Persuasion, The 
Warden, and others. It is perhaps a little surprising that there is little com-
bined joint decision making in Middlemarch. I mentioned that Lydgate and 
Rosamond do not engage in any joint actions. Obviously, an engagement is 
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a joint decision, but Lydgate and Rosamond’s is noticeably accidental and 
contingent. There is at no point a real meeting of minds. Similarly, Clennam 
rather drifts into his joint decision with Pancks to invest in Merdle.
•
 Several novels contain characters who function as mouthpieces for the 
local intermental minds. In their different ways, Sir James Chettam and Mrs 
Cadwallader have this role in Middlemarch, as do Lady Russell in Persuasion 
and Mrs Merdle in Little Dorrit.
•
 On a related point, many of the novels feature large and medium-sized 
units that are relentlessly judgmental of individuals such as Dorothea and 
Lydgate. Wives and Daughters and The Warden are good examples also. 
Group focalization is a particular feature of Middlemarch. There is also group 
focalization of Anne (by her family) and Clennam (by the clever ones and 
the public in the passage from Little Dorrit that I used as an example of 
action theory). A linked issue is the transgression of group norms. Some 
major characters such as Dorothea, Lydgate, and Ladislaw, in their different 
ways, are all norm-transgressors, while others such as Anne and Clennam are 
much less so.
•
 Fuzzy sets (intermental units with imprecise memberships) are a notice-
able feature of Middlemarch, where there are several discussions on the sub-
ject. There is little specific reference to this issue in the other novels.
•
 Scapegoating occurs with depressing frequency in most novels: for 
example, Bulstrode and Lydgate; Clennam in relation to the Dorrits; Mrs 
Smith in relation to the Elliots; Anne briefly for refusing Mr Elliot; Mr Har-
ding for taking a principled stand.
•
 Unsurprisingly perhaps, the intermental units that are made up of lovers 
do not function particularly well. As I said when discussing Little Dorrit, this 
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is consistent with the default assumptions contained in the cognitive frame 
for lovers. Difficulties may also be necessary in order to ensure that storylines 
can be sustained over the course of a novel.
•
 In most cases, readers have to be aware of what may be called the socio-
geography of the storyworld. This is most obviously true of the novels that 
are set in market towns such as Middlemarch, Wives and Daughters, and The 
Warden. Sociogeography can ensure that the class structure of a storyworld is 
precisely and vividly delineated. It is necessary to an understanding of Little 
Dorrit to know that the Marshalsea prison, Bleeding Heart Yard, and the 
home of the Barnacles have different sociogeographical locations. Similarly, 
it is important to be aware of the significance of the different country houses 
in Persuasion. The names of such houses are often used as metonymies for 
the upper middle class. One also needs to know about the geopolitical sig-
nificance of Bath in Austen. However, sociogeography is taken to the highest 
level of sophistication in Middlemarch.
•
 I referred in chapter 3 to what I called the intermental rhythm in Middle-
march. The only other novel considered by this study that shares this feature 
is “Narcissus.” For example: “Some thought . . . others disagreed . . . the boat-
swain said  .  .  . many did not understand, others did not care; the majority 
further aft did not believe . . .” et cetera (66).
•
 The ephemeral quality of many of the intermental units in Middlemarch 
is unique; none of the other books have anything like it. The same is true of 
intermental free indirect thought.
•
 By contrast, all of the novels feature intramental functioning that has a 
strong intermental component (in particular in anticipating the thought of 
others). For example: “Even much stronger mortals than Fred Vincy hold 
half their rectitude in the mind of the being they love best.” (Middlemarch, 
167).
•
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 The use of the passive voice for the purpose of constructing large-scale 
intermental thought is quite common. (See the beginning of chapter 3 for 
detailed examples from Middlemarch.)
•
To summarize this summary: for depth, complexity, and subtlety, and despite 
being in a high-quality field made up of truly wonderful novels, Middlemarch 
is in a class of its own.
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T HIS FINAL CHAPTER is divided into four parts. In the first, I com-ment briefly on some of the issues that would arise from a rigorously diachronic approach to the study of social minds in the novel. The 
second part consists of an analysis of the intermental thought to be found 
in Ian McEwan’s novel Enduring Love. In the third section I discuss pos-
sible future developments in the study of social minds in narratives in other 
media. The fourth and final section is, as promised in the first chapter, a 
rhetorical flourish.
A HISTORY OF SOCIAL MINDS
It is an obvious truth that historical periods are necessarily arbitrary. The 
novel form does not, of necessity, change utterly at the beginning of each 
century to suit the classificatory needs of future literary historians. Indeed, it 
is always necessary to complicate and question such easy and neat categories 
as “the nineteenth-century novel.” On the other hand, though, it is possible 
to paint a picture of the history of the English novel that does, as it happens, 
Conclusion 
(Including Enduring Love)
Shared minds create all we know.
—Colwyn Trevarthen
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fit quite neatly into divisions into centuries. There was a change at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, due in the main to the genius of Jane Austen, 
and it is possible to trace a satisfying line of descent from Austen through 
Edgeworth and the Brontës to Dickens and Collins, Gaskell and Eliot, and 
then on to Conrad and James. There was then a very different change at the 
beginning of the twentieth century with the beginnings of the modernist 
movement. Many features of the English novel will not fit comfortably into 
this satisfyingly schematic picture. However, from the externalist perspective 
on social minds with which this book is concerned, the picture is a genuinely 
illuminating one. The novel of this period explores the tensions between the 
internalist and externalist perspectives, between social and private minds, 
in ways that are noticeably different from both the eighteenth-century novel 
and the twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century novel. This is not to say 
that the novels of other periods are not interested in social minds. The dif-
ferences lie in the degree of interest, and the ways in which this aspect of the 
novel is presented and examined.
 The standard story for the historical development of the representation 
of consciousness follows what might be termed the speech category trajectory 
(see chapter 1 for a definition of the term speech category approach). Roughly, 
this begins with the reliance of narratives before Jane Austen on authorial 
thought report. Then, from Austen onwards until, say, Henry James, novels 
are marked by a growing preponderance of free indirect discourse. With the 
modernist novels of the early twentieth century, stream of consciousness and 
interior monologue become the dominant speech category modes. Leaving 
aside any quibbles regarding the accuracy of this history (its possible overes-
timation, perhaps, of the amount and importance of free indirect discourse 
at the expense of thought report), it is an indispensible aid to an under-
standing of the history of the novel. However, if we want a complete picture 
of the historical development of the representation of whole fictional minds, 
then the speech category trajectory has to be supplemented by others such as 
the history of social minds. This narrative might well intersect at a number 
of points with the speech category account. It could be, perhaps, that Jane 
Austen was the first great English novelist of social minds, just as she was the 
first of free indirect discourse. That sounds quite likely to me.
 Given that the history of social minds that I envisage would study all 
of the novelists discussed in this book, as well as many others, as histori-
cally embedded figures, several questions would arise. These might include 
the following: Are the workings of social minds more salient in the novels 
of the authors examined here than in the other authors of the same period 
who are not here for reasons of space? And are they more salient than in 
the novels of earlier and later periods? If the answer to the second question 
is yes, then further questions arise: Was the nineteenth century a privileged 
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moment in which these great writers caught the universal condition that we 
all share and that has since been obscured by assumptions that have limited 
the power of narrative to expose the full extent of this condition? Or, alter-
natively, were social minds a unique characteristic of the nineteenth-century 
British society that was the subject matter of those authors? 
 Kate Summerscale, the author of The Suspicions of Mr Whicher or the 
Murder at Road Hill House, a work of popular history that was a bestseller in 
the UK, suggests that the mid-Victorians were fascinated
by the idea that faces and bodies could be “read”, that the inner life was 
imprinted on the shapes of the features and the flutter of the fingers. Perhaps 
the fascination stemmed from the premium placed on privacy; it was terrify-
ing and thrilling that thoughts were visible, that the inner life, so jealously 
guarded, could be instantly exposed. (2008, 84–85)
Her theory is that these concerns arose out of the intense public interest 
during this period in the ability of detectives, both real and fictional, to read 
suspects’ faces and body language for clues. I am sure that equally plausible 
alternative explanations could be found. Clearly, any attempt to address the 
questions asked in the previous paragraph will have to be a major cultural 
studies research project.
 I think that it may eventually be possible to construct historical argu-
ments along these lines in terms of the relationship between narrative tech-
nique and cultural conceptions of the self. Such scholarship might involve 
a revaluation of Dickens as the novelist who captures perhaps more vividly 
than any other the universal, trans-historical fact that, in cognitive terms, we 
spend almost all of our lives on the surface, on the outside, and who is there-
fore undeserving of the condescension accorded him by advocates of the 
more internalist Henry James. On the other hand, it will also have in mind 
that Jane Austen, George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, and other novelists of the 
period were also acutely attuned to the workings of social minds. I say that 
it may eventually be possible to construct these sorts of arguments because, 
while I think that this sort of perspective will be of great value in aiding our 
understanding of the historical development of the novel, it should only be 
employed once the necessary detailed textual work has been done on the 
operation of social minds in a wide chronological range of novels. Once the 
evidence has been assembled, then such historical patterns will probably 
become apparent. But it would be unwise, in my view, to theorize too widely 
and too soon in advance of the textual evidence.
 The sort of theorizing that I have in mind could be taken in a number of 
different directions, social, historical, and cultural. In this context, The Tragic 
Muse makes an interesting comparison with the other, earlier nineteenth-
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century novels. Like them (in the main and apart from Dickens), it portrays 
a homogenous social group—the leisured upper-middle classes. I mention 
this because being of the same social class seems to be one of the enabling 
factors for the formation of social minds. Others include being of the same 
age; characters liking or loving each other; knowing each other for a long 
time; the absence of solipsistic characteristics, and so on. This is not to say 
that these factors guarantee social minds, only that they make them a little 
more likely. But how then can we explain the reasons for the stark differences 
in perspective between the James novel and the others? The two obvious rea-
sons are that they are written by different people and at different periods of 
time. But how can we know which factor is the more important? Is it the dif-
ference between two aspects of British upper-middle-class society, or simply 
the difference between Dickens, Eliot, and the others and Henry James? That 
is assuming, of course, that the novels discussed in this book are typical of 
their authors, and they may not be; other Henry James novels may be less 
internalist than The Tragic Muse.
 Fictional social minds have many other ideological, gendered, historical, 
and cultural implications that I hope will be explored in the future but cannot 
be addressed here for reasons of space. One single book cannot go in all the 
directions that will, I am sure, have occurred to readers of this book. There 
are many studies of nonverbal communication from a variety of perspec-
tives (anthropological, sociological, sociolinguistic, and so on) that I have 
not referred to. As an illustration of one important future direction, at the 
end of the discussion of Enduring Love in the next section I refer to the need 
for a rhetorical and ethical perspective on analyses of social minds. Also, 
attribution theory can be used to differentiate between the techniques of 
characterization formation and consciousness representation that are char-
acteristic, not just of different historical periods, but also of genres, authors, 
and types of characters. Finally, I will discuss later in this chapter my belief 
that the externalist perspective can fruitfully be applied to narratives in other 
media such as films and graphic novels. However, any comparative study of 
the fictional minds realized by contrasting narrative styles, periods, genres, 
and media should, I propose, pay as much attention to the large number of 
underlying and persistent similarities as to the marked and undeniable dif-
ferences.
 A history of social minds in the novel will, I am sure, show that an 
interest in them did not end with the beginning of the twentieth century. 
This is James Joyce’s characteristically playful take on the subject:
What, reduced to their simplest reciprocal form, were Bloom’s thoughts 
about Stephen’s thoughts about Bloom and about Stephen’s thoughts about 
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Bloom’s thoughts about Stephen?
He knew that he thought that he was a jew whereas he knew that he knew 
that he knew that he was not. (Ulysses, 558)
 Social minds play an important role in another, very different modernist 
novel: Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier. The unreliable narrator of that 
novel appears at first to be describing an intermental unit formed by two 
couples: he and his wife, Florence, and Edward and Leonora Ashburnham. 
He refers in the second sentence of the novel to their “extreme intimacy” (1) 
and later to “the swiftness with which intimacy had grown up between us” 
(40–41). However, he reveals later that, in reality, he knew nothing at all of 
the true nature of the relationships within this foursome (in particular, that 
his wife was having an affair with Ashburnham) until after his wife’s suicide. 
The actual intermental unit comprised the other three, who all shared their 
knowledge of the real state of affairs. When the focus of attention then moves 
onto the relationship between the Ashburnhams and their ward, Nancy, the 
narrator remarks that “that wretched fellow [Ashburnham] knew—by a 
curious instinct that runs between human beings living together—exactly 
what was going on” (217). In the final scene of the novel, the narrator is 
aware that Ashburnham is going to commit suicide but decides not to stop 
him. “When he saw that I did not intend to interfere with him, his eyes 
became soft and almost affectionate” (229; my emphasis). There are social 
minds of a sort in this novel, but, as you would expect of a modernist classic, 
they are partial, fractured, and deeply dysfunctional.
 The twenty-first-century novel has so far been characterized by an 
explicit interest in the workings and, in particular, the malfunctionings 
of characters’ minds. The first half of Ian McEwan’s Atonement is about 
the development of the thirteen-year-old Briony’s theory of mind and 
her growing ability to attribute mental states to others. She frequently 
muses self-consciously on the subject: “Was everyone else really as alive 
as she was? . . . If the answer was yes, then the world, the social world, was 
unbearably complicated, with two billion voices, and everyone’s thoughts 
striving in equal importance and everyone’s claim on life as intense, and 
everyone thinking they were unique, when no one was” (36). Within two 
paragraphs, the text refers to “three points of view” (40), “separate minds” 
(40), “other minds” (40), “different minds” (40), and again to “other minds” 
(40). Unfortunately, though, catastrophe results from a misattribution by 
Briony to Robbie. She thinks that Robbie wants to attack Cecilia when in 
fact he loves her. In contrast to this part of Atonement, which shows how 
Briony’s mind is opening up and acquiring some knowledge of the exis-
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tence of other minds (although what knowledge she has does not prevent 
her from fatally misreading Cecilia’s and Robbie’s minds), in the epilogue, 
many years later, she realizes that, because of her progressive dementia, 
“my brain, my mind, is closing down” (354).
 The modernist novel is characterized by a move away from the heterodi-
egetic narration that is typical of the realist novel and toward an experimental 
and impressionistic emphasis on subjectivity, inner states of consciousness, 
and fragmentary and discontinuous character construction. These sound 
like deeply internalist preoccupations. And my guess is that, when the com-
panion volume to this one comes to be written on the twentieth- and twenty-
first-century novel, the presence of social minds will be found to be much 
patchier than in the nineteenth century. However, David Herman’s chapter 
on the modernist novel in his edited collection The Emergence of Mind illu-
minatingly examines the modernist novel in terms of situated or distributed 
cognition. In any event, it should be stressed that the absence of social minds 
is as significant as their presence. If social minds in twentieth- and twenty-
first-century fiction are fractured, attenuated, or even absent, then that, in 
itself, is an important fact.
 I have maintained throughout this study that both perspectives, the 
internalist and the externalist, are necessary for a full picture of the workings 
of fictional minds in novels. In my view, this is as true of the twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century novel as it is of the nineteenth. The purpose of the dis-
cussion in the following section is to enrich, deepen, and complicate the pic-
ture of social minds that was presented in the earlier chapters on nineteenth-
century canonical novels. I will now jump to the contemporary period in 
order to show that the concerns of the previous chapters are still relevant. 
I do this by giving a single example of a social-minds analysis of a modern 
novel. I have chosen Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love for this purpose. McEwan 
is a good choice because his work reflects an interest in the whole history of 
the novel, even as he works in both modernist and postmodernist ways to 
represent fictional consciousness. As shown above, he is a novelist who has 
a self-conscious interest in fictional minds. The energy of Enduring Love is 
keyed to the subject of intermentality and, in particular, to the attribution 
breakdown within the intermental unit formed by the couple at the heart of 
the novel (Joe and Clarissa). We readers, as interpreters, are drawn into this 
breakdown if we assume, from the beginning, that the relationship between 
Joe and Clarissa will be robust enough to withstand the shock caused by the 
eruption of a mad person into their lives. It may well be that pressures and 
shocks of this sort will be found by a history of fictional social minds to be 
characteristic of the modern novel.
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ENDURING LOVE
The character-narrator of this novel, Joe, is a popular science writer who, 
following a hot-air balloon accident in which a man dies, is stalked by a 
young man, Jed Parry. Jed is in love with Joe and believes that Joe is in love 
with him. Joe comes to understand that Jed is suffering from de Cleram-
bault’s syndrome or erotomania (a real complaint), which causes the suf-
ferer to fall in love with someone who is usually older and of a higher social 
status, and who, sufferers often think, sends them signals of their love, for 
example by drawing their curtains. Sufferers typically stalk their victims and 
often attack them when they are rejected. However, Joe’s partner, Clarissa, 
does not take Jed seriously, is skeptical of Joe’s concerns, and thinks that 
Joe should have handled Jed better. The police are also unhelpful. After an 
unsuccessful attempt on Joe’s life, Jed threatens Clarissa with a knife and Joe 
shoots and wounds him. Jed is then detained in a psychiatric hospital. At 
the end of Joe’s narrative he and Clarissa are separated. The novel ends with 
an academic paper on the case (apparently thought to be genuine by some 
reviewers) which mentions briefly and in passing that Joe and Clarissa are 
later reconciled.
 My purpose in discussing this novel is to examine the nature of the attri-
butions of madness to Jed by Joe and Clarissa, and to show how these attri-
butional differences cause the breakdown of that couple’s intermental unit. 
I conclude the discussion with an analysis of Clarissa’s character—and, in 
particular, the question of whether her behavior is sufficiently motivated or 
not—from a number of different aspects: characterization theory, empathy, 
rhetorical and ethical criticism, and gender studies. It is in this way that I will 
be looking at the process by which attributions (a cognitive term) become 
judgments (an ethical term). Put bluntly, I think McEwan’s treatment of the 
character of Clarissa does not work. This section is, therefore, intended in 
part to show that a social-minds approach can form the basis of aesthetic 
appraisals of texts that bear a greater resemblance to mainstream literary 
criticism than the earlier, rather formalist and descriptive treatments of the 
nineteenth-century novels. (For a persuasive and highly productive dis-
agreement with my position on Clarissa from a rhetorical perspective, see 
James Phelan’s “Cognitive Narratology, Rhetorical Narratology, and Inter-
pretive Disagreement: A Response to Alan Palmer’s Analysis of Enduring 
Love” [2009].)
 I referred in chapter 1 to the debate about whether people regard their 
lives as narratives and whether this is a good thing. Enduring Love contrib-
utes to this debate by repeatedly and explicitly drawing attention to its char-
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acters’ attempts to make sense of and control their experiences by turning 
them into narratives. Four different perspectives on the storyworld of the 
novel are directly presented in the text:
•	 Joe (the bulk of the text consists of his first-person narrative);
•	 Clarissa (one chapter is written by Joe but focalized through her; 
and her letter to Joe is also reproduced within Joe’s narrative);
•	 Jed (two of his letters to Joe are also reproduced); and
•	 the authors of the academic article that follows Joe’s narrative.
These perspectives comprise narratives that, in different ways, account for, 
and try to make sense of, the events that occur in the storyworld. Unsurpris-
ingly, it emerges that life is aspectual. The words narrative and story recur 
continually, and even rather heavy-handedly, as ever-present reminders 
of aspectuality throughout the text. A minor character, Mrs Logan, has 
a “story” (122), “a narrative that only grief, the dementia of pain, could 
devise” (123). Joe asks whether Jed believes “in his private narrative” that 
he was sparing Clarissa’s feelings (144). “It was only when they reached us 
that our story could continue” (173). “I had my story” (196). “I want to 
hear this story at first hand” (224). There are references to the “narrative 
compression of storytelling” (213) and “Lacy’s story” (220). And this is just 
a selection. Given this plethora of stories and narratives, an objective view 
of the aspectual events of the storyworld will not be possible. To reinforce 
the point, the impossibility of such objectivity is referred to twice: “There 
could be no private redemption in objectivity” (181); and, “Besides, there 
isn’t only ever one system of logic” (214). This point becomes particularly 
significant when Joe’s reliability as a narrator of the events in the storyworld 
is called into question. 
 Both Joe and Clarissa obsessively retell the story of the accident. They 
turn it into a narrative. They are shown to be “circling it, stalking it, until we 
had cornered and began to tame it with words” (29). Reinforcing the need to 
“tame” events by means of narrative, Joe says later that, “Over the days and 
weeks, Clarissa and I told our story many times to friends, colleagues and 
relatives” (36). During this period, “our story was gaining in coherence; it 
had shape, and now it was spoken from a place of safety” (36). (Incidentally, 
this process is rather reminiscent of Briony’s narrativizings, her continual 
and self-conscious retellings and reshapings, of the events in Atonement.) 
When describing Jed’s request that they pray together, he tells “the prayer 
story as comedy” (30). The need to narrativize the accident lessens once the 
event has been tamed: “Talking the events over with friends no longer seems 
to help because, she thinks, she has reached a core of senselessness” (80). 
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Joe also likes to narrativize other events. Just before the murder attempt in 
the restaurant, Joe confesses that “I would have liked to tell the story of my 
encounter with Inspector Linley, spice it up a little and squeeze some amuse-
ment from it” (164). His need to narrativize is also apparent after the restau-
rant shooting: “A day or so later it became a temptation to invent or elaborate 
details about the table next to ours, to force memory to deliver what was 
never captured . . . It also became difficult to disentangle what I discovered 
later from what I sensed at the time” (166). So much so that some of the 
details that he gives to the police are later contradicted by others.
 As Joe is a popular science writer, his job consists of narrativizing sci-
ence: “I can spin a decent narrative out of the stumblings, back-trackings 
and random successes that lie behind most scientific breakthroughs” (75). 
But he is ambivalent about his work because he wants to be a “real” scientist 
and occasionally makes unsuccessful attempts to get back into serious sci-
ence. In particular, he feels revulsion at the professional necessity to narra-
tivize his subject: “Narrative—my gut tightened at the word. What balls I had 
written the night before” (56). He feels guilty about his dishonest method-
ology: the use made of a small number of convenient examples together with 
a total disregard for the many other counterexamples. In his science writing, 
as with his urge to spice up and tell as comedy his narratives of the events in 
his life, he is imposing an arbitrary and aspectual framework on the inchoate 
flux of facts and events.
 Because of his occupation, Joe has a tendency to come up with scien-
tific explanations for things. Some of these relate to the question of attribu-
tion. When Joe is waiting at the airport for Clarissa and looking at the other 
people in the crowd, he decides that the expressions on their faces confirm 
“Darwin’s contention that the many expressions of emotion in humans are 
universal, genetically inscribed” (4). Later, there is a long and general scien-
tific discussion on the age-old question of whether we can ascribe behavior 
to nature or nurture (70–77). These discussions form a context for the spe-
cific attributional problems that are caused by madness. The notion of mad-
ness arises from the difficulty in reliably projecting mental states onto others. 
To say that behavior is obsessive, mad, or insane is to admit that it is not 
possible to ascribe reliable motives, reasons, and intentions for actions, and 
so other explanations must be found. When the standard process does not 
work, the default explanation is “he must be mad.” Mad people have unread-
able minds; they do not have social minds. There is a significant emphasis 
in the text on madness as a complete, self-contained, solipsistic world that 
sane people cannot enter: Jed’s “world was emotion, invention and yearning” 
(147); “His was a world determined from the inside, driven by private neces-
sity, and this way it could remain intact . . . He illuminated the world with his 
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feelings, and the world confirmed him at every turn his feelings took” (143). 
“He was inviolable in his solipsism” (144). The scientific paper explains that, 
as a “well-encapsulated delusional system” (238), “erotomania may act as 
a defence against depression and loneliness by creating a full intrapsychic 
world” (239).
 As Joe is initially unable to narrativize Jed’s behavior according to the 
usual rules, he characteristically seeks a scientific explanation. At the first 
mention by Jed of Joe drawing his curtain, it is apparent to Joe that the cur-
tains have an attributional significance for him. “A curtain used as a signal. 
Now I was closer than before. I almost had it” (92). Joe has a faint memory 
of the importance of the signal from the “lover” for de Clerambault sufferers, 
but cannot quite place it at first. Finally he remembers the existence of de 
Clerambault’s syndrome: “The name was like a fanfare, a clear trumpet sound 
recalling me to my own obsessions. There was research to follow through 
now and I knew exactly where to start. A syndrome was a framework of 
prediction and it offered a kind of comfort. I was almost happy . . . It was as if 
I had at last been offered that research post with my old professor” (124; my 
emphasis). He is deeply relieved when he is able to attach a scientific label 
to this disruptive and inexplicable event in his life. He sees Jed’s behavior as 
“a love whose morbidity I was now anxious to research” (127; my emphasis). 
The point is reinforced even more strongly a little later: “Studying Parry with 
reference to a syndrome I could tolerate, even relish, but meeting him yet 
again, in the street, especially now that I had read his first letter, had fright-
ened me” (130; my emphasis). Although “comfort,” “happy,” and “relish” are 
odd words to use in this context, the reader knows why he uses them. He 
feels reassured by his knowledge: “I had read the literature and knew the 
possibilities” (153). He now has some control over the situation. Also, he 
makes it explicit that part of the reason for his frantic scientific study of Jed’s 
madness is to bring him closer to Clarissa again: “What could I learn about 
Parry that would restore me to Clarissa?” (128). And he feels better even 
though the conclusions are not necessarily reassuring in themselves, and do 
not appear to suggest that any such control is going to be possible: “Well over 
a half of all male de Clerambaults in one survey had attempted violence on 
the subjects of their obsessions” (142).
 Having found a coherent narrative that can serve as an explanation for 
Jed’s behavior, it is also important for Joe that, in addition, it be narrativized 
as criminal. Joe stresses that “Parry’s behaviour had to be generalised into 
a crime” (73). However, it is noticeable that this move is always resisted by 
everyone else associated with the case. Clarissa certainly does not see Jed as a 
criminal, and she never takes seriously the possibility that he might become 
violent. Joe’s narrative also differs from the official one. After Joe describes 
Jed’s behavior to a policeman, he is told that it is not possible to establish 
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that what Jed is doing is against the law. The response is that “There’s nothing 
here that’s threatening, abusive or insulting as defined by Section Five of the 
Public Order Act” (157). The aspectual nature of the narrative that Joe has 
constructed for Jed is thereby given additional emphasis.
 Joe’s theoretical or scientific interest in Jed’s mental illness may in part 
explain his dilemma over how to deal with the madman. Joe frequently 
engages with Jed and then immediately experiences a marked desire to 
disengage. Their encounters are characterized by a continual seesawing of 
movement toward him, then withdrawal. “‘What do you want?’ Even as I 
said the words, I wanted them back. I did not want to know what he wanted, 
or rather, I did not want to be told” (59). Sometimes Joe gives in to his unde-
niable feelings of curiosity and also pity. At other times he withdraws and 
refuses to humor him in any way. He agonizes a good deal over this recurring 
pattern. “I was quite interested to know, although I also wanted to get away” 
(64); “I should have walked on, but his intensity held me for the moment 
and I had just sufficient curiosity to echo him” (65); and “I had decided to 
say nothing more to him, but I couldn’t help myself ” (68). Joe’s ambivalence 
has serious consequences for his relationship with Clarissa when she accuses 
him of leading Jed on. Joe links the two issues of scientific curiosity and attri-
butional failure when he says that “When this story was closed it would be 
important to know something about Parry. Otherwise he would remain as 
much a projection of mine as I was of his” (60). There is a laudable awareness 
here of one of the chief pitfalls in the attribution process—the temptation 
to project one’s self into others. This is the concern that Clennam has about 
turning Little Dorrit into a “domesticated fairy.” It could even be argued that 
Joe goes too far in this direction because, when encounters with Jed go badly 
wrong, he seems to imagine himself “accused” of “a failed extension into 
mental space” (128). He appears to feel guilty that he does not realize imme-
diately that Jed is mad. But why? This seems to me to be an overreaction. It 
is surely praiseworthy to be reluctant to attribute madness too quickly.
 Meetings between the two men tend to revolve around the issues of con-
trol and intimacy. Jed remarks, “It’s all about control, isn’t it?” (62). Joe is 
understandably disturbed at the apparent closeness of their relationship. He 
finds himself “talking to a stranger in terms more appropriate to an affair, or 
a marriage on the rocks” (67). To his horror, he thinks, “I’m in a relationship” 
(73). In an oddly intimate form of words, Joe refers to Jed as “my de Cler-
ambault” (207). The use of the possessive when referring to Jed strikes a jar-
ring note. The issues of power, control, and intimacy become an important 
element in the conflicts between Joe and Clarissa when she begins to have 
doubts about Joe’s handling of the situation: “Was I giving her the impres-
sion that I was secretly flattered by Parry’s attention, or that I was uncon-
sciously leading him on, or that without recognising the fact, I was enjoying 
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my power over him, or—perhaps she thought this—my power over her?” 
(102).
 It is hardly surprising that the group of people including Joe and Jed who 
are suddenly thrown together in the hot-air balloon accident at the begin-
ning of the novel do not form an intermental unit. What is more surprising, 
though, is the fact that the narrative explicitly draws attention to the absence 
of intermentality. Joe states, “I should make something clear. There may have 
been a vague communality of purpose, but we were never a team” (10). The 
point is an important one, because he repeats it a few pages later: “But as 
I’ve said, there was no team, there was no plan, no agreement to be broken” 
(14). Nevertheless, the academic article that follows Joe’s narrative specu-
lates that Jed’s participation in this loose social unit, however fleeting and 
ephemeral it may have been, has a profound psychological effect on him. The 
authors suggest that “Such a transformation, from a ‘socially empty’ life to 
intense team-work may have been the dominating factor in precipitating the 
[de Clerambault’s] syndrome” (239; my emphasis). The article is proposing 
that Jed’s participation in what he thinks is an intermental unit (although Joe 
does not agree and it is doubtful whether any of the other participants would 
either) is the proximate cause of his descent into madness. Whether or not 
this is a plausible theory in this specific case, it is a telling acknowledgment 
of the power and importance of intermental units.
 At the start of the novel, Joe and Clarissa form a fairly well-functioning 
unit. Initially, their attributions of states of mind to the other appear to be 
accurate and successful. There was nothing, Joe says, until the Jed affair, 
that “threatened our free and intimate existence” (8). However, as with most 
relationships, there are some fine, potential fault lines. One is Joe’s desire 
to become a real scientist again. Clarissa finds Joe’s occasional unsuccessful 
attempts to do so rather upsetting because they are doomed to failure and 
they disturb the equilibrium of their relationship. Another is Clarissa’s 
inability to have children. Both of them would like to have a family. When 
these fault lines crack wide open on the impact of the invasion into their lives 
of a madman, then their relationship ceases to be intermental. The reason for 
the split is that they attribute different states of mind to Jed. They narrativize 
him intramentally. They never achieve a stable consensus on this issue. Joe’s 
attributions, as we have seen, construct a double cognitive narrative for Jed 
as a threatening, dangerous, potentially violent madman. Clarissa initially 
denies that Jed is mad at all. She narrativizes him as a joke, implies that Joe 
is unreliable in his accounts of Jed’s behavior, and trivializes the matter as a 
nuisance. Then, once she does accept the reality, she sees him as capable of 
being, in effect, tamed and domesticated. She also alleges that, in any event, 
it is all Joe’s fault (56–58).
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 Clarissa’s views on Jed, are, on the whole, focalized through Joe. To put 
the point another way, Joe is exercising his theory of mind on what Clarissa 
thinks of Jed. Clarissa is only able to speak for herself directly when she 
writes her letter to Joe, but this letter is placed near the end of Joe’s narra-
tive. Joe refers frequently to what he thinks (reliably, in my view) is Clarissa’s 
view of Jed, and tries hard to be convinced by it: “Clarissa was right, he was a 
harmless fellow with a strange notion, a nuisance at most, hardly the threat I 
had made him out to be” (61). While in general Joe sees Jed as dangerous, he 
is constantly aware that Clarissa regards him as harmless and he pays careful 
attention to her views. “Then he [Jed] represented the unknown, into which 
I projected all kinds of inarticulate terrors. Now I considered him to be a 
confused and eccentric young man who couldn’t look me in the eye, whose 
inadequacies and emotional cravings rendered him harmless. He was a 
pathetic figure, not a threat after all, but an annoyance, one that might frame 
itself, just as Clarissa had said, into an amusing story” (69; my emphasis). 
Later, Jed’s first letter to Joe appears to Clarissa to be “such an unfaked nar-
rative of emotion” (101; my emphasis) that she is convinced that it is Joe who 
is at fault. However, despite Joe’s attempt to reconcile the two narratives, 
they soon diverge. Trying on Clarissa’s attributions does not work for Joe for 
long. In the next passage, written by Joe but focalized through Clarissa, the 
note of skepticism is unmistakable: “She thinks she understands Parry well 
enough. A lonely inadequate man, a Jesus freak who is probably living off his 
parents, and dying to connect with someone, anyone, even Joe” (81). She has 
constructed a detailed life story for Jed that is fairly accurate, but what she 
leaves out is his potential for violence.
 Joe’s awareness of Clarissa’s ambivalence about Jed’s madness is well 
caught in this passage: “She seemed to agree with me that he was mad and 
that I was right to feel harassed. ‘Seemed’ because she was not quite whole-
hearted, and if she said I was right—and I thought she did—she never 
really acknowledged that she had been wrong. I sensed she was keeping her 
options open, though she denied it when I asked her” (100). The reliable 
mind reading on which any successful intermental unit is based is under 
threat here. It has become dangerously intermittent. Joe knows that some-
thing is not quite right, but he is simply not sure of the extent to which 
Clarissa’s views on Jed diverge from his own. In particular, he is not sure 
what Clarissa’s “options” might be. Perhaps the divergence with the greatest 
impact on their relationship is Clarissa’s insistence on holding Joe respon-
sible, at least in part, for Jed’s obsession. Joe thinks that Clarissa is fooled by 
Jed’s “artful technique of suggesting a past, a pact, a collusion, a secret life of 
glances and gestures” (100). In other words, Jed has constructed a (nonexis-
tent) narrative that Clarissa finds plausible. Multiple levels of theory of mind 
192 | Chapter 6
result: Joe thinks that Clarissa believes that Jed knows that Joe loves him too. 
In a key statement in her letter near the end of the novel, Clarissa writes to 
Joe, “I accept that Parry is mad in ways I could never have guessed at. All the 
same, I can understand how he might have formed the impression that you 
were leading him on” (218). This is in part because “You went your own way, 
you denied him everything, and that allowed his fantasies, and ultimately his 
hatred, to flourish” (218). These first-person views show that Joe was right 
all along to think that Clarissa had strong reservations about his handling of 
the affair. Both these statements put a good deal of the blame for the harm 
caused by Jed’s actions on Joe. What is noticeable about them is how intol-
erant they are of Joe’s perceived shortcomings. Clarissa certainly cuts Joe no 
slack whatsoever. I will come back to this point later.
 As a result of these intramental divergences, the unit is put under great 
pressure. The two individuals start to separate. They both acknowledge that 
it is Jed who has caused the divide. Joe says of the period before he invaded 
their lives, “Now I could not quite imagine a route back into that innocence” 
(127). Understandably, he is reluctant to talk to Clarissa about Jed: “Another 
reason for not talking now of our problem was that we would be bound to 
let Parry into our bedroom” (145). Clarissa also knows that they are drifting 
apart: “She remembers too that they love each other and happen to be in 
very different mental universes now, with very different needs” (82). How-
ever, intermentality is still a factor in their relationship. During their row, 
she realizes that, despite her best efforts, “She has let herself be drawn into 
Joe’s mental state, his problems, his dilemmas, his needs” (85). Nevertheless, 
Joe refers to “the fine crack of estrangement that had appeared between Cla-
rissa and me” (99). Their attributions of states of mind to each other become 
judgmental and confrontational. In Joe’s words, “We were hardly at war, 
but everything between us was stalled  .  .  . To her I was manic, perversely 
obsessed, and, worst of all, the thieving invader of her private space. As far 
as I was concerned she was disloyal, unsupportive in this time of crisis, and 
irrationally suspicious” (139).
 Any attempts at communication are inconclusive because they have less 
knowledge of the other’s mind than they used to: Joe “felt that we had been 
denied a conclusion . . . I thought that there remained between us an unar-
ticulated dispute, though I wasn’t certain what it was” (101). Joe’s illicit and 
totally unjustified reading of Clarissa’s letters seems to her to be “a state-
ment, a message, from you to me, it’s a signal. The trouble is, I don’t know 
what it means” (132). Clarissa tells Joe that a “stranger invaded our lives, 
and the first thing that happened was that you became a stranger to me” 
(218). However, it is noticeable from these statements that some vestigial 
traces of intermental thought remain, even though the gaps between them 
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widen. They know what they do not know. In Donald Rumsfeld’s phrase, 
these are known unknowns. What would be even worse, I suppose, would 
be unknown unknowns: not knowing that they do not know what the other 
is thinking, and assuming that everything is still fine when it is not. Given 
these pressures, it is inevitable that, toward the end, they drift apart. Joe refers 
to the “speed with which this mate, this familiar, was transforming herself 
into a separate person” (221). He talks slightingly of her letter: “I disliked its 
wounded, self-righteous tone, its clammy emotional logic, its knowingness 
that hid behind a highly selective memory” (222). As far as both of them are 
concerned, “The matter of our differences was unbroachable” (223). (How-
ever, as stated in a brief aside in the academic paper, they are eventually 
reconciled and adopt children.)
 A powerful irony operating in the novel is the fact that, when the per-
fectly sane Joe is faced by the mad Jed, both Clarissa and even Joe himself 
develop doubts about Joe’s own sanity. At one point Joe feels like a “mental 
patient at the end of visiting hours. Don’t leave me here with my mind, I 
thought” (58). Clarissa feeds these fears. In the chapter in which Joe specu-
lates about what Clarissa thinks about how his mind is working, he writes 
(from her point of view): “The trouble with Joe’s precise and careful mind is 
that it takes no account of its own emotional field. He seems unaware that 
his arguments are no more than ravings, they are an aberration and they have 
a cause” (83; my emphasis). Clarissa is wondering hard about Joe’s mental 
health: “Perhaps Parry, or the Parry as described by Joe, does not exist.” 
During their row, she says, “You were so intense about him as soon as you 
met him. It’s like you invented him” (86). “You ought to be asking yourself 
which way this fixation runs” (86). During another exchange, she exclaims, 
“I’m talking about your mind.” When Joe replies, “There’s nothing wrong 
with my mind,” she responds, “Don’t you realise you’ve got a problem” (148). 
Joe decides that “Now it was settled in her mind I was unhinged” (150). “Cla-
rissa thought that her emotions were the appropriate guide, that she could 
feel her way to the truth, when what was needed was information, foresight 
and careful calculation. It was therefore natural, though disastrous for us 
both, that she should think I was mad” (150). That “therefore” is surely a 
stretch. Why should Clarissa relying on her emotions and feeling her way to 
the truth necessarily cause her to think that he is mad?
 His alleged mania is linked to his growing sense of loneliness. Because 
the intermental unit has been broken and Clarissa has doubts about Joe’s 
sanity, he is alone: “We continued to live side by side, but I knew that I was 
on my own” (149). “Clarissa thought I was mad, the police thought I was a 
fool, and one thing was clear: the task of getting us back to where we were 
was going to be mine alone” (161). “I was on my own” (175). “I felt my iso-
194 | Chapter 6
lation and vulnerability” (177). This isolation is self-reinforcing. The more 
alone he feels, the more Clarissa feels it too: “Your being right is not a simple 
matter  .  .  . Shoulder to shoulder? You went it alone, Joe” (216). “You were 
manic, and driven, and very lonely” (217). These discussions about Joe’s 
sanity and the emphasis on his aloneness will reinforce any doubts about the 
reliability of Joe’s narration.
 Enduring Love is an instructive lesson in the aspectuality of narrative 
and of life generally. It turns out that Joe was right all along to think that 
Jed was a dangerous madman and that Clarissa was wrong not to take Joe’s 
views seriously. He was a reliable narrator. Clarissa does not know at the time 
that Joe is right. Fair enough—we all make mistakes. But for me, the issue 
is not Clarissa being wrong. It is whether she should believe in Joe more at 
the time and trust in him more than she does. From her aspectual view of 
the storyworld, what she undeniably does know is that they have a loving, 
trusting relationship and that he is intelligent and reliable. So why does she 
not believe him? Why does she not accept his narrative and, instead, create 
one of her own? Why does she not accept his attributions to Jed and replace 
them with hers? What evidence (what T. S. Eliot called the “objective correla-
tive”) is there that this character, Clarissa, would behave in this way? What 
would justify such a breach of faith by such an intelligent person within such 
a trusting relationship? How likely is it that this character, Clarissa, would 
think that this character, Joe, would wish to lead Jed on or even make it 
all up? How likely is it that she would be so unyieldingly critical of him? 
Why did she not make allowances for the fact that he is being stalked by a 
madman? Putting the question even more tendentiously: Is Clarissa’s why-
didn’t-you-just-invite-this-homicidal-maniac-in-for-a-cup-of-tea? strategy 
meant to sound as utterly stupid, inadequate, and pathetic as it does to me?
 This discussion of Clarissa’s behavior, and in particular the talk of evi-
dence for the workings of characters’ minds, raises interesting questions 
about characterization. The evidence that I have been discussing comprises 
the data that readers slot into the cognitive characterization frame that they 
create for the Clarissa character. My frame is as follows: a highly intelligent, 
sensitive, self-aware, and conscientious person who loves her partner, tries 
hard to behave well, and has a considerable degree of insight into herself, 
other people, and the mechanics of relationships generally. So, can I account, 
within this frame, for a person who would immediately be so utterly dis-
trustful of the man that she loves that she instantly jumps to the conclusion 
that he is making things up? Would not the character that I have created give 
him some considerable benefit of the doubt? So, what happens next? Should 
another frame be created? But I am not sure what that other frame would be, 
given that it would contain data that, to me, seems inconsistent with what is 
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already there. So perhaps we simply say that this is a characteristic of the text 
of this novel that we should simply accept. OK, people are inconsistent, they 
are complex. We’re not robots. But even though I know this to be true, why 
do I find it unsatisfying as an answer in this case?
 In order to explore this question further, I will summarize Clarissa’s 
criticisms of Joe as follows:
 (1)  Joe may be making it all up.
 (2)  Joe is guilty of leading Jed on.
 (3)  Joe does not show sufficient empathy for Jed: if Joe had invited 
  him into the house he may not have become violent.
 (4)  Joe cuts himself off emotionally from Clarissa and goes his 
  own way.
 (5)  Joe reads her letters.
The last point is easily dealt with. He is wrong to read her letters. This is 
something that Joe should not have done. It was a morally indefensible 
act. However, her lack of trust in him had begun before then. The other 
criticisms deserve closer examination. (1), (2), and (3) appear to be con-
tradictory. If he is making it up, then the possibilities of leading Jed on and 
not dealing with him properly do not arise. (2) and (3) are equally at odds. 
Surely, showing more empathy and inviting him into the house would be 
the clearest possible case of leading him on. As for the substance of (2), Joe 
is certainly ambivalent about how best to deal with Jed, but whether he can 
then be said to be “leading him on” seems to me to be debatable. With regard 
to Joe going off on his own (4), this looks like a chicken-and-egg situation 
in which, if Clarissa had been more supportive, Joe would not have felt the 
need to go it alone.
 It is sometimes said that the relations between men and women are 
made difficult by the fact that they are governed by two completely dif-
ferent impulses: men by shame and women by fear. The typical dynamics of 
arguments between men and women can, it is argued, be explained in these 
terms. This view might be applied to this case by suggesting that Joe feels 
shame at the growing closeness and intimacy of his relationship with Jed, 
and Clarissa feels fearful that Joe is drifting away from her and she is losing 
the person she loves. “It’s always been a fear that she’ll live with someone 
who goes crazy. That’s why she chose rational Joe” (83). In addition, there 
are the underlying tensions in the relationship that I referred to earlier: Joe 
wanting to go back into real science while Clarissa knows that he has left it 
too late; and Clarissa’s inability to have children. Perhaps these latent con-
flicts can explain Clarissa’s behavior, especially if she perceives Joe as irre-
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sponsibly attempting to avoid the problems in their relationship by throwing 
himself into the research into Jed’s condition?
 It may help at this point to focus on one particular event: Jed’s first 
phone call. Joe errs in not telling Clarissa about it at the time and waiting 
for a day or two before he mentions it. “It may have been exhaustion, or 
perhaps my concealment was protective of her, but I know I made my 
first serious mistake” (37). He also explains the delay by saying that it was 
because he could not cope with it at that time so soon after the balloon 
accident and he did not want to disrupt the intermental equilibrium that 
they had only just managed to recover following this accident. (“Would it 
have been right then . . . to intrude upon our happiness with an account of 
Parry’s phone call?” [53].) Let us look at this issue first in terms of empathy. 
(See Suzanne Keen’s Empathy and the Novel [2007] for an extended treat-
ment of this topic.) If I were to put myself into Clarissa’s position, I would 
find Joe’s explanation satisfactory. I suppose this is because I do that sort of 
thing myself. I sometimes wait before I tell someone something because I 
need time to process it myself first. But it seems to me that this is not what 
empathy is: it is not me trying to imagine being myself in that position; it 
is me trying to imagine being Clarissa in that position. And to do that, we 
have to ask: What caused her to behave in the way that she did? In other 
words, the reader must attribute reasons, causes, motives, and intentions to 
her actions, bringing us back, once again, to the question of evidence. So we 
need to return once more to attribution theory.
 Our well-researched tendency to overvalue the reasons for actions that 
focus on the individual (“he did that because he’s that kind of person”) and 
undervalue those that focus on the context (“he did that because that’s what 
everybody tends to do in that kind of situation”) is referred to by psycholo-
gists as the fundamental attribution error. Within this attributional frame-
work, it is possible to see Joe’s decision not to report the call in situational 
or contextual terms. That is, “Well, anyone in his situation—tired, stressed, 
wanting a little respite—would have done the same.” It is equally plausible, 
though, to see the decision as an example of a dispositional fallibility: his 
need to control the narrative. The combination of Joe’s personality flaw and 
Clarissa’s understandable fear of loss of intimacy might form the beginnings 
of an ethical justification of her behavior. But is it enough to set against the 
contrary case? Is not her distrust a distinct overreaction both to her fear 
of Joe drifting away and to Joe’s apparent faults? After all, there are worse 
things in life than being rather controlling. In any event, how much of a 
control freak is Joe? Agreed, his disposition is to use narrative as a control-
ling device, but don’t we all? He may have an ambivalent attitude toward Jed 
because he is curious about the syndrome, but this hardly seems to me to 
amount to an illegitimate exercise in power and control. And the careful and 
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respectful attention that he pays to Clarissa’s initial views on Jed is anything 
but controlling.
 At this point I have to confess that, when I read this novel for the first 
time, and again when I was studying it for the purpose of writing this chapter, 
I found myself getting angry with Clarissa. This is shaming to admit, but true 
nevertheless. I thought to myself, How dare she distrust and undermine Joe 
and leave him, a man alone, to face this homicidal maniac! Why was she not 
by his side? (My reaction, as you can see, had a rather “High Noon” flavor.) 
On the other hand, I have been equally conscious of a parallel, contradictory 
response: this is to doubt that Clarissa’s behavior is sufficiently motivated by 
McEwan the novelist. I have discussed some of the possible reasons for her 
behavior—her fear of losing the man she loves, her concern over Joe’s desire 
to be a serious scientist, her pain at not being able to have children with 
Joe. Nevertheless, I personally am not convinced by them. For me, they do 
not fully explain her behavior cognitively (as well as not justifying it ethi-
cally). These instabilities do not seem to me to constitute sufficient causes 
for the dramatic widening of the hairline cracks in their relationship under 
the impact of Jed’s madness. And, in particular, I simply do not see what 
evidence Clarissa has for thinking that it may be Joe who is the madman. So, 
if I cannot find the evidence to explain or justify Clarissa’s behavior, then it 
seems to me that the choices are these:
•	 I am an incompetent reader;
•	 McEwan is an incompetent author; or
•	 Clarissa is an unethical character.
 In other words, the evidence is in the text but I cannot see it, so I am 
incompetent. Or the evidence is not there and this lack is unintended. This is 
therefore an aesthetic fault in McEwan the novelist and so he is incompetent. 
Or the evidence is not there, this is intended, and it therefore shows that Cla-
rissa behaves in an unethical way. She is unjustified in behaving as she does. 
The question to ask can be simply put: Does Joe do enough wrong? On bal-
ance, I would say: no. A more nuanced question is this one: Does McEwan 
miscalculate in trying to set up a context within which Clarissa’s mistrust of 
Joe can be understood and even forgiven? I would say: yes.
 I wish to end this discussion with a tentative speculation that will take 
what is already a wide-ranging discussion into the area of gender studies. It 
is that I suspect that there may be a gender divide in readers over Clarissa’s 
behavior. That is, I suspect that women readers may tend to sympathize with 
Clarissa’s concern over what she perceives to be Joe’s erratic behavior and 
her fear of losing him, while men may be more likely to identify with Joe and 
his anger at what he perceives to be Clarissa’s disloyalty. The aspectual view 
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of the novel’s storyworld adopted by most women readers may have more 
in common with Clarissa’s perspective than Joe’s, and vice versa for male 
readers. This hypothesis might benefit from some empirical investigation.
SOCIAL MINDS IN OTHER MEDIA
Narratology studies the nature, form, and functioning of all narratives irre-
spective of their mode or medium of representation. Indeed, many narrato-
logical concepts are particularly suited to multimodal analysis (Ryan 2004). 
As is well known, the story of Cinderella can be told in any number of dif-
ferent discourses or media (a short story, a film, a play, a ballet, a cartoon) 
and still remain the same story. In considering whether the study of social 
minds is applicable to narratives in other media, I conclude that it is surpris-
ingly adaptable and is just as revealing about fictional minds across a range 
of media as it is about written texts. I say that the approach is surprisingly 
adaptable because it was built specifically for written narratives and, before 
I undertook this exercise, I expected it to be geared far more specifically to 
novels than in fact it is. In particular, I think that the sort of approach to 
narrative outlined in this book is well suited to graphic novels and related 
narrative forms. In his article “Presenting Minds in Graphic Narratives” 
(2008), Kai Mikkonen argues that the medium of graphic novels “stimu-
lates the viewer’s engagement with the minds of characters by recourse to a 
wide range of verbal modes of narration in a dynamic relation with images 
that show minds in action” (2008, 302). Mikkonen is extremely successful in 
exploring the nature of that relation. In addition, it strikes me that a social-
minds perspective would work really well in film studies. I will now briefly 
indicate what such a study might look like by commenting on two scenes in 
The Godfather Part I and a scene from The Usual Suspects.
 In The Godfather Part I, Sollozzo, “the Turk,” while putting a business 
proposition to Don Corleone and his associates, mentions that the rival 
Tattaglia family will be able to guarantee security. The Don’s son, Sonny, 
starts to object to the implicit slight to the Corleone family, but the Don stops 
him with a motion of his hand. (After the meeting, the Don tells him, don’t 
ever again tell anyone outside the family what you’re thinking.) Following 
the gesture, there are three split-second close-ups showing the reactions of 
Sollozzo and two others, Tom Hagen and Clemenza. These lightning-quick 
shots show in an instant that all three understand perfectly what has just 
happened: the insiders Hagen and Clemenza know that the outsider Sol-
lozzo knows that Sonny has been humiliated and shown to be an unreliable 
hothead who is unsuitable to become the eventual head of the family, and 
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that the Don has been forced to acknowledge this weakness publicly; Hagen 
and Clemenza are embarrassed by their knowledge; Sollozzo is wondering 
what use he can make of such knowledge, and so on. And the viewer learns 
about this substantial amount of mental functioning from a section of the 
film that lasts about a second.
 Later in the same film, another son, Michael, is standing at the entrance 
to the deserted hospital where his seriously ill father is recovering from an 
assassination attempt. Michael is with a young baker who happened to be 
visiting at the same time. Although both are unarmed, they successfully pre-
tend to be gunmen and so the car containing the men who have come to kill 
the Don drives past. Once the crisis is over, the baker is unable to light his 
cigarette because his hand is shaking so violently. Michael lights the cigarette 
with a perfectly steady hand and then pauses for a second, looking with sur-
prise and interest at the steadiness of his hand. The self-attributional process 
in this case involves the sort of external physical evidence relating to body 
language that is usually thought to be characteristic of third-person attribu-
tion. Michael is taking the advice offered by the psychologist Timothy Wilson 
in chapter 2 and is deducing the nature of his hidden mind by looking out-
ward at his behavior. He has just discovered something about himself from 
observing his own body, and this discovery is of great teleological importance 
to the narrative (he knows now that he has the courage to become the leader 
of the family). And again, the shot lasts little more than a second.
 My other film example is included here in order to illustrate how post-
modern and unnatural narratives can complicate, disrupt, and subvert the 
creation and maintenance of social minds in a fictional storyworld. In the 
famous climax to The Usual Suspects it is revealed that the confession being 
given in a police station by Verbal Kint, an apparent loser, was untrue in 
many respects and that he is, in fact, the master criminal Keyser Söze. His 
interrogator discovers this by seeing that many of the details of Verbal’s story 
were taken from the office notice board. As much of the film consists of flash-
backs illustrating Verbal’s story, viewers find themselves in a similar position 
to readers of Atonement. As an apparently authoritative world-creating nar-
rative has been revealed to be unreliable, how then do we know what really 
happened?
 Let us approach the question systematically. Some of the film is authori-
tative because it is independent of Verbal’s narrative, in particular the inves-
tigation into the shootout on the ship. Of the content of his story, some of 
the detail is unimportant—his singing in a barbershop quartet and going 
to Guatemala. Of the rest, two of the characters in the story are revealed to 
have made-up names inspired by objects in the police station: Kobayashi and 
Redfoot. Interestingly, though, we see “Kobayashi” drive Verbal/Söze away 
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from the police station, so, even though his name cannot be “Kobayashi,” we 
do at least know that he exists within the whole film storyworld. But what 
about Redfoot? Does this character exist at all in the film storyworld? Are the 
scenes that feature him pure fantasy? Or does he exist under another name? 
We do not know. Also, the gang, the usual suspects of the title, must exist in 
the storyworld because the police investigators refer to them. But we do not 
know about the conversations between them that Verbal describes, or about 
the power relations between them. Most importantly, was Keaton really the 
leader of the gang, as Verbal portrays him? So, the fictional minds presented 
in the film have been radically destabilized. We do not know whether some 
of these minds existed at all (Redfoot), and we do not know whether others 
operated in the way that the film shows (Keaton). Oddly, these ontological 
and epistemological uncertainties tend to be forgotten when, for example, 
Keaton’s characterization is being discussed by film critics. Can we say with 
any certainty where Keaton’s identity is situated, when nearly all of what 
we know about him is told to us by a proven liar? For the same reason, we 
cannot know the extent to which the gang of usual suspects ever became a 
social mind.
 Another area in which I believe this sort of cognitive analysis would 
have rewarding results is in the study of narratives about real minds: history, 
biography, and autobiography. Once you are alerted to the internalist/exter-
nalist divide, surprisingly explicit references to it crop up in the most unex-
pected places. The British politician Leo Amery said of the prime ministers 
David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill: “LG was purely external and 
receptive, the result of intercourse with his fellow men, and non-existent in 
their absence, while Winston is literary and expressive of himself with hardly 
any contact with other minds” (Times Literary Supplement, page 14, 25 Sep-
tember 2009). It is significant that the so-called group biography is currently 
becoming fashionable. These books are based on the premise that it can be 
at least as informative to write biographies of groups as of individuals. The 
author Richard Holmes made his name by writing conventional biographies 
of Shelley and Coleridge, but his book The Age of Wonder (2008), which won 
the 2009 Samuel Johnson Prize, is a group biography that examines the life 
and work both of the scientists of the Romantic age who laid the foundations 
of modern science and of the Romantic poets who responded to the new sci-
ence.
 My final example of internalist and externalist perspectives in media or 
genres other than fiction is pure self-indulgence. It is simply an excuse to 
refer to my first love: American popular music such as blues, jazz, country 
and western, soul, and gospel music. Consider the highly contrasting world-
views of two famous country gospel songs. First, the opening verse of a beau-
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tiful song made famous by the Carter Family called “Lonesome Valley”:
You’ve got to walk that lonesome valley
You’ve got to walk it by yourself
Ain’t nobody here can walk it for you
You’ve got to walk it by yourself
This is internalism taken to a chillingly Beckettian conclusion. By contrast, 
enjoy the thrillingly externalist chorus of an equally wonderful, and rather 
more typical, gospel song called “Farther Along”:
Farther along we’ll know all about it
Farther along we’ll understand why
Cheer up my brother and walk in the sunshine
We’ll understand it all by and by
CONCLUSION
In his foreword to a book titled The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersub-
jectivity (2008), from which the motto for this chapter was taken, Colwyn 
Trevarthen asserts that “human life and culture is incomprehensible without 
intersubjective processes” (2008, vii). His conclusion is that “We need a sci-
ence of the imaginative fictions persons so easily share” (2008, vii). Trevar-
then is actually talking about the real-mind sciences. To take his reference 
to “fictions” more literally, it could be argued that we already have a “science 
of imaginative fiction”: it is called narratology. The purpose of this book has 
been to attempt to add the last four words of his statement to the existing 
science.
 When a phenomenon is identified that does not fit within a well-estab-
lished paradigm, an anomaly is created. And, as Thomas Kuhn explained in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, that is, with the rec-
ognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expec-
tations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less 
extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the 
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the 
expected. (1996, 52–53)
The widespread and pervasive existence of fictional social minds and inter-
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mental thought constitutes an anomaly within the traditional narratological 
paradigm for the presentation of consciousness in the novel. The proof is the 
invisibility of intermental thought within the current theory. However, fol-
lowing a more or less extended exploration of this area and of all of the other 
aspects of the whole of the social mind in action, the paradigm theory can be 
adjusted to take full account of their importance. Social minds in the novel 
will then be anomalous no longer; they will be expected.
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